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hope that your journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
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Abstract
Increasingly, people turn to the Internet for access to services, which often require
disclosure of a signicant amount of personal data. Networked technologies have
enabled an explosive growth in the collection, storage and processing of personal
information with notable commercial potential. However, there are asymmetries in
relation to how people are able to control their own information when handled by
enterprises. This raises signicant privacy concerns and increases the risk of privacy
breaches, thus creating an imperative need for mechanisms oering information
control functionalities.
To address the lack of controls in online environments, this thesis focuses on
consent and revocation mechanisms to introduce a novel approach for controlling
the collection, usage and dissemination of personal data and managing privacy ex-
pectations. Drawing on an extensive multidisciplinary review on privacy and on
empirical data from focus groups, this research presents a mathematical logic as the
foundation for the management of consent and revocation controls in technological
systems.
More specically, this work proposes a comprehensive conceptual model for con-
sent and revocation and introduces the notion of 'informed revocation'. Based on
this model, a Hoare-style logic is developed to capture the eects of expressing indi-
viduals' consent and revocation preferences. The logic is designed to support certain
desirable properties, dened as healthiness conditions. Proofs that these conditions
hold are provided with the use of Maude software. This mathematical logic is
then veried in three real-world case study applications with dierent consent and
revocation requirements for the management of employee data in a business envi-
ronment, medical data in a biobank and identity assurance in government services.
The results conrm the richness and the expressiveness of the logic. In addition, a
novel testing strategy underpinned by this logic is presented. This strategy is able
to generate testing suites for systems oering consent and revocation controls, such
as the EnCoRe system, where testing was carried out successfully and resulted in
identifying faults in the EnCoRe implementation.
Keywords: Privacy, Consent, Revocation, Formal Methods, Hoare Logic, Testing
Strategy
v
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
There have been inventions in the history of mankind that changed the way people
communicate, causing such an impact on societal norms that the world became
a dierent place. For example, the printing press in the 15th century ended the
monopoly of Church to knowledge and its control on the ideas that were published
in the Western world. The printing press expanded the ow of information to new
audiences, giving them the opportunity to be educated and to freely publish their
thoughts and ideas. In contemporary times, the Internet has altered our society's
function since most of the economic, professional and social aspects of our lives now
hugely depend on networked technologies.
Individuals use the Internet to acquire access to products, services and benets,
to articulate their political or religious beliefs, to form their social relationships or
operate their businesses. Technological innovations oer opportunities to enterprises
for novel and agile business models and ever-growing capabilities to collect, store,
process and share huge quantities of personal data in cyberspace. As Francis Maude
noted in a speech at the Information Commissioner's Conference on 6 March 2012,
\cyberspace has become a vast storehouse for human knowledge" since there is an
abundance of data and sophisticated tools to analyse this data [96].
However, the use of online applications comes with compromise. Data subjects,
a term that in this thesis will be used to describe individuals whose data is han-
dled by others, when disclosing personal data on the Internet they practically lose
any control over how this data is handled. For example, information uploaded by
users on social-networking sites is often analysed and sold to enterprises, and users
are categorized in proles according to their demographic data and commercial
preferences. Mechanisms to enable users to control these actions are missing and
companies are reluctant to implement a system that manages controls and miti-
1
1. Introduction 2
gates the risk associated with the absence of such controls, for example, allow data
subjects to remove or modify personal data held. This lack of controls may hinder
data subjects from trusting data controllers, a term dened in this thesis to include
all the parties handling and processing personal data. When the data controllers
oer their services on cyberspace, the lack of controls raises concerns regarding data
subjects' privacy protection.
That these concerns are based on solid ground is illustrated by the increasing
number of incidents where data has been lost, mistreated, or shared without author-
ity [1], making the use of privacy-enhancing technologies essential for every Internet
user. For example, in 2005 Sony BMG's anti-piracy measure resulted in vulnerabil-
ities and loss of personal data, forcing the company to pay $150 to its customers in
Texas [1]. Since 2007, Google has been facing privacy complaints due to the Street
View application resulting in a ne of $142,000 by the French government [1], while
on 2010, Facebook's most popular applications confessed to sharing users' personal
data with advertising companies [1].
The absence of a system able to manage mechanisms to control personal data
in online environments does not only raise concerns for data subjects but imposes
consequences for data controllers as well. Enterprises have often been reluctant to
design and implement such mechanisms due to the nancial cost and the constraints
that these would impose on enterprise data-handling practices. But with the new
EU Privacy and Communications Directive [80] it is estimated that unless businesses
implement a mechanism to obtain and manage explicit consent for websites, they
could lose up to ten billion pounds [88].
In the recent years, voices acknowledging the need to consider privacy principles
when personal information is used by data controllers are increasing and privacy
advocates, governments and consumers require companies \to cater for privacy con-
cerns" [124]. Technological developments and the use of the Internet have crafted
current business practices to treat personal data as a commodity, without providing
any sense of control to the data subjects. However, the importance of information
privacy is challenging researchers from dierent disciplines to propose new infor-
mation systems that will shift business norms towards privacy-friendly practices.
According to Rule, today, information is indenitely stored, and there is no con-
trol regarding the future handling of the data or the context in which it is shared
further [223].
There are limited references to control mechanisms in the literature on privacy.
Privacy controls have only recently been introduced in large-scale information sys-
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tems, and the use of privacy-impact statements is still a maturing discipline. Social-
networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, include embedded mechanisms to
capture users' preferences regarding their consent, which oers some semblance of
control, while governmental directives require from companies to clearly state the
use of cookies in their websites[129].
However, whilst users may consent explicitly to the sharing, storing and pro-
cessing of data on such sites, they cannot as easily revoke (permissions to hold or
process) data they may already have disclosed. This means that, in most cases, it
is not possible for users to change their privacy preferences in a transparent way;
without an explicit revocation capability users cannot have clear and unambiguous
controls to protect data privacy. Unfortunately, there is a general lack of revo-
cation controls in social-networking, e-commerce or indeed almost any cyberspace
applications.
An eective system that manages control of data must provide mechanisms
enabling the data subjects to truly decide and understand in what they give consent
to and allow them to change their mind in the future [96]. The need for such a system
is also acknowledged by the White House, in an attempt to protect consumers'
privacy and boost innovation in digital economy [263]. In a report published on
February 2012, they dene individual control and note that \consumers have a
right to exercise control over what personal data companies collect from them and
how they use it. Companies should provide consumers appropriate control over the
personal data that consumers share with others and over how companies collect,
use, or disclose personal data" [263].
1.1 The vicious circle
In order to address individuals' privacy concerns in the online environment, one has
to understand how the problem occurs. One of the earliest attempts to concep-
tualise privacy took place in England and the rational that underpinned it can be
summarised in the phrase that \every man's home is his castle". In 1763, William
Pitt noted that \the poorest man may in his cottage bid deance to all the force
of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it;
the storms may enter; the rain may enter - but the King of England cannot enter;
all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement" [in [125]]. In his
statement, privacy is framed as protection from invasion and it is the right of every
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man, even for the most under-privileged people. Its importance raises from the fact
that not even the King of England, the highest authority of that time, could defy
the right to privacy.
If we subdue the fact that Pitt's denition remains oblivious to women, the
idea of privacy as invasion seemed to be eective for more than one hundred years.
Until privacy concerns re-appeared as a fundamental factor in the late 1800s in
United States, when Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren argued that new privacy
concerns have emerged and novel approaches to privacy, such as their proposition
of the \right to be let alone", must be embraced to address them [45]. However, the
circumstances that stimulated their position, reveal the root of the privacy problem.
As Brandeis' biographer writes [in [40]]:
Warren had married Miss Mabel Bayard, daughter of Senator Thomas
Francis Bayard. They set up housekeeping in Boston's exclusive Back
Bay section and began to entertain elaborately. The Saturday Evening
Gazzette, which specialised in blue blood items, naturally reported their
activities in lurid detail. This annoyed Warren who took the matter up
with Brandeis.
As Warren was a prominent and wealthy member of the \higher society", it
was natural that the marriage would attract the interest of the tabloids. However,
what was unexpected was what Brandeis and Warren describe in their article as
\instantaneous photographs" that when published in the newspapers \invade the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that `what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house tops' " [45]. However, according to the journalists, the
claim of invasion could not have been justied in a court as the photographer never
entered the property. Instead he took the photo while standing on a public place.
The authors of the article warned that \recent inventions and business methods, call
attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person" [45].
The same consequences that led Warren and Brandeis to publish their article
still exist today. Consider the war against illegal drugs in the US: It was thought
that using heat sensors to nd marijuana growing operations would be acceptable,
but in 2001 [Kyllo v United States (533 U.S. 27)] it was ruled that using thermal
imaging devices that can reveal previously unknown information without a warrant,
does indeed constitute a violation of privacy. With the outburst of technological
developments in the recent years, privacy concerns have increased signicantly since
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new ways of gathering personal information emerged. This aects the ways in which
privacy may be either protected or violated, depending on the purpose for which
these advances are applied. Examples of technological innovations that have either
aggravated or mitigated privacy concerns are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Technological developments that favour either society or individuals
The example of Warren and Brandeis demonstrates that legislation and regu-
latory procedures endeavour to establish functions which seek a balance between
individuals' right to privacy and the common good. But every time a balance is
found, the use of new technologies alters old norms either in favour of the individual
or in the interest of the common good, and new norms and functions need to be
re-established to restore the balance, thus forming a vicious circle.
Technological developments always proceed faster than the establishment of leg-
islation and regulatory policies, thus fuelling the vicious circle presented in Figure 1.2
and leading to new privacy concerns. Society is continuously attempting to achieve
a balance between privacy and security, individualism and the common good, with-
out ever fullling this goal. As Rule argues, privacy is a compromise depicting the
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prevailing societal norms, the technological advances and the seek for balance be-
tween the private and public sphere [223]. It is these compromises that question the
real value of privacy and whether this right is worth protecting [236].
Figure 1.2: The constant development of data collection, aggregation and processing
technologies results in a vicious circle as society attempts to seek a balance of protection
between the individual's privacy and security of society.
1.2 Establishing the importance of privacy
How can we decide if privacy is important? Why is it worth protecting? These
questions have concerned society throughout history. The development of technolo-
gies kept the debate around the value of privacy for centuries, but the proliferation
of novel information systems strengthened arguments both for privacy advocates
and privacy critics from various disciplines such as philosophy, law and economics,
rendering the \privacy erupt into a frontline issue around the world" [236].
Privacy advocates argue that privacy is evaporating and soon we will have a sense
of nostalgia if we do not act, whereas, critics are based on the privacy paradox, where
people declaim their privacy concerns but their actions are towards the opposite
directions. Thus, critics claim that there is a general paranoia and people cater for
their privacy in abstract [236], while balancing privacy against the common good
results in many conicting interests. In order to ascribe a value to privacy, one
needs to understand the benets and conicts it causes to society.
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1.2.1 Critique of privacy
Critiques of privacy as being socially detrimental, arise from several sources that
focus on dierent aspects of privacy. The most prominent is the communitarian
critique which, to quote Etzioni, perceives privacy as a \societal licence [. . . ] that
tramps all other rights or concerns for the common good" [86]. Communitarian
scholars argue that there is not an absolute right to privacy because it exempts
people from obligations of social life [86; 119], associating privacy with individualistic
benets which antagonise the public sphere. However, as many scholars argue, this
view is erroneous [236; 124]. The assumption that individual needs and societal
interests are always in conict, results in a fallacious quest for balancing privacy
with community needs. As Solove argues, \individualism becomes not an element
valued for its contributions to the common good, but a counter-value that stands
in opposition to common good", underestimating the contributions of privacy to
society [236].
Another criticism to privacy stems from the classical feminists, as they contend
that privacy is a right favouring men by concealing the abuse of women at home.
Historically, they argue, societal norms have been dominated by men and as a result
every husband is the master of the house, a private sphere in which authorities
cannot intervene if, for example, a woman is subject to domestic violence [166; 236].
Thus, privacy is the means to protect men and shift the authoritative relations
between the two sexes in favour of men. MacKinnon, by paraphrasing Warren and
Brandeis view of privacy, claims that \the right of privacy is a right of men 'to
be let alone' to oppress women" [166]. This view is valid if we consider common
practices in precedent centuries; courts in the 19th century \turned a blind eye to
issues of domestic abuse in the name of family privacy" [236]. However, society's
power relations between the two sexes have changed and women have strengthen
their position. Recent legislated laws are not oblivious to domestic violence and
privacy can be used to support the prosecution of oenders as it oers anonymity
in cases of rape and violence or forbids any disclosure of data to the public [124].
There is a stream of literature arguing that privacy hinders the disclosure of
information critical to establish trust relations and judge individuals' reputations,
thus leading to the sharing of discredible information and fraud [211; 85]. Scholars
in favour of this argument, emphasise the aspect of self-determination, dened as
the ability of individuals to manage information about themselves, claiming that
it can be used in dishonest ways to favour the withholding of information or the
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dissemination of falsied data. Posner ascribes an economic aspect to this criticism
by arguing that erroneous information can prohibit the commercial protability of
businesses. The non-disclosure of vital information tampers with the \economic
rationality"of the free market which forces enterprises to depend on assessing vast
amounts of information and make rapid decisions [211]. As a result, privacy Cate
argues, \may reduce productivity and lead to higher prices" [54]. However, the
critic suers from misconceptions, since privacy can enhance, rather than reduce,
the disclosure of data. Individuals feel more condent and \disclose information with
brevity" [124] when they have the sense of controlling the ow of their information.
Regarding the economic aspect of the argument, Acquisti [3] demonstrated the
existence of an economically \negative and statistically signicant impact" of data
breaches. The impact of the privacy breach is profound in large companies because
their reputation is at risk. Hence, the adoption of a system which is able to support
the management of personal data by data subjects, can not only enhance the trust
relation between customers and enterprises, but it can also boost the disclosure
of valid data, oering competitive advantage to those companies that cater for
customers' privacy needs.
Questions also have been raised from advocates of civil liberties and human rights
who dispute privacy as a right [274]. The rational is similar with the communitar-
ian critique and scholars supporting this argument believe that privacy undermines
other primary rights which protect civil liberties. Freedom of speech, liberty and
the right to be free from injury are some of the rights which are deemed antag-
onistic to privacy. To quote Postrel, privacy hinders \the freedom to gather and
disseminate truthful information, otherwise known as freedom of speech and the
press" [in [236]].This argument, however, assumes that privacy is in conict with
these rights. In a counterexample, someone could argue that privacy can be sym-
biotic instead. Several authors deem privacy to be synonymous with liberty [101],
while focusing on the freedom of speech there have been several journalists who un-
der the umbrella of anonymity or pseudonimity have expressed their opinions freely.
The symbiosis of privacy and freedom of speech or liberty ensures that people will
be able to express themselves freely, while retaining their dignity at the same time.
Further objections to privacy occur from scholars contending that social surveil-
lance and national security is hampered by the concealment of malicious activities
under the protection of privacy. As Pulitzer denotes, \there is no crime, there is
not a dodge, there is not a trick, there is not a swindle, there is not a vice which
does not live by secrecy" [in [94]]. The argument has gained in popularity after
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the events of 9/11 in US, as privacy is deemed to hinder government responses to
threats and conceal emerging dangers from terrorism [243; 212]. Posner declares
that nowadays \the government has a compelling need to gather [. . . ] vast quanti-
ties of information, much of it personal" [212]. In a similar manner, other scholars
wonder that \if you have nothing to hide, then what do you have to fear", or \if
you aren't doing anything wrong, then what do you have to hide?" [235]. The key
problem with this argument is that \it myopically views privacy as a form of con-
cealment or secrecy" [235]. Privacy may enhance openness and transparency in the
community since it has a positive eect on individuals' trust relations. In addition
, the existence of privacy rights ensure that the governmental surveillance will be
conducted with respect to human autonomy and dignity. The weakness of the ar-
gument emerges from its assumption that governmental authorities always behave
in a benign fashion. However, reasonable reasons to use surveillance may quickly
escalate and result in power abuse that causes \intimidation, embarrassment or
distraction" [124] as described in Orwell's book titled \1984" [198]. Furthermore,
the problem that occurs is not only \Orwellian but Kafkaesque" as well [235]. In
Kafka's book \The Trial" [138], the problem raised by the author is the situation
where individuals are powerless and vulnerable against the bureaucratic governmen-
tal system. The misuse of personal data with the exclusion of data subjects from
any governmental process results in a lack of transparency, misjudgement, errors,
authoritative abuses [235] and at the end of the book, the condemning of an inno-
cent man, Mr K., to death [138]. Thus, the argument of \nothing to hide" collapses
because avoiding behaving in an illicit manner is not enough to ensure individuals'
innocence, since, to quote Kafka [138]:
\- `One does not have to believe everything is true, one only has to be-
lieve what is necessary.'
- `Depressing though, said K.'[. . . ] The simple story had become per-
plexing."
1.2.2 The value of privacy
The vast majority of literature advocates the importance of privacy as essential to
an open and democratic society [124; 82; 45; 41; 101; 262]. Many scholars perceive
privacy as a right that protects solely individuality, while excluding people from
social interaction [82; 45; 41; 101]. To quote Emerson \[privacy] is based upon
premises of individualism, that the society exists to promote the worth and the
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dignity of the individual.[. . . ]The right of privacy[. . . ]is essentially the right not to
participate in the collective life the right to shut out the community" [82]. The value
of protecting privacy stems from the self-development and the respect for autonomy.
According to Westin \people respite from the whirlpool of social life [. . . ] achieve
goals of self-realisation" [262] and thus, develop a \rmer, better contracted position
in the opposition of the dominant" [236].
Although the importance of privacy is signicant when emphasising on the in-
dividual, perceiving privacy in nonconformist terms provokes conicts with other
primary rights and interests and provides solid ground for criticism. When privacy
is excluded from social life, inherently it is balanced against common good, resulting
in privacy being undervalued. Solove contends that privacy has a social value and
its importance also emerges from the benets it confers upon society [236]. Loss of
privacy has a signicant impact upon \freedom, creativity, culture and transparency
in social life", eects that are not assessed in the equation if privacy is considered as
a \stand-alone" right [262]. Since we are not isolated from other people and social
interaction is part of our daily lives, we cannot aord to consider privacy as some-
thing we abandon when we join social life. Thus, the \value of privacy should be
assessed on the basis of its contribution to society" and the value of individualism
should be integrated to the social benet [236], since \we cannot separate the idea
of ourselves and our own good from the idea of others and their good" [44].
Privacy oers a wide range of protections to a plurality of issues and as a conse-
quence, its value varies depending on which issue is being addressed. The value that
stems from the involved activities should be weighed against the value of contrast-
ing interests and privacy should prevail when the result is best for the society. As
Solove argues, \we live in an age of balancing and the prevailing view is that most
rights and interests are not absolute and privacy should be reconciled with other
interests" [236]. Balancing is a useful approach to resolve conicts but the criti-
cal step to maximise the utility in both parts of equation is to adopt a systematic
process that \will be as rigorous and thoughtful as possible" [236].
Privacy is a powerful tool able to shape social norms, alter power relations,
ensure democracy and freedom and establish a transparent and open society. Values
of the highest importance, but very dicult to be quantied and calculated in
mathematical equations. A solution to address privacy concerns while respecting the
common good must be sought. Since social trends are shaped by the participation of
individuals and the way they communicate, information systems that enable users
to manage their personal data can become a barometer for establishing balance.
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The research that will be presented in this thesis, has been conducted bearing in
mind that privacy cannot be isolated from social good and the balance in the vicious
circle must be researched in a manner that maximises both individual and public
good. In alignment with Solove's view, I believe that oering mechanisms to the
data subjects to control their data is the rigorous process to ensure, even-though the
vicious circle will remain, the means by which the exposure to risk can be mitigated
more eectively and the balance can be achieved more eciently.
1.3 Management of controls
The research undertaken in this thesis oers to data subjects, for the rst time,
the opportunity to express their consent and revocation preferences regarding the
collection, usage and further dissemination of their personal data and convey their
own privacy expectations. Oering controls to data subjects can create a positive
eect on their predisposition to disclose data, thus enhancing transparency and
openness in the relationship between the customer and the enterprise. On the other
hand, the controls available to data subjects can be designed with respect to the
common good, ensuring the social control and the resolution of any conicts with
other interests.
Capturing the process of giving and revoking consent provides solid ground to
express privacy controls. Legislation, and more specically data protection, already
requires from the data controllers the acquisition of data subjects' consent before
collecting any personal data. In addition, the process of giving consent has been
common practice for many years in several disciplines, such as medicine, where
privacy is of paramount importance.
This thesis seeks to develop methods by which balance can be achieved via
consent and revocation controls over the storage, use and sharing of personal data.
The issues addressed arise as a consequence of the disclosure of personal data.
Enterprises store personal data about their customers, often not only contact details
but various consumer preferences; such information enables an enterprise to tailor its
products and services to customer needs. Companies share, buy and sell customer
data with the aims of increasing their customer base and obtaining useful marketing
statistics. There are even rms whose entire business is to manage and market
large databases of personal data about individuals. The central problem is that an
individual for whom personal data is held can barely, if at all, control (view, modify,
1. Introduction 12
remove) the storage, aggregation and ow of this data.
While it is necessary, by law, to obtain an individual's consent for the collection
of data regarding her or his person, the possible semantic interpretations of such
consent can vary widely, possibly opening the way for data misuse and abuse [1; 88;
2]; this can arise when the data controller interprets the given consent in a way that
conicts with the individual's preferences. Furthermore, it is common practice for
an enterprise to request `blanket consent,' which is consent for data to be collected,
used and disseminated in any way the data controller deems appropriate; by giving
blanket consent, an individual completely relinquishes control over such data. When
more ne-grained consent is required, the request is usually accompanied by lengthy
details of the collector's privacy policy; research has suggested [65] that individuals
rarely study such policies carefully, and this may cause them to give blanket consent
to save time and eort.
1.4 Research questions and main contributions of the thesis
Having described the problem that this thesis seeks to address and having estab-
lished the value of privacy to society that attributes to the importance of the research
to be presented in the following chapters, this thesis contributes to knowledge in
multiple layers and its novelty concerns dierent aspects.
Adopting a user-centric point of view, the rst research question that I seek to
answer is:
What controls could a data subject perform in order to express privacy
preferences and requirements on the management of their personal data?
In order to answer this question, the methodology followed included a multidisci-
plinary literature study on online privacy. The ndings informed the rst framework
of eective controls and suggested that consent is the appropriate means to oer
these controls to the data subject. However, there is a signicant gap in the liter-
ature, since the functionality of the online environment raises considerable threats
to privacy and requires the ability to revoke the initial consent and delete data. As
Solove declaims \details about your private life on the Internet can become per-
manent digital baggage" [238]. However, so far literature perceives consent as an
one-o event while the possibility of revoking this consent is not considered.
The second research question which complemented the question presented above
in order to provide an appropriate answer is:
1. Introduction 13
What does revoking consent mean?
The approach followed to provide a model for revocation embraced elements from
the social sciences discipline. The methodological framework consisted of focus
groups and the generated data was analysed with the content analysis approach.
The result was a novel conceptual model of consent and revocation, which is the
rst contribution of the thesis. In addition, dierent types of revocation have been
dened and the term of \informed revocation" has been introduced, extending the
existing literature on online privacy.
The next step required the formalisation of the novel conceptual model that can
validate a system which oers data subjects the opportunity to express consent and
revocation expectations. The research question to be answered in this quest is:
How can consent and revocation controls be formalised?
I conducted a literature survey on the application of formal methods whose aim
is to resolve privacy issues. The ndings of this review concluded that there ex-
ists a gap in the literature, since the dominant approaches consist of languages
which address security issues and embrace extensions for catering privacy needs.
Privacy is not usually the primary concern of these eorts. Any existing method-
ologies addressing solely privacy concerns focus mainly on converting personal data
to non-identiable forms and not on controlling the ow of personal data through
its lifetime. The dierence in the two approaches lays on the sharing of data. In the
rst approach, the aim is to hamper the disclosure of certain information, whereas
the latter approach surveillances any dissemination of data throughout its life-cycle
by posing controls. In addition, all the formal models remain oblivious to consent
and revocation concepts. A Hoare-style logic was developed, capable to reason and
capture the eects of user's consent and revocation expectations in a system. This
novel logic is the second and main contribution of this thesis. In order to validate the
logic, the use of Maude, a rewrite tool for logic, was deemed necessary to prove that
the logic is designed in such a manner that certain healthiness conditions hold. In
addition, the logic was applied to formalise the consent and revocation requirements
of three dierent case studies. The pilot Employee case study, revealed ambiguities
that were addressed by enriching the logic. The rened and nal version of the logic
is presented in this thesis. The renement process and the lessons learnt from the
rst attempt are described in Section 4.5.
The last contribution of this thesis is a testing strategy, based on the Hoare style
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logic, generating tests for systems that handle consent and revocation controls. The
research question answered is:
How might a testing strategy be formed based on formal methods, for
a system that oers consent and revocation controls to ensure correct
behaviour while services and technological infrastructure evolve?
The result of this eort is a novel and rigorous testing strategy based on formal
methods, able to generate testing suites in an automatic way. The approach is tech-
nological agnostic and it is validated by creating tests for the rst case study. Further
validation required the development of a pseudo-code that automatically generates
tests. The pseudo-code was adjusted to the needs of the EnCoRe project [83], a
project that funded this research for the last three years. The proposed pseudo-code
was implemented by HW Communications Ltd , one of the partners participating
in the EnCoRe project who were responsible for the implementation of the system.
The novel approach was used to produce tests and reveal faults in the design of the
system.
Parts of the research presented in this thesis were presented in conferences.
Published papers [10; 11; 201; 7; 8] were co-authored with my supervisors, Professor
Sadie Creese and Professor Michael Goldsmith, to whom I am most grateful for
their guidance and support throughout this journey. Their guidance ensured that I
would not deviate from the research questions and that the methodologies followed
would be the most appropriate to provide valid answers, while giving me the liberty
to freely develop and express my own understanding of the problem and propose
and develop my own solutions. Furthermore, the research presented in this thesis
was used to underpin the design of the EnCoRe system and is included in the nal
deliverables of the project [9; 6].
1.5 About EnCoRe
The EnCoRe project ran from June 2008 to April 2012 and was a multi-disciplinary
research project which aimed to \develop technology-enabled solutions for deliver-
ing easy-to-use, practical and scalable consent and revocation controls over the use
of personal data in cyberspace; and to render these control mechanisms as simple
The link to their website is http://cyber.hwcomms.com/cyber/
1. Introduction 15
to use as a kitchen tap" [83]. The project was partially funded by the Technol-
ogy Strategy Board (TP/12/NS/P0501A), the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council (EP/G002541/1).
Currently, organisations' procedures for managing personal data may possibly
exploit the trust that data subjects place in them when giving their initial consent
and disclosing their data. There is not a system in place that can provide controls
to the users to express themselves and capture the giving of consent or the dynamic
notion of this process required to address data subjects privacy concerns.
In the EnCoRe project we perceived \controls" as the means which enable people
to manage the ow of their personal data, by expressing consent and revocation
preferences that can be implemented through non-interference and privacy policies.
The overall vision of the project was \to make giving consent as reliable and easy
as turning on a tap and revoking that consent as reliable and easy as turning it o
again" [83]. To this end, EnCoRe project took into account a variety of perspectives,
including social, legal, regulatory and technological aspects.
The EnCoRe project endeavoured to provide solutions that would:
 Enable organisations to adopt scalable, cost eective and robust consent and
revocation methods for controlling the usage, storage, location and dissemi-
nation of personal data.
 Benet individuals by providing meaningful, intuitive mechanisms which will
allow them to control the use of their personal information held by others.
 Help restore individual condence in participating in the digital economy and
so, in turn, benet the wider society.
The project partners were:
 Hewlett-Packard Laboratories
 HW Communications Ltd
 London School of Economics and Political Science
 QinetiQ Ltd
 Cyber-security group, Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
(October 2011 - present)
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 e-Security Group, Warwick Manufacturing Centre, University of Warwick,
Coventry (June 2008 - September 2011)
 Centre for Health, Law and Emerging Technologies (Helex), University of
Oxford
The project's website is www.encore-project.info and the tweeter account can
be found at www.twitter.com/encore_project
1.6 Thesis structure
The thesis is divided in nine chapters. Elaborating on each chapter:
Chapter 2 presents literature surveys of the online privacy and the concept
of consent, a description of the regulations legislated for the data protection and
a literature review of the formal methods that endeavour to model privacy. The
chapter starts with the main concepts of privacy and illustrates their limitations.
Based on the dominant concept which perceives privacy as controls, I examine the
available controls which researchers believe that can facilitate the management of
personal data by data subjects. The most appropriate mechanism is the concept of
consent and I explore the origins of the concept, the relevant theories of consent,
their application on our daily lives and their limitations. In addition, I present the
appropriate legislative eorts that enhance the concepts of consent and revocation
and provide legal ground to their adoption by the data controllers. Since the main
purpose of this thesis is to develop a formal model of consent and revocation, I
study the relevant formal languages that address privacy issues and present their
advantages and limitations.
Chapter 3 presents a novel conceptual model of consent and revocation. I
describe the qualitative methodology of focus groups adopted to underpin the design
of the model and I explain the content analysis approach used to code and analyse
the data generated by the focus groups. The analysis of the transcripts resulted in a
novel conceptual model of consent and revocation. More specically, I describe how
the ndings extend the theory of informed consent with an additional dimension and
the denition of dierent types of revocation. Furthermore, the term of informed
revocation is coined to describe a phenomenon observed in the focus groups.
Chapter 4 illustrates the novel logic of consent and revocation, which is de-
signed based on the novel conceptual model of consent and revocation. It is a
Hoare-style logic that captures the requirements of a system capable to manage
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consent and revocation controls. The expectations of the data subjects are cap-
tured with a set of actions that, when performed in completion, assign rights to the
participants of the system, create obligations and bound the handling of data with
constricting choices. The logic has been rened after its application to the pilot
case study and the process of renement among with the lessons learnt from the
formalisation of the case study and more specically, how these lessons informed
the implementation of the EnCoRe system are also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 5 describes the pilot case study, namely the Employee Data Scenario
and presents the formalisation of employees expectations regarding consent and
revocation in their working environment. Several use cases depict dierent require-
ments which are elicited with the Goal Notation Structure. The chapter illustrates
the application of the rened and nal version of the logic and provides evidence
that the ambiguities acknowledged in Chapter 4 have been addressed.
Chapter 6 presents the formalisation of requirements for a real case scenario,
which due to condentiality issues it will be called the Biobank. There are multiple
use cases formalised which illustrate dierent consent and revocation expectations
which patients may have. The requirements are elicited by analysing transcripts
from focus groups, specically designed to capture privacy concerns of patients and
cater for the needs of Biobank's researchers.
Chapter 7 presents the formalisation of requirements regarding the consent
and revocation controls oered to the data subjects for the Identity Assurance Pro-
gramme, a mock system inspired by a real project whose name will not be revealed
due to condentiality issues. The context in this case study involves dierent power
relations from the previous case studies, because there are governmental needs to
be addressed. The requirements are elicited by analysing documents and discus-
sions from the research community which was assigned to assist in the design of
the project. Not all sets of actions, constraints and choices expressed in the nal
version of the logic are used in each case study, as the business model and the data
subjects' preferences change according to the context. The successful application of
the logic to three diverse contexts validates its ecacy and richness of expression.
Chapter 8 explains the need for a testing strategy based on the logic illustrated
in Chapter 4 and presents the novel approach, which is technological agnostic and
able to generate testing suites for a system that manages consent and revocation
controls. The model comprises of two procedures and is validated by being applied
to generate tests on the Employee case study. In addition, I developed a pseudo-
code which was adjusted to the technical architecture of the EnCoRe system. The
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pseudo-code was implemented in the rst EnCoRe prototype, specically designed
for the Employee case study. The testing strategy is successfully implemented in
the EnCoRe system and the results of any faults in the EnCoRe implementation
are reported in the chapter.
Chapter 9 summarises the research presented in the thesis. The chapter illus-
trates the contribution to knowledge that this thesis achieves and proposes direc-
tions for future work. These directions could extend the logic further to address
issues that are not considered in this approach, such as anonymity and improve the
automatic generation of testing suites.
CHAPTER 2
The journey from privacy to consent and
revocation
What is privacy? Philosophers, legal theorists and scientists from diverse disciplines
have not provided yet a satisfactory solution to that riddle. Philosopher Julie Inness
declares that the privacy conundrum is in a \state of chaos" [131], privacy advocate
Simon Davies contends that \even after decades of academic interest in the subject,
the world's leading experts have been unable to agree on a single denition" [73]
and the legal theorist Robert Post doubts if a denite and widely accepted answer
will ever be given as \privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and
contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I
sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all" [213].
What can undoubtedly be answered though, is the importance of the concept
of privacy which has been highlighted from privacy advocates to privacy sceptics,
as it is the catalyst when referring to diverse rights and values that can only be
articulated under the umbrella of privacy. As Charles Sykes [245] notes, \privacy is
like oxygen; we really only appreciate it when it's gone". In the published literature,
privacy is declared as \essential to democratic societies" and recognised as \the heart
of our liberty and beginning of our freedom" [101]. It is considered to be the core
element for protecting autonomous life, maintaining human dignity [215] and the
remedy to preserving individuality [40]. Many scholars intertwine privacy with our
senses of rightness and our moralities [142; 202] and argue that the explanation
of the privacy enigma is based on the \feeling", the \instinct" and the familiarity
with \common usage of language" which is \riddled with paradoxes"[202]. As Lord
Philips of Sudbury said, in an abstract and indirect denition of what privacy is,
after opposing the ID-card policy[39] in the United Kingdom, \I instinctively and
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quite deeply reject [to vote the policy under consideration]. I can't quite nd the
language to rationalise the depth of my feeling about this" [264].
Privacy is not a \stand-alone" issue but emerges from social interaction. It
depends on the context and the environment where these interactions occur and
oers opportunities for social association regarding \political expression and criti-
cism, political choice and freedom from unreasonable police interference; it allows
non-political participations in family and religion"[262]. It is this social interaction
that dierentiates our understanding of privacy according to our experiences and
the cultural and political environment in which we act, resulting in our privacy con-
cerns to stem from our subjective perceptions [132]. As Simon Davies [73] argues,
\privacy means dierent things to dierent cultures. In France, it equates most
closely to liberty. In America, it is an inseparable component of individual free-
doms particularly freedom from intrusion by federal government. Many European
countries interpret privacy as the protection of personal data. Since the days of
the huge campaign against the government's proposed ID card in 1987, most Aus-
tralians view privacy as a measure of state power, while the government views it as
a set of strictly dened legal rights".
Due to the multi-dimensional, subjective and context-depended nature of pri-
vacy, unsurprisingly its prism has been investigated by adopting dierent lenses
that vary widely. In the next section I present the dierent conceptions in the vast
literature on privacy that seek to distil its core characteristics by dening privacy,
as Solove [236] argues,\per genus et dierentiam". In essence, researchers search
for a\common set of necessary and sucient elements that single out privacy as
unique from other conceptions" [236]. In Section 2.2.1 I review the research con-
ducted regarding privacy concerns in online environments. The researchers draw
elements from the philosophical concepts of privacy in order to mitigate online pri-
vacy concerns and the dominant concept is the perception of privacy as controls.
These controls can be captured with the notions of consent and revocation and in
Section 2.3 I illustrate how social sciences understand consent and revocation and
the proposed models that lead to the theory of \informed consent". These models
are depicted on legislative attempts to protect privacy and in Section 2.4 I present
the rationale that dictates contemporary privacy regulations. In Section 2.5 I il-
lustrate the formal methods aiming to provide the mechanics for a privacy-friendly
framework able to encompass the research undertaken regarding privacy in social
sciences and law.
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2.1 Conceptualising privacy
I dene the conception of privacy as \an abstract mental picture of what privacy
is and makes it unique" [236]. The conception of privacy diers from the daily
usage of the word privacy, dened as the diverse ways that we speak of privacy
when referring to things [236], and I adopt the denition of conception in order to
avoid the multi-use of the word that leads to paradoxes [202]. Literature suggests
several conceptions in an attempt to describe the common characteristics of privacy.
Every conception encapsulates interesting insights and is criticised for its limitations.
There is not a clear distinction between the dierent concepts presented below and
many of their characteristics interleave.
2.1.1 Privacy as the right to be let alone
The rst attempt to address the privacy conundrum was Aristotle's [74] distinction
between the public \polis" and the domestic or private \oikos" sphere. Centuries
later, legal theorists encapsulated the problems emerging from this distinction by
legislating rights to privacy. Two of the pioneers were Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis who argued for \the right to let alone" [45], drawing on an earlier view by
Thomas Cooley who suggested \the right of personal immunity" [75].
Brandeis's and Warren's seminal article drew attention to the privacy problem
and since then it has been the cornerstone for privacy laws in the United States [236].
The authors distinguish the core characteristic of privacy to be \that of inviolate
personality"and underline that the value is \found not in the right to take the prots
arising from publication, but in the piece of mind or the relief aorded by the ability
to prevent any publication at all" [45].
Brandeis's view ourished when he was given the opportunity to advocate and
establish the conception of being let alone as a right after the US Supreme Court
in Olmstead vs United States decided that telephone wire-tapping does not violate
the Fourth Amendment since there is no physical trespass [in [202]]. Brandeis in
his dissent argued that \they conferred, as against the government, the right to
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by citi-
zens"[in [236]]. Several US Supreme Court Justices were in alignment with his view
and many distinguish legal scholars endorsed his conception such as Bloustein [41]
and Posner [211]. The latter however, limits his perception of privacy to \people's
right to be free from unwanted solicitations"[210] only.
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The right to be let alone preceded its time and set the foundations for more
robust privacy conceptions. However, it is criticised of being too broad failing to
enlighten the circumstances under which the individuals shall be let alone. Accord-
ing to Parent [202] there are \innumerable ways of failing to let a person alone"
which are irrelevant to privacy [202]. Allen[14] contends that \if privacy simply
meant `being let alone', any form of oensive or harmful conduct directed toward
another person could be characterised as a violation of personal privacy". Although
highly inuential as a conception, it still remains quite vague.
2.1.2 Privacy as limited access to the self
A considerable amount of literature conceptualises privacy as \limited access" to
the self [101; 100]. The core characteristic of this theory is individual's will to
concealment and acting remotely from the others. As Parent denotes \it has the
virtue of separating privacy from liberty"[202]. Thus, it is a renement of the \right
to be let alone" theory as it endeavours to describe under which circumstances people
could be let alone.
The rst version of this theory was illustrated in Godkin's seminal article [107].
Godkin denes privacy as \the right of every man to keep his aairs to himself, and
to decide for himself to what extend they shall be the subject of public observation
and discussion" [107]. He argues that every individual should decide to what extend
public could obtain \knowledge of his aairs"[108]. This work set the foundation for
other scholars to underpin their theories. Gross envisages privacy as \the condition
of human life in which acquaintance with a person or with aairs of his life which are
personal to him is limited" [114] while Den Haag declares that individuals should
request exclusive rights to either \watch, utilize or invade someone's realm" [254].
Bok [42] extends this view and distinguishes physical access from personal informa-
tion, while Allen introduces the concept of inaccessibility as the \apt application of
privacy" [14].
There are though subsequent shortcomings in the limited access to self approach.
Parent [202] drawing on Bok's dichotomy argues that violations of \physical prox-
imity" could better be explained by other concepts such as personal property while
violations regarding access on personal knowledge are considered \limitations on
cognitive access that do not imply privacy" [202]. In addition, Solove poses the
question of how the grey area between absolute restriction of access and the total
accessibility is dened [236]. He suggests that limited accessibility fails to recognise
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what violations of access constitute privacy breaches, thus rendering the conception
too vague.
Gavison [101] attempts to ll the gap in this theory and as a reply to the criticism
she focuses on dening a \neutral" but \coherent concept of privacy" elaborating on
what is considered as limited access. Her model consists of three distinctive elements
namely \secrecy, anonymity and solitude"[101]. Posner focuses on secrecy and ar-
gues for the individual's right to \conceal discreditable facts about himself" [209].
His view is expressed under the prism of economics and by focusing on the prots
that such a concealment may oer, he suggests that people \want more power to con-
ceal information about themselves that others might use to their disadvantage"[209].
Jourard adds that privacy should have a dynamic and continuous eect as the \out-
come of a person's wish to withhold from others certain knowledge as to his past
and present experience and his intentions for the future" [137]. A more rened
version of secrecy is expressed by Etzioni that proposes a selective form of secrecy
and describes privacy as \the realm in which an actor can legitimately act without
disclosure and accountability to others" [86].
Although these renements of Godkin's seminal theory endeavoured to address
the criticism and provide a solid and satisfactory conception of privacy, in their
attempt to become more descriptive they ended up in being too narrow. Secrecy
and solitude involve only the concealment of the information and once personal
facts are publicly disclosed or leaked then according to the theory there can exist no
privacy [236]. However people may willingly share their personal facts with a group
of people while keeping the same facts private from others [40]. Even in the selective
secrecy perception, privacy should not be narrowed in refraining from disclosure but
other issues, such as using personal facts for the desirable purpose, should be taken
into account [236]. Furthermore, there are situations where there is no \reasonable
expectation of privacy" [236] when people for example act in public places. As
Parent suggests limitations on access, no matter how applicable they could be, are
not privacy themselves but \safeguards" of what privacy stands for [202].
2.1.3 Privacy as personhood and autonomy
Another stream of literature conceives privacy as the means for protecting auton-
omy and personhood. Gavison, although a prominent advocate of the limited access
theory, recognises the value of privacy to be lying on the principles of autonomy,
liberty and freedom [101]. Considering autonomy, privacy could be \the freedom to
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decide and to act in public or private as one deems appropriate, without government
interference" [15]. An example where autonomy is endangered, as Benn declaims,
is when people are under surveillance and in essence their freedom is restricted
since the \observed becomes aware of himself as an object having a determinate
character" [36]. Riley extends this view by arguing that there should be an \un-
derstanding that certain aspects of people's lives are sacrosanct and only shared in
cases of justiable legal requirements" [219].
The term personhood was coined by Freund to identify \those attributes of an
individual which are irreducible in his selfhood" [in [66]] and the emphasis is on
the integrity of the person. The foundation of the theory is Brandeis's concept of
\inviolate personality" [45] and Bloustein builds upon suggesting that privacy is the
concept which safeguards people against \conduct that is demeaning to individuality
and to personal dignity" [40]. Davies concurs and identies integrity amongst other
elements as a core characteristic of privacy [72].
Criticism of the theory evolves around the association of privacy with liberty
and autonomy, arguing that these notions should be independent. However, this
view is opposed by DeCew, who believes that these conceptions can interleave [75].
Further criticism highlights the lack of a clear and articulated denition of what
personhood is [236]. In addition authors that discuss individuality do not present
satisfactory descriptions of what individuality is [114]. Furthermore, the case where
personhood or individuality is equated to autonomy leads to a vicious circle as \to
call an individual autonomous is simply another way of saying he is moral free and
to say that the right to privacy protects freedom adds little to our understanding
of doctrine" [222]. This vicious circle is enhanced as defending dignity and per-
sonhood against surveillance and intrusion requires the state to establish its own
understanding of the conception, hence restricting the autonomy of the individuals
to enforce themselves what is appropriate according to their beliefs. In addition,
there might be situations where loss of dignity does not imply a loss of privacy (for
example having to beg in order to survive constitutes a loss of dignity but it is not
a privacy breach) [173].
Despite the criticism, the personhood conception could be complementary to
other theories or underline important privacy breaches. Beardsley suggests that
\the norm of autonomy is what gives our obligation to respect another's right of
selective disclosure" [27], strengthening the limited access conception. Another in-
teresting observation by Solove, responding to Rubenfeld's criticism [222], is that
although the theory of personhood and dignity is not robust enough it reveals the
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problem of aggregation. Whereas minor and isolated pieces of information may not
be considered as privacy breaches, when combined together they could begin to
\portrait our identities" [237], rendering personhood a necessary element for every
privacy theory.
2.1.4 Privacy as controls
The perception of privacy as a means of information controls about ourselves domi-
nates the literature [33]. Alan Westin set the cornerstone of this theory by dening
privacy as \the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for them-
selves when how and to what extend information about them is communicated to
others" [262]. Introna concurs and distinguishes one aspect of privacy to be the
\control over personal information" [133], whereas according to Miller, for a privacy
theory to be robust it must provide the \individual the ability to control the circu-
lation of information relative to him" [176]. Fried extends this view by arguing that
the absence of information \about us in others minds" does not necessarily con-
stitute privacy but it is the \control we have over that information" that matters,
perceiving controls as a subset of the limited access theory [97].
One of the limitations of this theory is that it neglects aspects that are not re-
lated to information, rendering the theory narrow [236]. Furthermore, not every loss
of control implies loss of privacy and vice-versa [75]. Schoeman imagines a situation
where a person is isolated in a deserted island; he practically has no control over
who possesses information about him however there is no privacy breach, rather
\his problem is that he has too much privacy" [227]! Another question that seeks
a clear and solid answer is what information the individual will exercise control on.
Schoeman argues that \to determine what information could be available to others
presumes privacy is something to be protected at the discretion of the individual
to whom the information relates"[227], raising issues regarding the moral aspect of
privacy as it is not only a single person's prerogative but it should invoke society
decisions as well. But even if we manage to achieve the perfect balance and the
individuals are able to draw the limits of what information they can control in a
satisfactory way, there is still the question of whether the individuals are in the
position to act in a meaningful or informed manner. As Schwartz notes, \there
are disparities in knowledge and power in bargaining over the transfer of informa-
tion" [228].
Parker attempts to reply to some of the criticism by dening the concept of
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personal information upon which individuals could impose controls. He suggests
\control over who can see us, hear us, touch us, smell us, and taste us, in sum con-
trol over who can sense us is the core of privacy" [205]. However, his denition is very
broad. Murphy's attempt shares the same fate when he describes personal informa-
tion as \any data about an individual that is identiable to that individual"[188].
Identiable information should not always be considered as private and a counter-
example for such a denition is that of a famous actor where people are aware of
his profession but it is not considered private information.
Acknowledging the problem, a stream of literature endeavours to limit the scope
of personal information by introducing the element of intimacy and reallocates the
value of privacy from posing controls to personal information in general, to posing
controls to the development of relationships. Fried denes privacy as \control over
knowledge" essential in enhancing \fundamental relations of respect, love, friendship
and trust" [97]. He concludes that \intimacy is the sharing of information about
one's actions, beliefs or emotions which one has the right not to share with anyone",
hence circumventing the problem of morality. Rachels concurs and recognises that
the value of privacy lies \between our ability to control who has access to us and to
information about us, and our ability to create and maintain dierent sorts of social
relationships" [218]. Inness builds on that and species that the value of intimacy
emerges from \the agent's love caring and liking" and the control of a person on
matters like that should \cover choices on access to herself, the dissemination of
information about herself and her actions"[131].
Another challenge for the control of information theory is that theorists do not
elaborate on what controls could the individuals exercise. One solution proposed by
Westin is to understand controls as a form of ownership. He argues that \personal
information, thought of as the right of decision over one's private personality should
be dened as a property right" [262]. Locke contends that \every man has a property
in his own person" an argument that underpins the intellectual-property law [161].
However, there are serious limitations when treating controls as intellectual property,
since information may be created in a group of people or can be derived from an
original piece of information, posing dilemmas on who the owner of the information
is.
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2.2 Privacy in the online environment
According to Solove, in a volatile environment where people depend upon services
and benets which are delivered via the Internet, privacy is evolving [236]. While
individuals seek more rened mechanisms to control their information, from inno-
vative technologies to sophisticated business practises and legal requirements, the
conceptualisations that attempt to address the privacy conundrum narrow the un-
derstanding of the problem and our ability to provide eective solutions [265; 55].
Solove believes that in order to capture the \dynamic and evolving" nature of
privacy in an Internet-based society, we need to distance ourselves from describing
general and abstract elements in request for a \common denominator" and focus
on viewing privacy with many dierent lenses, investigating dierent contexts and
dening problems instead of oering solutions. He underpins his privacy theory
on Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances. Wittgenstein, in his attempt
to solve problems on logic and language, developed his theory of activities that
although they have \no one thing in common" somehow \are related to one another
in many dierent ways" [271]. Hence, instead of identifying the common element
the aim is to draw the common canvas of elements and at the end there is not a
single answer but a \variety of answers depending on a variety of factors" [102].
Solove emphasises on privacy problems and creates a taxonomy for privacy by
identifying four basic groups of activities that lead to problematic situations. These
are:
 Information Collection
 Information Processing
 Information Dissemination
 Invasion
He analyses those activities further by identifying specic privacy problems. The
most important of these problems are: aggregation which he denes as the \com-
bination of various pieces of data about a person"; identication which is \linking
information to particular individuals"; insecurity which depicts the situation where
stored information is poorly protected; secondary use dened as the process of using
collected information for dierent purposes than those initially collected; exclusion
dened as the failure of an individual to be aware of data that others possess about
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him and become part of the handling the data; and increased accessibility as \am-
plifying the accessibility of information" [234]. These are all problematic situations
that individuals seek to address with the appropriate controls.
Another interesting conception that captures the evolving element of privacy is
Nissenbaum's theory of \contextual integrity" [193]. She suggests that processing
and gathering of information may be allowed in some context as long as the process
\obeys the governing norms of distribution with in it", suggesting some kind of
control, but prohibited in others [193]. For example, a doctor may discuss health
issues with the patients or other colleagues but should refrain discussing these issues
with their friends. Both Nissenbaum and Solove attach to privacy a dynamic notion
but they do not quest the controls that can be appropriate for the individuals to
adequately address the privacy issue in an online environment. It is this question
that empirical researchers endeavour to answer.
2.2.1 The notion of controls in online privacy
In the literature on online privacy, several surveys have identied as a primary
consumer's concern the way data is being collected and processed by private and
public companies via the Internet [181; 151; 200; 232]. More specically, according
to Harris, 78% of online consumers would disclose more data if privacy practices
were transparent [261], as online privacy is \a salient issue for users" of the Internet
and they prefer websites that they believe are \privacy protective" [250]. Lach
estimates that 71% of respondents request stricter legislation for online privacy [157]
and Clarke [61] argues that these concerns are the threshold for a new debate about
trust in online communications. He estimates that building a trusting environment
will amplify consumers' concerns regarding privacy [61]. However, these studies do
not explore the nature of those concerns. Asking \how concerned are you about
threats to your personal privacy in America today" [Equifax, 1990 in [179]] may
shed some light on the importance of these concerns but it will not provide valid
data for the nature of those concerns [233].
Once the importance of privacy in online transactions had been highlighted [181;
151; 200; 232; 250; 61], researchers started to explore the nature of privacy concerns
by focusing on the collection, use and the dissemination of personal information
online. Control issues are dominant in these surveys as, according to Alge [13], a
signicant factor regarding privacy concerns is \how much control one believes he
or she has over handling of information (use and dissemination)" and researchers
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are drawing elements both from the \privacy as controls" conception [262] and
from Solove's theory [236]. However, identifying and proposing specic controls is a
delicate issue since \we have little idea of the ways in which people in their ordinary
lives conceive of privacy and their reactions to the collection and use of personal
information " [118].
Smith et al. developed and validated an instrument for measuring individuals'
privacy concerns regarding organisational informational practices [233]. Based on
the literature on privacy conceptions, they underpin their instrument on four central
dimensions that aect individuals' concerns, namely collection of personal informa-
tion; unauthorised secondary use; errors in personal information; and improper
access to personal information. They veried the correctness of their instrument
by conducting a series of interviews and surveys where as they reported, it became
clear that participants were unaware of the processes that companies follow to col-
lect data [233]. Culnan and Armstrong support Smith's ndings and declaim that
\privacy concerns can be mitigated through fair information procedures" [68]. In
addition Sheehan argues that online users should be better informed of their \rights
and responsibilities" [230]. The ndings in these researches concur and verify the
Fair Information Practices framework released by the OECD [95].
Malhotra et al. adopt the instrument proposed by Smith and their colleagues
and extend the four dimensions of the privacy concerns by conducting an online
marketing survey where they consider whether an individual has \control" over the
data. Building upon the work of Smith et al., they distinguish behaviours towards
the \control over the use of personal data, awareness of privacy practices and how
personal information is used" [242]. From a managers' perspective they suggest
that it is important to ensure that the correctness, collection and use of personal
information, both inside and outside the borders of the company, could be easily
veried by the users. From a customer's perspective they highlight the importance
of controls and they indicate some limited options such as \controls to add, delete
and modify information at will" [167].
Further qualitative studies verify the four pillars that inuence consumers' pri-
vacy concerns and provide rened models by examining the interrelation of controls
with each dimension separately. A stream of surveys focuses on the collection of
data and investigates the dual relation of peoples' perceptions towards a privacy-
friendly data-collection process, with their intention of disclosing data and their
\refusal and misrepresentation" of that data [239]. Findings suggest that when
consumers were ensured of fair information practices, they were willing to divulge
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more personal information [68; 77]. In the case where a lack in transparent privacy
policies is evident, Hui et al. contend that consumers as a counteraction tend to
disclose falsied information or decrease the amount of data they disclose [127].
Another branch of quantitative studies rather than revolving around the amount
of information released during the collection process, examine the type of infor-
mation that individuals disclose. A survey conducted by Son et al. concluded
that consumers provide information that they believe does not jeopardise their
anonymity [239]. Furthermore, their ndings suggest that some types of data are
more sensitive, hence more hesitantly disclosed than others, while they also in-
vestigate whether rms could derive further information from sensitive data in an
unsolicited manner [239].
Other studies consider the tensions in the handling of data, identifying usage
as the protagonist factor in consumers' privacy concerns. As Hann notes \among
the concern dimensions, we nd that the respondents value improper access and
secondary use to be more important than possible errors [in collection]" [115]. How-
ever, Brown's et al. survey provides contradictory ndings as consumers' concerns
focus not only on the unauthorized secondary use but also on errors in personal
information [46]. Cranor et al. concur that the purpose for which information has
been disclosed is a signicant factor and contend that any violation may result in
consumers' dissatisfaction [65]. Culnan et al. report that when the collected infor-
mation for a specic purpose is subsequently used for a dierent reason it should be
perceived as a privacy breach and they introduce the notion of consent to control
whether the secondary use occurs \without the knowledge of the consumer" [67].
They note that consumers should control secondary use of their personal informa-
tion by \objecting to other uses when information is collected for one purpose and
used for others" [67].
An interesting study by Van Dyke et al. veries that attention should be drawn
on how companies misuse the data of the users and provides a rened model of con-
trols by introducing the processing principles of notice, choice and access. They coin
the term of \construct privacy empowerment" which they dene as a \psychologi-
cal construct related to the individual's perception of the extent to which they can
control the distribution and use of their personally identifying information" [255].
Homan et al. concur and argue that controls on usage of data could tamper the
power relations between the individual and the companies and \shift the balance of
power from service providers, who have traditionally held power, to the consumers
who have traditionally been powerless" [123].
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Awad et al. focus particularly on one aspect of Van Dyke's model, and examine
the personalised services that some enterprises oer [23]. Further ndings suggest
that companies which provide online services, should be very cautious when they
send their costumers targeted marketing messages or attempt any other form of
unsolicited communication [117; 65]. In addition, any further dissemination of data
to other companies has subsequent consequences in consumers' privacy concerns [65].
Regarding consumers' access and choice, Cranor et al. contend that when users
are having access to their information \within company data bases" their privacy
concerns are mitigated. In addition they identify a positive relation with consumers'
attitude to disclose more data [65]. In a similar manner, Acquisti et al. suggest that
once the purchase is nished and the consumer has no further access to the data
it may aect their perception on the secondary use of data, since consumers do
not have any indication of how their data is handled [4]. Other studies examined
the accessibility of data by users from an economical perspective and concluded
that organizations gain \competitive advantage through customer retention" when
they facilitate procedures to enhance customers' privacy [68]. Tsai et al. concur
and further believe that there may be a niche space for business to prot as \when
privacy information is made more salient and accessible, some consumers are willing
to pay a premium to purchase from privacy protective websites" [250].
Only a limited number of surveys focus on further dissemination of data from
the data controller, where the data subject initially disclosed the data, to another
third party. Stewart et al. examine the relation between further sharing of personal
data with privacy concerns. They identied that the refusal of the dissemination
of data further down the chain is a \small degree of control" and that \consumer
control is also communicated on behalf of companies when they state on application
forms that any personal information collected will not be shared with any other
organisation" [242]. A survey conducted by Cranor et al. declaims that onward
sharing has a negative eect on people's trust in companies as \privacy policies do
not have [any more] signicant value to consumers" [65]. Cranor's research is not
the only one suggesting a connection between trust and privacy concerns. Camp et
al. contend that when the concerns are \elicited by the merchant's behaviour, the
individual may lose trust in the merchant" [51].
Several ndings are consistent with Camp et al. [51] and acknowledge that there
is a positive relation between privacy concerns and a decrease in trust [160]. Tan et
al. developed a conceptual model of trust for an e-commerce environment, where
the trust level of any transaction consists of \party trust and control trust" which
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are the fundamental \mechanisms that ensure the successful performance of the
transaction". It is generally agreed that some level of trust is required in order
for people to engage in e-commerce transaction [246]. Dinev et al. [77] verify in
their research that limited control over data is associated with trust, which is a
fundamental element for the growth of online services [123].
Responding to consumers' needs for establishing a trust relation with online
providers, several \trust seal" programs have emerged online to \facilitate the re-
lational exchange of personal information" [164]. An example worth mentioning
is TRUSTe, a non-prot, privacy seal program \dedicated to building consumers'
trust and condence on the Internet" [35]. When the logo of the TRUSTe is dis-
played on the website, the provider declares the processes followed to collect, use
and disseminate personal information. TRUSTe, as a third party, certies that
certain functionalities, such as notication for the disclosure practises, protection
of the data from misuse and access to consumers to prevent inaccuracies in their
information, are available [35]. However, surveys reveal that \trust seal" programs
have no eect on the disclosure of personal information [127] while people do not
seem to understand privacy seal programs [65].
Both quantitative and qualitative research in the literature provide valuable
ndings regarding the relation of privacy concerns with controls and they iden-
tify specic areas appropriate for control mechanisms. However, they fail to shed
more light on the means that can enable these controls. Whitley argues that \the
understanding of user-centric control is an impoverished version based on earlier
understanding of technology" and that information privacy literature provides an
\implicit and limited" view of controls [267].
Implicit as there are a few references in the literature that imply some kind of
control meaningful to the consumers mostly envisaged, although not clearly artic-
ulated, through the notion of consent. For example, Culnan et al. identify as an
eective mechanism the \ability of individuals to remove their names from mailing
lists. Milne et al. [179] expand this view by suggesting that people should be able
to remove any type of data while Son et al. provide some rather limited controls
suggesting that consumers could opt-out \from the database to receive targeted
marketing messages" registered initially without their knowledge [239], a view also
adopted by Malhotra et al. [167]. A dierent approach from Son et al., visualises as
controls the sharing of negative experience and feedback with other users, aiming
at ruining enterprises' reputation [239].
The literature provides a limited perception of controls because it mainly evolves
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around the disclosure of data and the understanding of how the data is used, whilst
in an \Internet enabled society it is increasingly important to understand what can
be done to control this further use and reuse" [265]. An eective mechanism, only
implied or briey mentioned from some researchers [67; 233], to represent these type
of sophisticated controls is the notion of consent which can provide useful insights
to when, how and by whom the personal information is used. In addition, as voices
for the \right to be forgotten" [171] become more vocal, the notion of revocation,
a concept poorly investigated, becomes essential to every theory that targets to
address privacy concerns.
2.3 The literature on consent and revocation
The concept of consent has attracted the interest of many researchers in various dis-
ciplines. It is a vital requirement for establishing and preserving the ethical element
of every discipline as it is \at the heart of codes of research ethics" [269]. Natu-
rally, consent originated and has been extensively studied in the eld of medicine
and bioethics [135; 269]. The cornerstone of the idea of consent in medicine is the
safeguarding of patients' autonomy. The core elements ensuring that individuals'
autonomy will not be eroded is the voluntarily nature of consent, since consent
should not be given under coercion, and the informed manner under which the
patients should act when giving their consent.
In the recent years, as there is overgrowing evidence that providing a user-
centric control model in online transactions mitigates privacy concerns, researchers
recognise that the element of consent as applied in the eld of medicine, can become
a basis for understanding and implementing controls [265; 159; 177; 123]. Kerr et
al. argue that consent \becomes privacy's linchpin" and envisage it as a \nexus",
providing the \interface between human beings and our increasingly automated
information gathering systems" [147]. Whitley [265] deems that consent can be an
eective and important mechanism when determining how and when the data will
be used and disseminated further. In general there is a belief that consent can
adequately address the problems and the criticism emerging from the literature on
online privacy. In order to comprehend how the notion of consent can facilitate the
concept of controls in online transactions, we need to obtain an insight to its origins,
the rationale under which it was applied and the limitations of the concept in the
eld of medicine, the discipline where the idea of consent was initially conceived
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and widely applied.
2.3.1 History of consent
There is an \institutional myth" that the idea of consent was conceived as a remedy
to the horrifying experiments conducted by doctors that facilitated the operation
of German concentration camps during the World War II [122]. Following the end
of the war, several trials were conducted by the Americans and amongst those ac-
cused for crimes against humanity were the Nazi doctors. The culmination of these
trials was the Nuremberg Code that established \the right of a research-subject
to give a voluntary consent"and \the right to withdraw from research" [122]. The
rationale was to respect the autonomy of the data subjects and protect it against
any hazardous research [17]. However, Grodin identies fragments of consent in the
literature that preceded the Nuremberg Code. In 1767, a British court prohibited
doctors from trying new instruments on patients without their approval, whereas
in early 1900 in Prussia a primitive version of consent was developed. Ironically,
this version was later adopted and legislated into law by the Nazi Weimar Repub-
lic. Nazi's were the rst to prohibit research on animals and individuals but later
these laws were neutralised when applied to prisoners of war [113]. The same chal-
lenge arose for the Nuremberg Code as American doctors did engage in hazardous
experiments as well. It is an indication why the idea of consent was not adopted
by doctors in daily practise until the early 1960s since, as Katz, explains obtain-
ing consent \is a good code for barbarians but an unnecessary code for ordinary
physician-scientists" [143].
It was not until 1957 and after several trials where doctors were accused by
unsatised treated patients [221], that the idea of consent was extended by the term
of \informed consent". In the case of Salgo v Leland Stanford the court wondered
whether the patient was appropriately informed prior to giving his consent for the
treatment [159]. The rst articulated authoritative denition of informed consent
was captured by the Helsinki Declaration in 1964, developed by the World Medical
Association, where:
In medical research involving competent human subjects, each poten-
tial subject must be adequately informed of the aims, methods, sources
of funding, any possible conicts of interest, institutional aliations of
the researcher, the anticipated benets and potential risks of the study
and the discomfort it may entail, and any other relevant aspects of the
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study. The potential subject must be informed of the right to refuse to
participate in the study or to withdraw consent to participate at any
time without reprisal. Special attention should be given to the specic
information needs of individual potential subjects as well as to the meth-
ods used to deliver the information. After ensuring that the potential
subject has understood the information, the physician or another ap-
propriately qualied individual must then seek the potential subject's
freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing. If the consent can-
not be expressed in writing, the non-written consent must be formally
documented and witnessed (World Medical Association, 1964) [in [265]].
This denition emphasises on the autonomy of the patient and the idea of consent
is introduced to establish an environment where any violations will be prohibited [28;
89]. The Medical Association dictates two requirements to ensure that the process
of informed consent is valid. Firstly, the patient should not be coerced or forced
when giving consent and secondly the data subject must act in an informed manner.
Regarding the \freely given" consent, this requirement underlines the situations
where the patients are coerced either because there are not being given an alternative
or becasue they are being manipulated when the consent choices are engineered. In
the latter case, the default choices of consent are extremely important [163]. Due
to the aspect of \ voluntarily agreement", consent should be specic and propose a
detailed aim since \one never agrees in an vacuum; rather one agrees to something or
with something" [147]. In addition, consent should be obtained before the disclosure
of any data [71].
Since consent precedes the disclosure of data, it is required that patients should
be informed of all the benets and risks regarding what they give consent for, render-
ing a clear and coherent informing process essential. In addition, the data subjects
should also realise the consequences of their refusal to give consent. The issues that
emerge relate both with the understanding of the description regarding the purpose
of the consent and with the comprehensiveness of the procedure followed to pro-
vide information to the patients [175; 144]. Elaborating on patients' comprehension
regarding the purpose of consent, Williamson [269] proposes Feinberg's concept of
\inducement set", where a subject must be aware of all the true propositions that
in relation to his beliefs will determine whether or not to disclose the data [90]. In
addition, there are categories of patients where certain circumstances prohibit them
from performing in an informed manner.
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Faden and Beauchamp, reecting on the desired conditions for informed consent,
developed the most important theory of \informed consent", deriving signicant
insights on the procedures for obtaining consent [89]. Drawing on concepts from
moral philosophy and law, they describe a theory of informed consent based on the
principles of respect for autonomy, benecence or welfare of the data subject and
justice or fair treatment. The authors emphasise on informed actions rather than
informed persons, since sometimes uninformed persons could act in an informed
manner [89]. Further, they provide ve core elements that underpin their principles
for a valid informed consent. These are:
 The disclosure of relevant information regarding the process prior to data
subjects decision.
 Comprehension of the benets and risks of each treatment and consequences
of the denial of giving consent.
 Voluntariness of giving consent.
 Competence of the patient that gives consent.
 Alternative options, where the patient must be provided with the choice to
prefer other solutions.
However, from the core elements of the theory of informed consent emerge a two-
fold limitation. The rst aspect considers the manipulation of the data subject when
choices are engineered and the second questions the intellectual capacity of data
subjects which under certain conditions prohibits them from acting in an informed
manner.
2.3.2 Consent in the literature on information privacy
In the last 30 years, informed consent was adopted and applied in the context of
online transactions and it is now considered to be a core feature for mitigating
privacy concerns [99]. It is mentioned in data protection regulations and policies,
referred in best business practices and linked with fair information processing prin-
ciples. However, as a concept, it is arguably not completely understood in the online
community. Questions remain unanswered regarding how consent can function and
more importantly how it can be managed and implemented by the public and private
sector [99; 267].
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Recently, there have been eorts to provide guidance on how to apply the idea
of informed consent in online environments and many researchers recognise the
problems and the limitations created from such an endeavour [99]. Researchers
adopted Faden's and Beauchamp's theory of informed consent and considered how it
can be applied in an online environment where the individuals will be able to control
via consent the collection, use and dissemination of their personal information [37;
98; 177; 99]. The most notable example is Friedman et al. approach, where they
embrace the core elements of the informed consent theory and suggest a model with
one additional element that of agreement. They dene agreement as a \reasonably
clear opportunity to accept or decline to participate" [99].
However, several issues emerge when the model is applied in online environments
that raise questions regarding the core elements of the informed consent theory. Fo-
cusing on the disclosure of information, it must be clear to the individual how the
information will be collected, who will be able to obtain access to that informa-
tion, for which purposes the data will be used and under which circumstances the
information will be disseminated further. These are controls mentioned in fair in-
formation practice principles and a clear articulation and understanding of these
practices is of crucial importance [98; 146].
Departing from disclosure, comprehension of procedural practices is essential
since the data subjects are required to perform in an informed manner. Towards
that direction, they must adequately understand the privacy policies and the fair
information practices under which businesses operate. Studies suggest that stan-
dardization of these policies and practices has a signicant positive eect on the
level of understanding [144]. However, as surveys conclude, there are worrying signs
that only a limited number of data subjects will read the privacy policies before
consenting to them [178; 175].
Furthermore data subjects must be aware of the benets and the risks under-
taken when they agree to give their consent. Unlike medicine, in an online envi-
ronment a dynamic model for consent is required as the continued use of data by
the enterprises may lead to a secondary use of that data. As a consequence, if the
initial consent remains static, it is no longer valid. Current business practices ob-
tain data subjects' consent in the appropriately signied time, but unfortunately its
static form is considered to be an \indication" that the individuals have provided
consent for the use of data under dierent purposes. Further issues emerge from
the secondary use of data as it may enable the deduction of information about data
subjects that individuals did not mean to reveal [98]. This could be achieved by
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aggregating their data with information derived from other sources [236]. Hence,
not all information is of the same importance, as data considered as \sensitive"could
reveal further information when processed dierently or aggregated with other data.
In these cases a detailed and clear description of the benets acquired when data is
disclosed is crucial, as the risk in the event of a privacy breach can have devastating
consequences [146].
Voluntariness suggests that consent should be freely given. This element em-
phasises on situations where data subjects may be manipulated when the consent
choices and the default values oered to them are engineered [163; 25]. There is a
stream of studies that draw from concepts of psychology and decisional theory and
reveal the important role of \choice architects" [147]. These people \quietly skew
individual decision making while preserving the illusion of free choice" [147], thus
impeaching the premise of the freely-given consent.
Based on psychological barriers, Kerr et al.l declaim that people inherently de-
velop a tendency prohibiting them from freely giving consent and more importantly
minimising the possibilities of withdrawing that consent in the future [147]. To
corroborate their point they draw upon decisional theory and the concept of \sub-
jective utility" [147]. Subjective utility suggets that individuals' personal value of
an outcome correlates with the expected time of that outcome. More specically
the subjective value of a loss or benet decreases as the time-expectancy of the out-
come increases, a suggestion which is in alignment with the prospect theory [162].
For example, individuals will prefer to gain $50 at the present time rather than
gaining $100 after 5 years. Furthermore, the decreasing rate of benets is inverse
proportional to that of loses. Thus, gains become less good in the future while loses
become less bad [197; 3]. Hence, when an individual gives consent to gain some
benets, the loss of control that might occur in the future is less valued. On the
contrary, when they intend to withdraw the initial consent the loss of their benets
is \higher weighted" than the regain of that control in the future [147; 139].
Further issues regarding the voluntariness of consent emerge when individuals
are manipulated. Based on normative behaviour, Marx suggests that businesses en-
deavoured to universalise practices and establish them as normal behaviour coercing
individuals to react in a manner that rarely reects their privacy concerns [168].
For example being asked for your personal details by a cashier tends to become the
normal shopping experience. Reinforcing Marx's point, Kerr argues that bounded
rationality, which suggests that people have knowledge limitations thus they can
make wrong decisions [231], enhances the \misdirection" of the consumers while
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preserving a sense of illusionary choice [147].
Another aspect that emerges from the element of freely-given consent, is the
problem of \Hobsons choice". Hobson's choice describes a situation where the in-
dividual has no alternative but to give consent to a specic action, rendering the
process of informed consent meaningless [265]. Absence of choice may occur when
data is collected for governmental use, for security reasons or in cases where individ-
uals have to provide personal information to acquire access to services. For example,
the popular electronic games EA Sports requires full access on individuals' comput-
ers before permitting them to install and play any of their games, providing them
with no other choice but not to play the game.
Competence refers to demonstrating the cognitive, mental and physical capa-
bilities required for an individual to give informed consent. It is of paramount
importance in online environments since acquiring access on the Internet is easily
achieved by almost anyone. The issue is mentioned in the Article 29 Working Party,
where certain categories of individuals, such as children and individuals with men-
tal disorders are considered vulnerable online because they lack the capacity to give
appropriate consent [216].
Regarding children, their capacity to decide whether to disclose their personal
data relies on several factors and the choice until they are able to demonstrate com-
petence is delegated to their parents [79]. In the case of adults lacking capacity,
it is essential to acknowledge that it is not a constant situation and a more dy-
namic response should exist. The responsibility for giving consent on their behalf
is delegated to relatives and primary carers [128].
Agreement refers to a clear, legible and visible online opportunity for individuals
to either accept or decline giving consent. It should be an on-going concept and
individuals should be able to withdraw their consent in the future. There are cases
though that not all forms of agreement are explicit, leading to the concept of implied
consent where by explicitly giving consent to gain access into a service, the individual
has in essence consented to all the activities that might occur in that context. In
order for the implied consent to be valid all the other elements of the informed
consent must hold. For example giving consent to pay by credit card online, implies
that the individual agrees on his bank acquiring the data of the transaction.
Informed consent reveals the potential risk or benet of an online transaction and
provides an opportunity to the data subjects to choose whether to accept or decline
to participate. It can be the appropriate mechanism to enable users to control
the collection, use and further distribution of their personal data, mitigating their
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privacy concerns and enhancing their trust towards data controllers. However, there
are limitations that current consent practices fail to address. A model of consent
that will provide meaningful control over personal information must embrace the
dynamic nature of the online environment and reect people's behaviour. Acquisti et
al. declare that \we need to incorporate more accurate models of users' behaviour
into the formulation of both policy and technology" [5]. To-date, understanding
the management of consent in information systems is limited and as a consequence,
controls applied in online interactions with the form of giving consent remain archaic.
Unfortunately, current practices conceptualise consent as a unique transactional
moment, leading to a static and rigid model unable to handle the ongoing and rapidly
changing procedures of collection, use and disclosure of personal information. Thus,
the current implementation \fails to recognize the unique role that consent is meant
to play as the nexus between people and information technology" [147]. A rened
model for informed consent, able to address the issues of disclosure, voluntariness
and competence, must be based on a dynamic perception that will enable users to
change their minds and revoke their consent. Hence designing a model for revocation
of consent is crucial for a holistic understanding of the management of informed
consent. Furthermore, a dynamic model that oers revocation choices can mitigate
the psychological barriers as users can always make the necessary changes to regain
the control of their data because it is no longer \an all-or-nothing, take-it-or-leave-it,
instantaneous transaction" [147].
2.3.3 Revocation in the literature on information privacy
Although the literature presented above suggests that controls is the dominant con-
cept for mitigating privacy concerns and consent is a well understood and applied
concept in medicine, the conceptualisation and management of controls as giving
consent in online interactions is limited [265]. Many studies restrain their perception
of controls to fair information processing, abilities to access data and opt-out choices,
while others interpret consent as a rigid and static process rendering the controls
of consent inappropriate for the dynamic online environment. Giving consent to an
on-going and volatile procedure of collecting and processing personal data, such as
those implemented by business operating online, presupposes that individuals will
be oered the opportunity to revoke their initial consent either by replacing it with
a dierent one or by indicating that their consent is no longer valid.
However, the literature that conceptualises control of personal information as
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revoking consent is still a stream in infancy. To my knowledge there has not been any
proposals or designs for a model of revocation equivalent to that of informed consent.
Those researches that suggest revocation mechanisms to enhance the control of
personal data, present simplistic choices, such as opt-out mechanisms from targeting
management practices [239; 167], the removal of data and the sharing of negative
experiences [179].
Kerr et al. recognise the gap in the literature and they suggest that \consent
provides the fulcrum for understanding" of controls as means for protecting privacy
as long as the notion of \consent as on-going agent" is proposed [147]. Towards
this direction Whitley [265] identies several encounters that could alter individ-
uals choices of consent and argues that revocation of consent could have multiple
interpretations. He lays the foundations for a model by suggesting the dierentia-
tion between revoking consent for the collection of personal data and revoking con-
sent for processing it. Whitley also acknowledges that further research is required
for understanding \what is meant by revocation in the context of organisational
systems"[265]. In addition, the recent shift to legislative eorts regarding data pro-
tection in the European Union, renders the development of a revocation model more
imminent than ever [216].
2.4 Legislating privacy and consent
The evolution of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) and the
adoption of innovative business models craft the processing of personal information.
Thus, legislation regarding the data protection, in response to these changes, is
constantly evolving to address new privacy threats. From the diusion of personal
computers to the explosion of the Internet, legislative eorts based on the right
to be let alone concept, endeavoured to impose controls on the disclosure of data.
However, the increasing number of privacy breaches provoked a shift in the European
Union's perception towards a more dynamic perspective, focusing not only on the
disclosure of the data but on the ongoing usage of that data, drawing elements from
the right to be forgotten concept [171].
One of the pioneering attempts to legislate a data protection law, was con-
ceived in the German state of Hessen in 1970, followed by a UK eort in 1972 and
the national laws in Sweden (1973) and France (1978). These attempts focused
on mitigating privacy concerns regarding the use of personal computers and the
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threat of data bases withholding information on individuals [125]. In that direc-
tion, the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare circulated a report in
1973, presenting principles for fair information practices that should dictate every
technological-driven use of data. The emphasis is given on reassuring individuals
regarding the fair processing of their data by organisations. In essence, it is required
the procurement of informed consent before collecting the data. In addition, the
right of the data subjects to access their personal information in order to prohibit
any unsolicited secondary use is introduced [67]. A rened version of this report
was published in 1980 by the OECD, aiming to address the needs emerging from
the globalisation of services that instigated discrepancies in the cross-border ow of
data [95]. The aim of the report was to develop basic principles that would harmo-
nize diverse approaches from dierent national privacy legislations, facilitating the
data ow between countries [70].
The culmination of these eorts was the European Union's Data Protection
Directive (95/46/EC) providing the principles underpinning privacy legislation in
every European country [2]. The directive distinguished data in normal and sensi-
tive, enforcing a standard level of consent pertinent to normal data and requiring
an explicit consent for more sensitive data. The principles described in the directive
converge with the controls identied in the literature on online privacy. More specif-
ically, personal data should be: fairly and lawfully processed; collected for specic
purposes; relevant and kept to the minimum amount necessary for the specied
purpose; accurate and, where possible, kept up-to-date; and stored for a designated
time when linked with the identity of the data subjects [2]. Most of the principles
concentrate on the disclosure of data, remaining oblivious to the emerging needs of
individuals for more dynamic types of consent.
It was not until recently, that the European Parliament authorised the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a report underpinned by the same principals
on which the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) was developed and is considered
to be its replacement. Unlike its predecessor it is not a directive and will have a
\direct eect" in all peers of the European Union as they are obliged to replicate it
on their national legislation within two years of its agreement [80].
GDPR is a rened version as it regulates stringent procedural controls and a
framework to allow individuals to exercise consent in a dynamic manner by intro-
ducing the individuals' right \to be forgotten" [80]. Regarding informed consent,
GDPR bolsters its role and establishes the concept as an essential mechanism for
enabling individuals to control the collection, processing and dissemination of their
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personal data. It seizes the dichotomy of data to sensitive and non-sensitive data,
requiring explicit and detailed consent which can be revoked at any time.
Towards revocation of consent, GDPR introduces the right to be forgotten.
Drawing on and extending the existing right to keep the data up-to-date when
necessary, it stipulates rights for erasing data and restrains any further use. Those
rights can be exercised in ve occasions: where the processing of data does not
necessitate the purpose for which the data was initially collected; where consent is
revoked by the data subject; when the time-duration of the legitimate given consent
has elapsed; when there is an objection on behalf of the data subject; and in any
encounter the procedures followed by the organisations are not compliant with the
GDPR [80]. Although GDPR is pointing on the right direction, there are concerns
raised regarding the applicability of revocation and how such controls can be veried
and enforced.
I believe these concerns converge with the gap in the literature on revocation
identied in Section 2.3.3 and highlight the necessity of an applicable model of
consent and revocation. Faden and Beauchamp believe that \philosophy and law can
provide a systematic approach to moral problems" [89] but when the applicability
of such models is in question they cannot provide solid answers. Unlike formal
methods, a discipline that can verify with a mathematical and unequivocal manner
the eciency and applicability of conceptual models in information systems.
2.5 Formal methods
Formal methods comprise of languages, tools and techniques formulated on mathe-
matical principles that provide rigid and reliable answers regarding the specication
and verication of information systems [60]. The application of formal methods on
systems operating in complex and volatile environments can shed light on any in-
consistencies and ambiguities that may rise in the life-cycle of the system and can
provide solid ground for reasoning about its correctness [60].
The development of formal methods has revolved around two main avenues,
namely formal specication and formal verication. Formal specication embraces
languages structured with mathematical semantics to describe the properties of a
system. A stream of literature focuses on describing sequential systems by seg-
menting the behaviour of the system in states which are expressed in mathematical
manner as sets, relations and functions. Change in the behaviour of the system
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is captured by state transitions given in the form of pre- and post-conditions. An
example of such methods are Z [240] and VDM [136]. Other models draw atten-
tion to describing concurrent systems where behaviour is modelled as sequences of
events and emphasis is given on whether these events could occur simultaneously.
Methods such as CSP [121], CCS [180] and Temporal Logic [208] are the most dom-
inant in the eld. The value of formal specication models stem from expressing
the requirements of a system in an analytical and rigorous form, enabling designers
to gain useful insights, to resolve conicts and unravel ambiguities.
Complementing formal specication, formal verication aims on corroborating
a specied property of the system. Towards this direction, two dierent approaches
have been developed, namely model checking and theorem proving. The rst
approach requires the design of a nite state-model, enabling designers to check
whether the desired behaviour is satised in each or any of these states [220]. The
latter approach relies on expressing both the system and the desired behaviour in
a mathematical logic. The logic requires the formulation of axioms and rules that
will construct the proofs. Each desired behaviour is proved when deduced by the
rules and axioms of the logic [58]. Successful models combine and benet from both
approaches, such examples are [59; 156], and several tools to automate the process
have been proposed and successfully implemented [110; 109; 156; 217].
Due to the often obscure mathematical models, formal methods were reluctantly
embraced in information systems. Research areas that were early adopters of such
methods were areas where systems' security was of paramount importance, such as
military systems. In information security history, the earliest approach to achieve
and verify trusted controls was access control models. The use of such models is
expanded in cyberspace and the aim of the method is to determine the actions and
the operations that a legitimate user can execute in a system.
An access control model consists of a subject which is the entity of the system
requesting a specic access, the object which is dened as the entity of the system
corresponding to the information or application that the subject may access and
the action which illustrates the type of activity or operation that the subject is
performing when accessing the object. Whether a subject will be allowed or not
to access an object for a specic action is dictated by two components that govern
the access control models, namely the access control policies and the set of control
procedures. Access control policies are a set of rules that determine when an access
is valid and the control procedures ensure that every access is in accordance with
the policies and principles in place [225; 111]. Access control models is a fertile area
2. The journey from privacy to consent and revocation 45
for research and as such has attracted the interest of various disciplines. Regarding
formal methods, researchers have focused on developing formal models for dening
and expressing access control policies, as these policies are in the heart of every
access control model and a crucial factor for their success or their failure [225].
In the literature on formal methods, three dierent approaches have been de-
veloped to express access control policies. The rst approach is the discretionary
policies where every subject of the system is given authorisations and permissions
(read, write, execute) for each object. These permissions are allocated to the sub-
jects by the owners of the objects [116; 53]. Every time there is a request from
a user to access an object, their credentials are matched against the specied au-
thorizations of the object and access is only allowed if the authorisations pertained
to the object specify that the user can access it. This rationale allows for greater
exibility, rendering the discretionary policies suitable for systems implemented in
commercial environments. However, there is a compromise for the exibility that
they oer, as the policies focus only on the disclosure of information and are unable
to handle the ow of information. In addition, there is not any control or restriction
posed on data processing. For example, a subject may acquire access on data and
then provide a copy to another subject to whom access to the specic data was
initially prohibited [225].
The second approach was developed as a response to the limitations of the dis-
cretionary policies [225]. Mandatory policies provide a stringent and more nuanced
framework on how access on the system is governed. They dene a segmentation
of the subjects and objects into dierent hierarchical security levels [34]. Instead of
permitting the owners to dene diverse authorisations to subjects, an approach that
allows for greater exibility and granularity, here each subject and each object is
allocated to a security level that corresponds to the sensitivity of the object and the
level of trustworthiness of the subject. The decisional process is underpinned by two
principles that associate the security levels of subjects and objects. The rst princi-
ple requires that a subject's level must supersede the level of object before access to
read the information is permitted. The second principle requests that the objects'
level must supersede the level of the subject before a write action is allowed. The
combination of those two principles aims in prohibiting the ow of information from
a high level object to a lower level, are rendering the mandatory policy approach
inelastic and only applied on rigid environments, such as military systems [225].
The dominant approach of mandatory access control is the Bell-LaPadula model
which denes classes forming a hierarchy from \Top secret" to \Unclassied" [34].
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The limitations acknowledged in discretionary policies approach and the lack of
information ow from a lower to a higher level in the mandatory policies approach
fail to satisfy the requirements for services oered on cyberspace [226]. A third
approach aims in providing a solution that combines the two approaches. The role-
based policies approach govern access decision based on what activities users perform
in the system [38]. Instead of associating each user with authorisations or dening
a rigid schema of diverse security levels, the rationale in this approach is to identify
dierent roles in the system. Each role is dened as a set of acceptable actions and
authorisations related to a specic behaviour. Roles are allocated to users, who can
perform one or more roles in the system, and authorisation is determined according
to the role that each user adopts [224; 111]. This approach controls the usage of
information as well as maintains exibility. However, there exists a drawback since
dening the appropriate roles in a system is a complex procedure [111].
2.5.1 Challenges for formal methods in privacy
A study released by the National Academies regarding \Privacy and Information
Technology in a Digital Age" [258] intensies the need to address privacy concerns
and provide answers to what is technically achievable or practically impossible, in
order to avoid a situation where infeasible privacy regulations are legislated. Since
the applicability of dierent conceptual models of privacy is into question, formal
methods should be embraced. The complex nature of privacy raises new challenges
and new opportunities for research in the community of formal methods [251].
According to Preinbusch [214], conducting research on online privacy practices
suers from two problems. The rigid current practices opposing to consumers'
behaviour that stakeholders are reluctant to abandon and the lack of models able
to reason about privacy controls and their valid implementation. He concludes that
the need of \advancing and integrating" formal methods is more imminent than
ever, as they could shed light on understanding and supporting \consumers' privacy
decision- making", provide solid mathematical proofs of proposed technical solutions
and rene current practices oering \agile re-certication" based not on stakeholders
claims for privacy-friendly environments but on actual implementation [214].
More specically, formal methods can assist in the development of a framework
for privacy rights, concerns and breaches. The arsenal of formal methods from
state machine models to mathematical logics and model behaviour provide the ap-
propriate tools to formalise the requirements of a dynamic and highly contextual
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informational system [251]. The dierent conceptions of privacy can be captured by
formal languages and novel logics can be applied to verify privacy-friendly system
behaviour or capture the dierent information ow in systems required to address
privacy concerns.
Privacy policies encapsulated in access control models can enable researchers
to reason about privacy properties, identify ambiguities and detect inconsistencies
and conicting requirements. As highlighted in the online privacy literature review,
it is important not only to control the disclosure of personal information but to
control the usage and the further dissemination of the information as well. Thus,
data controllers must express their policies in machine readable languages, enabling
methods for reassuring data subjects that their wishes are respected throughout the
life-cycle of the processing of their data. Traditional formal models cannot address
these issues and as Tschantz et al. argue new logics and tools will be needed
to respond to these challenges [251]. Challenges that researchers have started to
investigate in the recent years.
2.5.2 Formal methods in privacy
According to Goncalves access control models must aim at safeguarding conden-
tiality and limited access to personal data [111]. A purpose that is in alignment
with the limited access to the self privacy conception [101; 100]. The rst formal
models addressing privacy issues were based on traditional access control models.
However there is a fundamental dierence between security and privacy. In security
the entity operating the system has an inherent interest in maintaining the system
secure, whereas in privacy the entity who is at risk from a privacy breach is the
data subject that has little control on traditional formal models. Culnan et al. [69]
highlight that organisations may be operating in a secure system that can still mis-
use personal data raising privacy concerns. Attempts to ll this gap emphasise on
embedding privacy policies and requirements mainly on role-based access control
models [18; 19; 152; 182]. These models are preferred from mandatory and discre-
tionary models because privacy policies impose restrictions not only on access but
on the future use of data as well. In addition, they depend on the context and a
greater exibility is required [214; 26].
In an attempt to mitigate online privacy concerns the World Wide Web Consor-
tium suggested the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P). P3P is an XML-
based language that provides a framework for describing privacy policies [64; 63]. It
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is based on the rational that the users could compare the websites' privacy guide-
lines with their preferences and decide whether to disclose their data or not. In
particular, data controllers dene P3P policies comprised of specications regard-
ing the required data, the purpose of collection and any conict resolution proposals.
In addition these policies impose the aforementioned restrictions in terms of data
hierarchy, which is an illustration of personal attributes arranged in sets and sub-
sets [257]. On the other hand, data subjects are provided with a policy language
called \A P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL)" enabling them to express
their privacy preferences in a compatible format [256]. A preference dened in
APPEL dictates whether disclosure of data to a data controller expressing a spe-
cic P3P policy should be denied, limited or permitted. Although P3P lacks of
formal specication and cannot assist in policy enforcement by ensuring that a ser-
vice provider will operate as promised, it has set the threshold to develop a widely
accepted language for privacy, and thus underpins most of the research in this area.
Aiming on policy enforcement, IBM developed the \Enterprise Privacy Autho-
rization Language (EPAL)" which emphasises on formally expressing privacy poli-
cies [22; 141]. The formalisation of policies is the key factor for ensuring that policies
will be implemented. EPAL requires a policy decision point responding to stimu-
lus from a policy enforcement point. Given any action in the system, the policy
enforcement point requests from the policy decision point to evaluate the appropri-
ate EPAL policy and the answer could be either \allow, deny or don't care". In
addition EPAL policies once evaluated, can create obligations, which are actions
either required or prohibited in the future [22]. Similar to EPAL, another language
designed to automate the process of policy enforcement is the eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML) [187; 106]. Languages such as EPAL and
XACML that dene schemas for privacy policy languages, are the rst step towards
a formal methodology for addressing privacy issues. However, a \deeper integration
between privacy and access control requirements is needed" [18].
Agrawal et al. [12] attempt to embed privacy policies into access control mod-
els. Their model requires expressing customers' privacy preferences in P3P format.
When personal data is disclosed, the P3P expressions are captured by a policy trans-
lator and stored into a schema named \TI". These schemas contain specications
denoting under which purposes the data should be used and which entities of the
system can acquire access to the data. In essence, TI schemas create restrictions
that are tied with specic data and access is granted only when restrictions are
satised [12; 158]. This approach focuses only on limiting the disclosure of personal
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data [158].
Byun et al. [48] propose a role-based access control model that interprets privacy
policies only as purposes for intended use of data and instead of allocating permis-
sions to roles they assign purposes. They introduce a labelling schema, which allows
the assignment of roles to either a single element, or to a single record stored in a
data base, or to a column of a data base or to the entire data base table [48]. Ni
et al. [191; 192] ameliorate Byun model [48] and they propose a privacy preserv-
ing role-based access control model (P-RBAC). In addition to purpose, the authors
introduce a schema consisting of ve privacy requirements namely data, action, pur-
pose, condition and obligation. Thus, an action can only be implemented for the
specied data if it suces the purpose, the condition and the obligation factors.
Condition is formalised as a boolean variable that captures parental and data sub-
jects' consent and obligation is a function required to be performed either prior or
after the action described in the schema [191]. A similar approach is introduced
by Fischer-Hubner [93]. Instead of focusing on actions, she proposes a task-based
access control model with the intention of dening the purpose of use and the indi-
cation of consent. Data can only be disclosed when a user is authorised to execute a
specic task and the completion of the task depends on the disseminated data [93].
Distancing themselves from limiting the disclosure of data, some researchers
adopt a dierent perspective that focuses on group privacy, drawing on Gavison's
conception of privacy as \secrecy, anonymity and solitude"[101]. Instead of limiting
access to data pertaining to a single individual, the aim is to control the type of
information disclosed, by limiting data controllers' potential of deducing further
information about members of a group. There is a number of techniques proposed
to anonymise data [26]. In k-anonymity [244; 57] the information is suppressed
until there are at least another k people in the group with similar characteristics,
a rational adopted by l-diversity approach [165]. However, as Ohm argues [195],
information can be either anonymised or of use. In addition, there is no guarantee
that in the near future data controllers will not develop methods to unveil the hidden
identity [195].
Adopting Posner's perception of privacy as the right to \conceal facts" [209],
Ciriani et al. [56] introduce a language for addressing condentiality and visibil-
ity constraints. According to their model, the data is fragmented in sets and they
impose restrictions on whether the data must be visible to the user or remain con-
dential. There are two types of constraints expressed formally as Boolean vari-
ables. Condentiality constraints denote that the single data set associated with
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the Boolean variable or any joint sets of data should be treated as sensitive data
and thus must remain invisible. Likewise, visibility constraints indicate the dissem-
ination of a set or any joint sets of data [56].
All the aforementioned models are designed based on the limited approach to self
conception or its variations and intuitively inherit its limitations as researchers focus
only on restricting access to personal data. On some occasions they neglect how
data is used by the data controllers while on others they neglect whether personal
information is disseminated further to third parties and under which restrictions.
In order to address these limitations, the focus is shifted from access control models
that specify the requirements for the release of the information, to usage control
models that emphasise on how data must be handled after the disclosure [273; 203].
The proposed solutions are underpinned by the conception of privacy as a set of
controls and the models attempt to formalise controls identied in the online privacy
literature.
One of the pivotal initiatives towards a usage control approach is Sandhu's et al.
User Control Authorisation oBligation Conditions model (UCONABC) [203]. It is
an approach that brings together elements from traditional access control models,
trust management techniques and digital rights management (DRM) technologies.
The authors claim that their approach is not \a substitute\ of the aforementioned
methods as they \encompass these three areas and go beyond their denition and
scope" [203]. The model denes a framework that comprises of authorisations,
obligations, conditions, subjects, objects and attributes. Attributes are capabilities
and identities allocated to subjects and objects via an authorisation process. The
authors introduce a novel characteristic of attributes as they distinguish them to
mutable and immutable. Mutable attributes may change when the object is accessed
or could be updated at any time by the subject whereas immutable attributes can
only be changed with an administrative request. Obligations in UCONABC diverse
from the denition of obligations in other access control models as they capture
requirements that have to be fullled either prior or during the usage of data but
not in the future. Conditions capture requirements emerging from the environment
where the system is implemented and are not aected by subjects and objects.
The authors provide formal examples of how UCONABC can perform as a
mandatory access control model, as an discretionary model and as a role-based
model, while they consider privacy as a predicate dictating controls regarding ac-
cess and usage. Attributes, obligations and conditions are assigned to dierent roles
however, it is the data controller who unilaterally designs the policies that apply to
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each role, reducing the expressiveness of the model. This weakness is acknowledged
by the authors who, in a position paper, explore future directions of how UCON may
be extended to support diverse policies for data subjects [204]. For a case study,
Park et al. examine the application of UCON in social networks, a context where
each user expresses dierent privacy preferences. Formalising users' preferences re-
quires individual policies that would be congured by the data subject [204]. The
authors fail to propose an adequate solution but highlight opportunities for future
research.
For the needs of the PrimeLife project, Ardagna et al. developed a model for
addressing the problem of secondary use of data [19]. The value of the model
stems from focusing on policies that specify the usage and not the dissemination
of data and the policy-language design comprises of data recipients, purpose of use
and obligations. The proposed framework integrates the new policies focusing on
dening constraints for the handling of data with traditional access control models.
However they fail to provide a solution for the dissemination of those policies to
other data controllers. Bussard et al. [47] address the limitation of the model and
propose an XML-based language that enables data subjects to express the stream
that their data will follow. In their approach the authors distinguish three dierent
types of policies, namely \preferences" that capture access control requirements
necessary for obtaining access to the data; \policies" that certify the compliant to
the preferences data controllers and their intentions regarding the use of data; and
the \sticky policies" that concern the dissemination of personal information between
dierent data controllers aiming at ensuring that the preferences of the data subject
will be respected by all the data controllers that may obtain their data [47].
This joint eort by Ardagna et al. and Bussard et al. set the foundations for the
PrimeLife Policy Language (PPL) [20]. PPL is an extention of XACML aiming at
capturing specications regarding the usage and the further dissemination of data.
The language encompasses three dierent types of policies namely data handling
policies that regulate the intentions of the data controller, data-handling preferences
that describe the expectations of the data subject and the sticky policies that is the
result of the matching process amongst the aforementioned policies. Each policy
comprises of obligations and authorisations. Obligations are dened as a promise
made by a data controller to a data subject in relation to the handling of his/her
personal data" and are formalised in an \Event-Condition-Action manner" [206].
The term used in the PrimeLife Project is downstream data
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Authorisations are dichotomised in those describing the use of information and
those dening the process of disseminating data further down the chain.
The proposed technical approach resembles that of the P3P approach. It con-
tains a component named Policy Decision Point (PDP), which is responsible for
matching data subjects' preferences with data controllers' promises and determines
whether or not a party may obtain personal data, a Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP), which transfers the decisions to the appropriate applications of the system
and an Obligation Handler that supervises the creation and enforcement of obliga-
tions [248]. The aim of the proposed framework is not to control the ow of the data,
but to prevent the undesired disclosure of information and any possible aggregation
that may occur. Thus, there is no mechanism described for revoking policies.
Becker et al. propose a similar approach that emphasises on matching data
subjects' wishes with data controllers' intentions, checking compliance and provid-
ing a disclosure framework for supervising the dissemination of data to other data
controllers [29]. Initially developed for formalising policies that regulate the autho-
risation processes in decentralized systems [31; 32], SecPal is a rst order logic that
its signature comprises of constants and predicates describing a set of assertions.
The assertions are given in the form E says f0 if f1, . . . , fn where c, where E is
a constant of the logic, c is a constraint of variables and f is a fact dened as a set
of predicates [30].
SecPal for Privacy (SecPAL4P) is an extension of SecPal enabling the formalisa-
tion of users' preferences and services' policies, by introducing a x set of predicates
that correspond to Personal Identiable Information(PII) behaviour [29; 32]. Both
users' preferences and service's policies are formalised by dening an upper and
lower boundary. The upper bound of preferences describes how the data controllers
may handle personal data, while the lower bound denes the obligations that ser-
vices must comply with. In a similar manner, the upper bound of services' policies
declares the possible behaviours of the data controller towards personal data, while
the lower bound captures the promised behaviours. Matching a policy with a pref-
erence requires that the upper bound of a service is specied in the upper bound of
the preference and the lower bound of the preference is also expressed in the lower
bound of a service.
The dual expression of preferences and policies is captured formally by extending
the formalisation of assertions with the formalisation of queries. Hence, the upper
bound of preferences is a set of may-assertions with the form of E says S may f0,
. . . , fn, where c, while the upper bound of policies is captured by may-queries since
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the data controller must request permission for handling personal data. The queries
are of the form E says S may f0, . . . , fn, where c? and are satised when they are
a subset of the upper bound preferences. Likewise, the lower bound of preferences
is captured with a will-query of the form E says S will f0, . . . , fn, where c?,
while the lower bound of policies is formalised with a will-assertion of the form E
says S will f0, . . . , fn, where c?, since the data subject requests the minimal
expected behaviour prior to disclosure. The queries are satised when the lower
bound preferences is a subset of the services' obligations [29]. Formally matching a
policy to preferences, requires that both may and will queries are satised.
The authors further describe a framework based on checking certain assertions
against the may and will queries to enforce compliance. In addition, they pro-
vide a disclosure protocol that encompasses predicates responsible for capturing
users' preferences regarding the further dissemination of their data to other data-
controllers [32]. Although SecPAL4P addresses changes in policies when they are
still satised by preferences, the authors fail to describe changes in data subjects'
preferences.
All the models based on the conception of privacy as controls, formalise controls
mentioned in the online privacy literature regarding the collection, usage and dis-
semination of data. They only implicitly consider the concept of consent, however,
while they provide rigid frameworks unable to capture revocation properties.
Departing from formal methods based on the conception of privacy as a form of
controls, Barth et al. [26] introduce a formal language for handling the dissemination
of information in situations where data controllers may operate in more than one
context. Drawing on Nissenbaum's theory of contextual integrity [193], they dene
a temporal logic that allocates roles to people according to the context in which
they operate in. Then dierent constraints are imposed on the disclosure of data
according to the role that people perform each time. The language has successfully
formalised privacy policies such as the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA) [194] and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act [62].
However the expressiveness of the logic is limited and cannot formalise the usage of
personal data.
There is a general lack of work specically addressing the processes of consent
and revocation in the context of personal data. While the concept of consent has
been studied extensively in the social sciences and law, formal methods have only
implicitly provided the framework of such processes. In addition, although models
have advanced in expressing privacy policies regarding the collection, usage and
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dissemination of data they fail to express data subjects' ability to change those
policies. Individuals' privacy concerns can be mitigated when allowed to revoke or
change the initially given permissions [214]. However, revocation is not related to
users preferences and is usually captured in these models as invalidating a security
certicate.
There appears to be a gap in the literature regarding the formalisation of a con-
sent model as described by the law and social sciences research and the formalisation
of a revocation process that will address the retrospective change of policies to data
stored in information systems. A research challenge that will convert consent, revo-
cation and data protection legislation into competitive advantage for business [214]
emerges. The development of a formal privacy model able to cope with the revoca-
tion processes that stem from the dynamic privacy behaviour of online consumers
can ll the identied gap.
CHAPTER 3
The conceptual model of consent and
revocation
The review of the literature on privacy presented in Chapter 2 suggests that the
privacy conundrum from a philosophical and legal aspect is perceived as nuanced
conceptions, each of them claiming dierent factors to be core in determining what
privacy is. The most dominant conception which understands privacy as controls,
is adopted by researchers endeavouring to address privacy concerns in the online
environments. Their attempt focuses on the collection, use and further dissemi-
nation of personal data while they determine dierent controls that once available
may mitigate the risk of a privacy breach. Legislation reinforces the implementation
of such controls by necessitating not only the obtaining of individual's consent for
the collection of personal data but the altering and withdrawal of the initial consent
given. However, the dynamic notion of the online environment renders the proposed
controls rather limited for addressing privacy concerns in cyberspace while the im-
plementation challenges raised by the recent regulatory environment [80] cannot be
addressed by the existing formal models.
In most cases of online applications it is not possible for data subjects to change
their consent preferences in a transparent way; without an explicit revocation ca-
pability data subjects cannot have clear and unambiguous control mechanisms to
protect data privacy. When I commenced writing this thesis there was a general
lack of revocation controls in social-networking, e-commerce or indeed almost any
cyberspace application. Recently, social networks have introduced simple controls
to revoke permissions, however the full potential of revocation controls has not been
reached yet. A conceptual model for consent and revocation has still not been de-
veloped and this lack is manifested in the literature review of online privacy and
55
3. The conceptual model of consent and revocation 56
the literature review of formal methods addressing privacy problems presented in
Chapter 2.
As data protection legislation has become stringent and the consequences of not
conforming to it have increased, companies and governments are becoming increas-
ingly aware that the acquisition of data subjects' consent and revocation preferences
is of crucial importance. Developing a conceptual model for consent and revocation
is the rst step towards providing consent and revocation controls eectively. In
this chapter I present a novel conceptual model of consent and revocation that con-
siders dierent types of controls which an individual could give consent to, ensures
that consent will be an on-going process and not an one-o event, and captures the
dynamic notion of the online environment by introducing a revocation model for
handling personal data in cyberspace.
The conceptual model is informed by elements highlighted in Chapter 2, since
literature on privacy and data protection oers useful insights regarding the adop-
tion and practice of informed consent in cyberspace. However, literature suggests
that a series of specic issues identied in Chapter 2 emerge and references regard-
ing revocation are so scarce that prohibits the elicitation of any concrete insights. In
order to explore further the issues of informed consent and gain a holistic view of the
process of revocation, the conceptual model is motivated by a series of focus-groups
undertaken by the EnCoRe project [83]. The focus groups aim at understanding
the control requirements for a variety of data subjects, identify possible revoca-
tion mechanisms, explore and, if possible, provide answers to what extent the data
subjects are aware of the issues that emerge from the process of informed consent.
As a general observation, there is a lack of understanding of the various technical
options available for implementing revocation preferences. The analysis of the focus
group transcripts not only provides insights for a concrete revocation model but also
gives rise to a new concept of informed revocation, which is conceived by analogy
to Faden and Beauchamp's informed consent [89]. Informed revocation describes
the phenomenon where data subjects tend to alter their default privacy preferences
when they are informed of all the dierent types of revocation available to them. I
argue that the novel conceptual model of consent and revocation can provide the
basis for technological solutions, such as EnCoRe, that will overcome the limitations
associated with informed consent. I apply the model and demonstrate its validity to
a number of data-handling scenarios which have arisen in the context of the EnCoRe
research project.
In Section 3.1 I argue for the necessity of the qualitative tools in order to de-
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velop the conceptual model and present the methodology adopted to analyse the
transcripts of the focus-groups. In Section 3.2, the novel model of consent and re-
vocation derived by the ndings of the focus-groups methodology and the existing
literature on online privacy is presented. In Section 3.3, I acknowledge the dierent
power relations between the data subjects and data controllers that aect the con-
sent and revocation options and verify the model by applying it to diverse contexts
where data subjects have dierent consent and revocation expectations. Section 3.4
introduces the concept of informed revocation and argue why the limitations from
which the informed consent concept suers do not apply in the process of revoca-
tion. The nal Section 3.5 provides a synopsis of how this chapter contributes to
knowledge.
3.1 Adopting a qualitative approach
\Qualitative research" encompasses diverse approaches that although signicantly
dierent from each other, they serve for \dening characteristics and purposes" [170].
It requires a systematic and in-depth study of people in their natural environment,
avoiding assumptions made by researchers when \contriving their settings" [170]
and often entailing interviews to capture experiences and perspectives of a specic
concept or phenomenon. As Kaplan et al. argue \qualitative researchers assume
that they do not know enough about the perspectives and situations of participants
in the setting studied to be able to formulate meaningful hypotheses in advance,
and instead develop and test hypotheses during the process of data collection and
analysis" [140]. The generated data is in the form of transcripts and documents
and must be analysed with a systematic approach, in order to retain its \inherent
textural nature" which is lost \when data is quantied or aggregated" [170].
Myers [189] argues that \qualitative research diers from quantitative research
most notably in the human ability to speak" and it reveals relationships with-
out involving mathematical models [189]. Furthermore, converting \speech or con-
textual data" into measurable variables, will lead the participants' perception of
a phenomenon and its specic \social and institutional context" to severe major
losses [140].
Conducting qualitative research within the Information Systems (IS) context
presupposes that the researcher understands them not as purely technical rigid sys-
tems but as soft systems shaped by their interaction with society. The aim is to
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examine the interrelations of humans with the technological and organizational di-
mensions of the situated problem [16]. Applying qualitative research in the eld of
IS embraces elements from social sciences able to reason about the interplay of soci-
ety with technology and oer concrete insights to researchers studying the cultural
and social dimensions of a specic phenomenon [189]. Qualitative methods could
provide an in depth understanding and conrm the applicability of the concepts
under study.
I decided to adopt a qualitative approach to underpin, in conjunction with the
literature review, the conceptual model for consent and revocation. As Maxwell
declares, when a researcher studies concepts that are not easily distilled into dis-
tinct elements or is interested in the \dynamics of a process rather than its static
behaviour" qualitative research is the appropriate approach to be adopted [170].
He argues that its strengths lie in the in-depth understanding of the social and
cultural context in which data is generated [170]. According to Mason to study
such concepts we should \interact with consumers, talk to them, listen to them and
nd out their options" [169]. Moreover understanding cultural inuences from data
generated with qualitative approach avoids complexity, as peoples' intentions and
habits cannot be formed into a mathematical model.
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, individuals' perceptions of what constitutes pri-
vacy depend on the context and their cultural inuences. In order to capture the
cultural dierences and the diverse contexts that may aect data subjects' expecta-
tions for consent and revocation controls, the EnCoRe project and more specically
Dr Edgar Whitley's group at the London School of Economics (LSE) conducted a
series of focus-groups comprising participants with dierent backgrounds. The dis-
cussion in the focus-groups revolved around the issues of informed consent and the
participants' expectations of a system that manages consent and revocation con-
trols. I analysed the transcripts of four focus-groups to gain a deeper understanding
of data subjects' wishes and a synoptic view regarding revocation mechanisms. It
is worth noting that I was not present at the focus-groups and the procedure was
organised by Dr. Edgar Whitley. However, the themes of the focus groups and the
questions around which the discussion revolved were decided at EnCoRe general
meetings, where I had the opportunity to help craft the questions and the discussed
topics.
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3.1.1 Focus groups as a qualitative methodology
Although the research approach that dominates the eld of qualitative studies is
conducting interviews to generate qualitative data, recently there is a shift to the
focus group methodology as it has been acknowledged as oering a richer set of
data and advantages over other qualitative approaches [268; 150; 155]. The focus-
group methodology has been widely adopted for conducting research in the eld of
marketing in such a degree that \in practice, qualitative research has become almost
synonymous with the focus group interview" [49], but it is also used in a wide range
of disciplines [186]. Its application to IS and more specic in the area of privacy still
remains in its infancy and usually is not a self-contained approach but is combined
with other methods [186]. Therefore, analysing data generated from focus-groups,
which underpin the conceptual model is a novel approach in the discipline.
The focus-groups methodology has its origins in group interviewing, an approach
that has been applied for \as long as sociologists have been collecting data" [186].
The aim of focus-groups is to \focus" on a particular concept and engage all the
participants in the discussion. It diers from other procedures that engage mul-
tiple participants but do not motivate interactive dialogue among them, such as
Delphi groups [241]. Thus, the centre of attention is the group and not the individ-
ual [207] and whether the group will concur or conclude with recommendations is
irrelevant [249].
Conducting focus groups to acquire qualitative data oers rich and detailed infor-
mation regarding a specic phenomenon, concept or process. Similar to interviews,
focus-groups is an interactive methodology with the advantage that during the pro-
cess of collecting data there will emerge diverse viewpoints and conceptions. It is a
fundamental part of the method that the researcher instead of posing questions to
every interviewee, facilitates the participants to discuss between them and adopt,
defend or criticise dierent perspectives [91; 148; 149] since \participants ask ques-
tions to each other, as well as re-evaluate and reconsider their own understandings
of their specic experiences" [103]. It is this interaction and tension that oers the
advantage over other methodologies and renders the approach adequate for testing
conceptual models, exploring novel concepts and introducing new ideas [91]. Espe-
cially when the group dynamics are successful, participants might lead the research
to \unexpected directions" [148].
The data generated from focus-groups must be the result of an organised discus-
sion initiated by the researchers [103], which will stimulate communication amongst
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the participants and it will revolve around a specic topic [148]. Acquiring data from
focus-groups is particularly helpful for scrutinising participants' experiences and ex-
pectations. Regarding the conceptual model, analysing data from focus-groups can
provide an in-depth understanding of peoples' expectations about consent controls
and reveal preferences for revocation controls. Furthermore, the set of data can
unveil not only the perceptions that people have for a particular concept but how
and why they reached these perceptions. This characteristic is useful for the revoca-
tion process since via the participation in the focus-groups, \individuals can explore
and clarify their views" [148] thus, providing solid ground for Kerr's psychological
barriers to be further investigated and addressed in the model [147]. In addition,
Morgan argues that the researcher may acquire information explaining why an is-
sue has been salient and what characteristic results in the issue being salient [185],
unveiling dierences between what people say and what they do, which can be crit-
ical for examining problems regarding how well people understand the consent and
revocation controls, what they wish to happen to their data and what controls they
actually request.
Although group interaction can result in revealing individuals' perceptions, shifts
in beliefs and indications about how people formed an opinion, there exist trades-o
when adopting this approach. According to Kitzinge the group norms may prohibit
voices of dissent while authoritative power relations take place as well [148]. For
example, an employee may be forced to concur with his employer even if they
have a dierent perspective. In addition the focus-groups may oer depth in the
research ndings but comparing to surveys and interviews the results are limited in
breadth [186]. In order to overcome the downsides in the EnCoRe project, all the
participants in the focus-groups were experts in their eld a decision that mitigated
the group norms. Regarding the depth to breadth trade-o, I sought to gain an in-
depth understanding regarding the consent and revocation controls and not a wide
overview of more general controls or other conceptions existing in the literature
claiming to mitigate privacy concerns.
3.1.2 EnCoRe focus groups
For the EnCoRe focus groups, the decision was made to conduct a series of sessions
with experts in the eld of privacy and consent. Thus, the participants chosen were
individuals who had already a good understanding of the complexities and challenges
of the concepts to be explored. This design of focus groups is providing access into
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views of professionals whose business activities shape and challenge privacy and
consent policies in real life.
Finding the appropriate expert participants for each focus group was rather
challenging. For the rst focus group that took place in November 2008 and was
held at the University of Warwick, eight participants who were representatives from
civil society organisations were chosen. These participants were members of the
EnCoRe's User Advisory Group. Dierent members of the same group participated
in the second focus group that took place in January 2009. Eleven people who were
data protection professionals accepted the invitation to participate. Regarding the
last two focus groups, participants were selected based on recommendations and
contacts known to members of the User Advisory Group and project participants.
The third focus group, held also at LSE, contained nine public-sector representatives
and took place on February 2009. The last focus group, was held at the University
of Warwick and was part of a networking event organised by the university for a
Warwickshire SME technology cluster. As a result, twenty three people participated
in this focus group, whereas many of the participants knew each other well, leading
to a common sharing of beliefs.
Regarding the expected outcome from the four dierent focus groups, the data
collected from the data protection professionals was intended to provide an insight
on consent practices and the various issues that organisations, in which partici-
pants work, face every day. Participants from civil society organisations sought to
highlight problems that individuals are faced with and potential misuse of consent
policies by organisations. The third focus group, where participants worked for the
public sector, sought to investigate how one of the largest users of personal data
in the UK handle data and whether consent has a key role in their practices or is
complete absent (sometimes providing data to government services could be oblig-
atory). Finally, the last focus group where employees were working for companies
with limited resources, explored whether consent was considered a trivial issue or
liability for these SMEs and potential problems that the implementation of a system
able to provide revocation mechanisms may cause to their business.
The EnCoRe project decided to hire Tim Morley from KnowInnovation to or-
ganise and facilitate the focus group discussions. Through out the sessions Tim
mentioned to the participants that he was an expert on organising focus groups
rather than an expert on the concept of privacy and consent. Dr Edgar Whitley
was also present as a note-taker in all focus groups, whereas Dr Nadja Kanellopoulou
attended the last focus group to assist in note-taking due to the large number of
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participants. Both Dr. Whitley and Dr. Kanellopoulou had minimal impact on the
discussion.
The invitation sent to all participants provided information of the EnCoRe
project and details of the process of focus groups. Typically, the focus groups
would start with lunch where participants would meet each other and Tim. Then
the session would begin with a small description of what the EnCoRe project en-
deavoured to achieve and a statement that there were no right or wrong answers in
this process. Participants were asked to sign a consent form and were informed that
the sessions were audio and video recorded (only to facilitate the transcription of
the sessions) and the data generated would be available to all research sta of the
project with the obligation that the transcripts created by these recordings would
be anonymised. More specically, participants were informed that:
\the data from their session will be available to all researchers working
on the project but the transcripts will be kept anonymous. The data
may also be used in reports and publications and direct anonymised
quotations from the transcript may be used in published output" [183].
In addition, for all focus groups a break for coee was provided halfway through the
session.
The discussion in focus groups started with an open question introduced by
Tim regarding what could keep people awake at night in terms of consent issues. To
ensure a ow in the conversation, participants in all focus groups were presented with
various realistic scenarios in which they needed to grant and might wish subsequently
to revoke consent to better control the handling of their personal data. They were
asked to discuss their rational for consent and revocation achievements. More detail
on the focus-groups regarding the chronological order that these took place, the
number of participants attending and their background, can be found in Table 3.1.
Finally, a commercial transcription company was hired to produce the transcripts
of all the focus groups. They were provided with copies of the audio and video
recordings which, upon completion of the task, were destroyed. The transcripts
were stored securely on the project's Twiki page, where access to all EnCoRe's
members was provided. It is worth mention that the data used for the analysis
in this chapter was not processed by anyone other than the author in any manner.
Rather, I downloaded the transcripts from the Twiki page and used my own intuition
and methods to process and analyse the transcripts.
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Date Participants Duration Transcript Size
Civil society organisations Nov 2008 8 People 3 Hours 25,500 (Words)
Data protection professionals Jan 2009 11 People 3 Hours 27,000 (Words)
Public sector organisations Feb 2009 9 People 3 Hours 22,000 (Words)
Regional technology cluster: SMEs Feb 2009 23 People 1 Hour 16,000 (Words)
Total 10 Hours 90.000 (Words)
Table 3.1: Focus-groups
In the analysis section 3.3, I include relevant excerpts from transcripts in quo-
tations. The themes that guided the discussion in the focus groups were crafted at
the EnCoRe meetings. These are:
 Privacy policies
{ Are data subjects adequately informed by the privacy policies regarding
the actions they are giving consent to?
{ Are privacy policies explanatory regarding the aims and procedures of
the data controller?
 Controls for personal data
{ What controls the data subjects may have regarding the usage of data?
{ What do data subjects expect to happen when they refuse to give con-
sent?
 Regulation and consent
{ How can on-going consent be achieved?
{ How can the existing regulation in UK protect the process of giving
consent?
3.1.3 Content analysis as a methodology to discuss the results from
focus-groups
Finding and designing an appropriate approach to generate data is not the only
requirement for reaching valid conclusions in qualitative studies. Unless the data
is analysed following a scientic and systematic procedure, the contextual nature
of the data will be lost and the results will be likely to be unreliable. According
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to Elo et al., content analysis is the appropriate methodology to adopt in order to
analyse data generated from approaches that require individuals to participate in
dialogues and freely express their perceptions in their own language [81]. Thus, it
is one of the most widely used methodologies to analyse transcripts and documents
with data generated from interviews and focus-groups.
Content analysis is a systematic research methodology applied to analyse and
describe phenomena [154; 190; 126] by \designing replicable and valid inferences
from texts to the context of their use" [81]. Thus, it is a scientic technique that
oers insights and in-depth understanding of the concept under study. In addition,
content analysis facilitates the testing of conceptual models in order to verify the-
ories and hypotheses [81; 126]. Unlike quantitative research where the researcher
compares scientic hypotheses with observed evidence, in content analysis these
hypothesis are compared with inferences from the available text [81].
The origin of content analysis can be traced back to the Inquisition period in
the 17th century, where the diusion of printing press forced the Church to seek
dierent systematic approaches to identify and address \morally poor" and non-
religious documents [190]. The pivotal approach of a systematic analysis occurred
in Sweden in the 18th century as a response to the debate that followed the pub-
lication of a ninety hymns collection, titled as the \Songs of Zion" whose author
remains unknown [190]. Once the collection gained popularity, the controversy re-
volved around whether the hymns concealed symbols opposed to the preaching of
the Church. Scholars arguing in favour of forbidding the poem from being circu-
lated further identied possible symbols and excerpts from the collection that could
potentially undermine the authority of the Church. As a response, scholars on the
opposite side, conducted a quantitative analysis on other documents published by
Church to highlight the existence of the same symbols in these documents. Then
the debate focused on how the symbols were interpreted and in what context these
emerged. This process was systematically repeated until both sides positively con-
curred and crystallised the interpretations of how the symbols were used in the
poem and how they diered from other documents [190]. It was this response to
criticism from both sides, the categorisation of concepts and the revising procedure
to establish their interpretation in diverse contexts that provoked the inception of
many ideas applied in the content analysis today.
Since then, the systematic analysis of texts was adopted in a wide range of disci-
plines and applied to establish fundamentally diverse goals. Scholars used Markov's
probability theory to statistically analyse documents and propose a quantitative
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approach to content analysis [190]. This approach was particularly used to examine
the quality and the ethical standards of the mass increase production of newspapers
in New York around 1920's. The researchers, in order to provide statistical results,
were counting occurrences of specic words in the newspapers in an attempt to dis-
tinguish gossip and scandals from reporting news, while during the Second World
War, content analysis was adopted to deduce information from propaganda leaets.
It was not until the end of the war that the perspective shifted from a quantitative
approach to a more qualitative, as researchers embraced the method to \make use
of verbally gathered data with the form of answers to open-ended interviews and
focus-groups conversations" [153].
Qualitative content analysis is more rened than quantitative analysis, as it
extends the counting of specic words for statistical results by focusing on the char-
acteristics of the language and on the multiple meanings that the words may obtain
depending on the context they are mentioned [260; 126]. The text is scrutinised
as the researchers classify and code patterns into dierent categories that corre-
spond to the multiple interpretations of the words or themes in order to \provide
knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study" [24]. When words,
themes or patterns are allocated to the same category, they are assigned the same
interpretation [126]. The aim is to elicit a \broad description of the phenomenon"
by developing several categories that illustrate the phenomenon from dierent per-
ceptions. Elo et al. argue that this methodology is useful for developing conceptual
models [81].
There exist three dierent approaches to facilitate the classication process,
namely the inductive, deductive and summative content analysis [126]. The induc-
tive content analysis is based on \open coding" and the categories are freely created
by the researcher. In the open coding, headings and notes are written in the tran-
scripts while reading them and dierent categories are created to include similar
notes that capture the same aspect of the phenomenon under study [126; 81]. The
process is repeated and the notes and headings are read again. The next step is
to classify the categories into groups. The aim is to merge possible categories that
share the same meaning [24; 126; 76]. Dey explains that this process categories data
as \belonging together" and presupposes a comparison that crystallises the dierent
perceptions [76].
The deductive content analysis requires the existence of a theory to underpin the
classication process. This approach is more structured than the inductive method
and the initial coding is crafted by the key features and variables of the adopted
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theory [126; 81]. In the process of coding, excerpts are ascribed to categories and
the ndings are dictated by the theory or prior research. However, there could
be novel categories that may contradict or enrich the theory by oering a rened
perspective. Thus, deductive analysis is useful to validate and rene existing theories
or prior research observations. According to Mayring, the existence of a theory may
provide a framework to anticipate relations between categories, or predictions for
the issues under study, thus helping the researcher not to deviate from the research
question [172].
The summative approach is a blend of quantitative and qualitative elements. The
initial step is to identify specic words of interest and examine how frequent they
are used in the content. The next step embraces qualitative elements and focuses
on identifying hidden meanings and dierent interpretations of contents [126].
The classication of categories and the interpretation of the various themes at-
tribute a subjective element to the research and biases of the researchers may dictate
the discussion and the ndings of the study. In addition, content analysis is adopted
in such a wide range of studies that there is not a strict process to be followed that
will lead to a successful and awless application of the methodology. On the con-
trary, as Elo et al. argue, it depends on the ability of the researcher [81].
Content analysis is one among a plethora of other qualitative methods to pro-
vide guidance for analysing data generated from focus-groups. Some of the other
noteworthy methods include grounded theory and ethnography. Grounded theory
is similar to inductive content analysis as the researcher begins from the bottom
(ground) to the top, distancing herself/himself from any previous research in an
attempt to arrive to a theory \grounded suited to its supposed uses" [104]. Ethnog-
raphy comprises of various of methods, embracing a direct and constant communi-
cation with the agents involved. It requires the presence of the researcher for a long
period of time to the environment where the phenomenon under study occurs in
order to observe and gain \experience". The understanding and representation of
experience shapes the ndings of the research as to quote Herodotus \so far it is my
eyes, my judgement and my searchings that speaks these words to you" [in [270]].
Both of these methodologies, albeit useful for their purposes, were rejected as
they would exceed the needs of this thesis. Grounded theory requires the constant
renement of the questions posed to focus-groups and the presence of the researcher,
while ethnography is a time-consuming methodology that may endure for more than
two years in order for the researcher to obtain the appropriate experience to apply
the method. The purpose of this thesis was not a social science perspective of consent
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and revocation controls. Rather I decided to exploit my experience in qualitative
methods and apart from the literature review, further validate the conceptual model
of consent and revocation.
To analyse the data generated from the focus-groups, I applied the content anal-
ysis methodology. As there are three possible avenues to be followed regarding
the classication process, a blend of inductive and deductive approaches to identify
codes and develop categories was preferred. This decision was informed by the fact
that there exists a well documented theory regarding informed consent and prior
research to controls regarding consent is in abundance. Thus, applying a deductive
approach will facilitate the validation of the conceptual consent model and provide
solid grounds for its possible renement. On the contrary, prior research regard-
ing revocation is in infancy and to my knowledge there does not exist a theory
equivalent to the theory of informed consent [10]. Thus, the inductive analysis was
favoured to underpin the coding and the categories created for the conceptual model
of revocation. Summative approach was rejected, as it requires the quantication
of specic words and regarding revocation the word was hardly mentioned by the
focus-groups since it is a word rarely used in every day language. Instead partici-
pants preferred to use synonyms such as withdrawal of consent. Thus, applying a
summative approach could not have oered richer results in comparison with the
other two approaches.
3.2 A novel conceptual model for consent and revocation
The blend approach provides a systematic method to analyse, code and classify the
transcriptions of the focus-groups. Furthermore, it provides a crystallised view of the
dierent interpretations that revocation may have and an in-depth understanding
of how and which mechanisms may be oered to users to control the ow of their
data and, as a result, mitigate their privacy concerns. In this section I present and
analyse the results of the content analysis. Regarding consent, the theory is partially
veried as ndings suggest that it can be further extended with a new dimension.
Concentrating on revocation, my initial nding was a gap between the legal and the
technical perspectives. In the legal view there is an ongoing philosophical debate
to understand the concept of privacy independently of technology, while computer
scientists perceive privacy mechanisms only as security requirements. Even though
the examined sample was relatively small, references to revocation requirements
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were scant and almost without exception revocation was understood as deletion of
personal data. However, the inductive approach led to a novel conceptual model
of revocation and, in addition, it revealed an interesting phenomenon which I coin
with the term of \informed revocation" [10].
The analysis of the data centres around ve fundamental issues:
 The validity of the consent mechanisms identied in the literature that enable
data subjects to control their personal data.
 The person's ability to consent to the release of her personal information and
how informed the consent is.
 Mechanisms that can ensure ongoing-consent for dynamic environments.
 An individual's ability to meaningfully choose to withdraw consent.
 Dening a revocation model.
The analysis of the rst three areas occurs from the deductive approach focused
on the issue of informed consent while the remaining two areas are analysed with
the inductive approach which investigates the issue of revocation.
3.2.1 Building the consent model
The deductive approach presupposes the existence of a theory or prior research
results. The theory that underpinned the coding for the conceptual model of consent
is Faden and Beauchamp's theory of informed consent [89]. In addition, I gained
valuable insights from the literature on information privacy, where controls have
been conceptualised mainly during the process of consent [265].
The theory of informed consent in alignment with scholars conducting research
in the area of online privacy, identied controls that are applied at three dierent
occasions:
 At the start of a disclosure.
 During the processing of data and by providing the choice for the individual
to be notied.
 On personal data that is made available to others and with whom this data is
shared.
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Thus, I created three main categories for which a data collector requires consent
from an individual:
 Collection of personal data (for storage in a database).
 Use of personal data (for analysis, processing marketing or one of many other
purposes).
 Sharing or dissemination of personal data (to the public domain, or to another
data collector).
Each of these cases gives rise to interesting variations and corresponding chal-
lenges. Collection can be performed in many ways (directly, indirectly), through a
variety of media (an explicit registration or consent form, email, online purchases),
into various forms of storage (a local enterprise server, distributed/cloud-based stor-
age). In addition, the theory of informed consent requires the individual to acquire
knowledge of how the data will be collected and of the duration of the consent
given [98; 146; 89]. Another issue that emerges is that of what the Latins used to
describe with the phrase \qui tacet consentit", meaning those who remain salient
are assumed to give consent. Thus, consent can be considered implicit when some-
body shares personal data without ever giving consent when intending to access
some form of service (although in practice users are usually required to accept some
terms which typically go unread, allowing a service provider to claim explicit con-
sent when in reality it could amount to uninformed implicit consent). It is crucial
for the collection process that the data subject understands the procedural practices
in order to perform in an informed manner [68; 77].
Regarding the processing of data, emphasis is given on the purposes for which
consent is requested [67; 4]. The purposes are practically impossible to enumerate,
and no list could be exhaustive. Even if a purpose for the use of data is unam-
biguously dened, it is not evident how one can check that the actual use of the
data matches that purpose. To illustrate the issue, consider the case of an indi-
vidual giving consent for his personal data, including health records, to be used
by an enterprise for medical research. The scope of \medical research" as the pur-
pose of data collection is too broad for any realistic control to be applied to the
data. The individual in question may be happy to have her data used for breast
cancer research but not for diabetes research, as this may reveal private family his-
tory. In any case, there is no universal language for dening purposes clearly and
unambiguously, making this aspect of consent dicult to quantify.
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Providing controls for the processing of data, signies that consent is not treated
as a static procedure which is only obtained in the appropriately signied time, but
it acquires an on-going element. Both in the informed consent theory and in the
literature on online privacy, giving consent to a specic purpose is not sucient
for the holistic treatment of the processing of data. Further issues emerge from
the secondary use of data, as aggregation practices may reveal information that
individuals sought to remain private [98; 239]. Thus, it is crucial to dene who may
gain access to the data and what other data is available [239].
Dissemination of personal data between enterprises could cause a multitude of
privacy problems, and consent for such onward sharing needs to be clearly dened
and carefully enforced [242]. An enterprise may require the services of a third party
to full its business commitments, and in doing so share its customer database. It
is up to the enterprise to ensure that the third party adheres to an adequate privacy
policy, and in some cases there may be caused to be even more stringent - e.g., to
prevent the third party from sharing the data onward to other parties. There are
other complications also: for example, legal requirements over transferring across
borders, or a situation where a public sector body needs to outsource data to a
private enterprise, but is bound by tighter controls that would need to ow down
through the sub-contract.
From the analysis of the transcripts, a novel category emerged. Participants in
the focus-groups dichotomised the procedure of giving consent for the dissemination
of data. They felt that a reasonable distinction could be made between the unre-
stricted sharing of data, where they felt that any sense of control is lost and the
one-step further dissemination, where data could only be disseminated to a third
party without that party having the ability to share the data further. In the latter
case, participants felt that they were able to control the ow of the data and were
more comfortable to provide consent for the dissemination of that data.
3.2.2 Building the revocation model
Unlike the deductive content approach adopted for the analysis of the conceptual
model of consent, the inductive content approach is not structured and coding is
freely invented by the author. Hence, classication is impacted by author's biases.
The coding regarding the issue of revocation was designed based on the assumption
that the revocation controls may be symmetrical to the existing controls for giving
consent. The rst attempt to analyse the transcripts comprised of four categories
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in analogy to the four categories identied in the analysis of the consent concept.
During this step, I tried to allocate excerpts of the text into the four categories. In
the case were an excerpt seemed not appropriate to t in one of the categories, I
would create a novel one, based on the information from the transcript. The second
step was to process again the data by focusing on recognising and merging similar
categories. For example a category named as revoking data, was merged with the
category deletion of data. I repeated the process several times until I crystallised the
dierences of various interpretations of the revocation concept. At the conclusion
of the analysis the remaining categories were numbered to eight, indicating that
the assumption of the apparent duality of consent and revocation does not always
involve a symmetry; there exist scenarios in which consent for data to be collected
or used has not been explicitly given, and yet an individual has the right to perform
revocation.
Consider the case of SPAM or advertising e-mails sent to individuals' accounts
without obtaining their initial consent. In such cases individuals may have a right
to demand a halt, however, the mechanism for exercising that right may not be
readily (if at all) available. Similarly, there are cases in which, once consent has
been given, revocation may not be allowed. This is true, for instance, in the case of
proles submitted to national DNA databases in the UK (although for some, this
will be conceived of as a form of forced consent or even consentless collection as
they will have no option but to comply).
The analysis of data revealed that there are limited references to revocation
controls and these only focused on opt-out choices. Control over personal data held
regarding an individual, from the individual's point of view, can be understood as
the ability to revoke either the data or certain permissions to process and disseminate
the data, or both. Consequently, revocation has many dierent avours, with subtle
dierences depending on how the data and the associated consent must be altered.
The principal results of the analysis is a novel taxonomy of revocation. Four
fundamental types of revocation are identied(1-4 below), and another four types
of revocation can be derived from the rst ones (5-8 below).
1. No Revocation at all: personal data remains static, and once it has been dis-
closed, it is either physically impossible to revoke (how could someone ever re-
voke their reputation) or prohibited for various reasons (e.g., law-enforcement,
data from police's DNA data-base).
2. Deletion: data is completely erased and cannot be retrieved or reconstituted
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in any way. Certain privacy rights are enshrined in national and European
legislation; it is worth mentioning here how our model incorporates some of
the stipulations of the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [2]. In article
12, for example, the directive mentions \the rectication, erasure or blocking
of data the processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this
Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the
data" [2]. Rectication is a variant of revocation in the sense that a data
subject may request the deletion of incorrect data held about him or herself
and have it replaced with other data.
3. Revocation of permissions to process data: data subjects withdraw consent
that would enable an enterprise to process or analyse their personal data for
a specied purpose. EU Data Protection mentions \blocking," which corre-
sponds exactly to revocation of permissions to process data in our model.
4. Revocation of permissions for third party dissemination: data subjects with-
draw consent that would enable an enterprise to disclose information to a third
party.
5. Cascading revocation is a variation on any of the above kinds of revocation,
whereby the revocation is (recursively) passed on to any party to whom the
data has been disclosed. Through this mechanism, data subjects are able to
revoke data by only contacting the enterprise that they had disclosed their
data to originally. It should be remarked that oering such a service is only
practicable if data is only disclosed to organisations which themselves oer
such a control.
6. Consentless revocation: personal data for whose storage and dissemination no
consent has been explicitly given by the data subject, but which may need
to be revoked. Again, any of the fundamental types of revocation may be
invoked. This form of revocation is introduced to capture the privacy problems
identied by Solove [236]. The need to revoke consentless data emerges mainly
when a breach in privacy has occurred and the data subject experiences one
of the acknowledged problems. For example, a picture of Jane drunk at a
party was uploaded onto Facebook without her consent. As a consequence her
reputation is ruined. She takes legal action in order to have the photograph
removed from the site.
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7. Delegated revocation: This is a kind of revocation which is exercised by
a person other than the individual concerned, such as an inheritor or par-
ent/guardian.
8. Revocation of identity (Anonymisation): data subjects may be happy for per-
sonal data to be held for certain purposes as long as it is not linkable back to
them personally. Anonymisation may be regarded as a variant of revocation,
in that data subjects request a change to data held so that it is no longer
personally identiable.
The last four revocation types are derivative, while the others are basic; for in-
stance, revocation of permissions to process data may be delegated and consentless.
Cascading revocation is an ideal that is dicult to implement in practice.
3.2.3 Limitations
The conceptual model of revocation model proposed in this section may be limited
in the following ways:
 The issue of granularity needs to be considered specically for the deletion
type of revocation.
 Data subjects may want to partially revoke their data, or to scramble their
data instead of having it erased completely.
 The question of deletion certicates, namely, non-repudiable proofs that dele-
tion has really been performed, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
 The possibility of anonymisation poses interesting problems as it makes the
origin of data untraceable; there are cases where this is not in the interest of
security or the common good in general. A system implementing anonymi-
sation should have safeguards in place to ensure that data subjects will act
legitimately and that the anonymised data will not impose problems on the
system's integrity. On the other hand, if data is (even partly) identiable, an
enterprise can aggregate it and eventually infer to whom it refers. Such issues
need to be taken into consideration when implementing revocation mecha-
nisms.
Indeed, one goal of the EnCoRe project is to develop an implementation of this ideal which
can be deployed in actual enterprise information systems.
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The novel conceptual model of consent and revocation is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The model comprises of the four fundamental types of revocation which are sym-
metrical to the four consent preferences depicted in the theory of informed consent
and veried by the analysis of the transcripts of the focus-groups. The existence of
inner circles in the gure depicts a relation between the four elements. The exis-
tence of the element illustrated in the outer circle of the Figure 3.1 presupposes the
existence of all the other three elements. For example, giving consent for processing
data, implies that consent for collecting data has been given already or will be given
at the same time.
Figure 3.1: The novel conceptual model for consent and revocation
3.3 Verifying the model in dierent contexts
The literature suggests that privacy has a context dependent nature [174; 87; 112;
219]. The analysis of the focus-groups transcripts veried the literature ndings as
it emerged that the environment in which data subjects give consent to or revoke
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their consent regarding the collection, use and dissemination of their personal data,
drastically inuences their preferences. In this section, I present the possible envi-
ronments that are created, when adopting a data subject's perspective and validate
further the proposed conceptual model. When stakeholders with dierent interests
in the privacy problem interact, they establish relationships. In these relationships,
there are conicting needs to be balanced, dierent kinds of requirements arise and,
as a result, diverse environments are formed. The concern is centred around three
dierent categories of stakeholders:
 Data Subjects, who have a role in protecting their own personal information
and specifying how it should be handled by others
 Society, which sets the standards, monitors their implementation and ensures
compliance
 Data Controllers, who play a role in implementing and operating solutions
Here, I adopt a data subject's perspective, and examine the environments that
are created when a data subject interacts with each one of the above three dierent
stakeholders. Understanding the interactions that dominate in each relationship is
the rst step to capture the contextual nature of privacy. The focus is on interactions
in order to obtain a representative view of a relationship in motion, as opposed to
just a snapshot of a specic situation. Each type of interaction leads to dierent
consent and revocation requirements and I have distinguished four cases of interest
depicted in Figure 3.2 below. The arrow denotes an interaction between the data
subject and a stakeholder.
Data Subject ! Subject (e.g. Online Social Networks)
Data Subject ! Private Sector Data Controller
Data Subject ! Public Sector Data Controller
Data Subject ! Society (Regulatory/Legal Environment)
Figure 3.2: The environments formed from the data subjects' interaction with the possible
stakeholders of the privacy problem
The interactions of the data subject with public and private sector data con-
trollers must be treated separately, as the participants of the focus-groups empha-
sised; privacy preferences of data subjects dier substantially in these two cases, as
the asymmetries that emerge especially in the public related environment, create
more complex situations for the data subjects to handle. Participants in the focus-
groups were not asked specically to distinguish the diverse environments in which
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they perform the act of revocation. What follows below is an analysis of the identi-
ed environments. It should be noted that my decision to apply the formal model
to be presented in Chapter 4, to the specic case studies that will be presented in
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, was informed by the analysis of the dierent
power asymmetries presented below.
3.3.1 Identifying data subjects' requirements
In this section I present an explanation of how privacy requirements vary across
dierent environments.
Social-networking interactions
The social-networking environment involves interactions between data subjects
mediated by a third party. The literature suggests that social networking enables
data subjects to control not only their own data, but often that of their friends by
providing the means to disseminate information from various data subjects to some
extent [105]. Thus, data subjects are now empowered with capabilities that enable
the collection process and dissemination of personal information.
In the focus-groups, there were a number of references to data subjects' inter-
actions with other citizens, in the context of social networks. People indicated that
they use sites such as Facebook and Twitter only for socialising. They do not bother
to read privacy terms and conditions as they believe that the information they dis-
close is trivial. Even though it may be a fallacy, data subjects believe that they
are always able to delete data uploaded onto these sites. They feel secure and more
condent to disclose data when deletion mechanisms are in place, even though they
have no guarantee that the act of deletion will actually put their data out of use.
To quote one participant:
Twitter's advanced search page allows data subjects to nd deleted
Tweets, an issue highlighted earlier this week after UK chat show host
Jonathan Ross accidentally posted his personal email address in a mes-
sage. Even though he quickly deleted the message the information was
still easily obtainable, because Twitter fails to purge deleted tweets from
its system.
In social networks there are some privacy controls already available. Facebook
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provides ne-grained privacy settings that allow data subjects to control with whom
to share what, for example [112]. Revocation in this setting is almost exclusively
understood as deletion of data, and this is not always possible (as the above quote
illustrates). Data subjects generally would like to have more revocation options,
including anonymisation and actual deletion (expunging the data from the system
altogether).
Interactions with Private Sector
When data subjects interact with private data controllers, they seek to build and
enhance a relationship based on trust. Data subjects experience a lock-in eect, as
they are reluctant to disclose data to another controller. They often highlight the
importance of \previous experience". In contrast to the social-networks, where the
interactions between data subjects have similar value for both parties (although
there are exceptions [105]) because all participants share the same expectations,
in this environment the situation becomes far more complex and new asymmetries
emerge. These asymmetries take the form of asymmetric expectations, in which
\one party expects the other party to behave in ways in which the other party does
not expect or intend to behave" [105].
As mentioned above because of \expectation asymmetries," their trust is some-
times violated and data subjects wish to perform revocation mechanisms to balance
the situation. Individuals are only vigilant if they happen to have experienced a
breach of their privacy, and are unwilling to revoke data when the revocation mech-
anisms available are not clear in terms of objective and function. As stated by one
participant:
I don't really think I would actually go and pursue every company I've
been shopping with and do that, because it would just be a waste, a lot
of a waste of my time.
When data subjects act in this environment they mainly conceptualise revocation
as deletion and opt for a regulatory organisation to certify that not only their data
is properly deleted in accordance with their preferences, but also that it is not used
in an arbitrary way. The importance of revocation mechanisms, understood just as
deletion of data, is underlined from both data subjects and enterprises:
I want the option [to delete my data], no matter what [damage] it does
to the public [good].
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I observed in the focus-groups that participants in this environment would opt
for revocation mechanisms, such as revocation of the permission to process data
and revocation of the permission to disseminate data. These mechanisms were not
explicitly identied by them at the beginning of the focus-groups. Only through
discussions at the focus-groups, where participants were incrementally forming their
novel perception did they realise in how many ways they could exercise control.
Interactions with public sector
According to the literature, when data subjects interact with public data con-
trollers new forms of asymmetries occur and thus data subject's preferences dier
from the previous environments [105]. The following diverse forms of asymmetries
were identied in the focus-groups:
 Asymmetry in value, in which public controllers derive high value from inter-
actions, but data subjects derive low value
 Asymmetry in expectations, in the same sense where data subjects experience
this form when interacting with a private data controller, as described above.
 Asymmetry in power, in which data subject has disproportionate ability to
cause \damage" to the public controllers. Some times data subjects are forced
to consent and have no information on how their data is collected, processed
and disseminated among the diverse public data controllers.
From the focus-groups, participants indicated that they alter their perception
of revocation when they interact with a public data controller as they experience
the asymmetries presented above. The data collected and processed by the public
sector is sensitive private information and citizens' interest in preventing an invasion
in their private lives may be by-passed for the sake of national security, to enable
medical research, or in the interest of the common good or government policy. In a
focus group, a data subject expressed concern about:
[the] merging of state and private sector, which is complicating a lot of
the services under which data is actually processed, the value of data
is valuable to the state for, you know, for anti-terrorist organised crime
and so on and that again is making it more complicated.
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Recent incidents of lost or stolen government data [253] have reduced condence
in public authorities. Data subjects are increasingly concerned about preventing
arbitrary use of personal data by government services. Although data subjects
acknowledge that, in particular cases, the revocation of data will not be permitted
(e.g. DNA data-base), they desire revocation mechanisms so as to deal with the
aforementioned problems and to restore trust in their relationship with the public
sector.
Individuals are willing to share personal data for medical research if certain
conditions are met. Those participated in the focus-groups have indicated that
anonymity and traceability are required features of a health database if they are
to disclose their medical records. However, these two concepts are in tension, often
resulting in solutions based on separation but with the potential of tracing back:
Patients - who already had the right to opt out of the scheme - now have
the right to have their medical records anonymised or masked once they
are put onto the system.
Due to the asymmetries, participants believed that they could not perform any
revocation. However, when they realised the options that they could have, data
subjects opted for the revocation of the permission to process data, to disseminate
data and to delegate their decision to revoke. More specically, when discussing
scenarios with medical issues, delegated revocation was a popular option.
Interactions with society
Society could motivate enterprises to enhance their privacy mechanisms by pro-
viding revocation controls. Privacy guidelines for large enterprises exist, and law
requires that these are used. Smaller enterprises need to abide by the same rules
and report to the Information Commissioner Oce. On the contrary, in the public
sector it appears to be occasions where revocation controls are prohibited for the
sake of common good [229]. In the name of society data subjects' right to privacy
is invaded and in cases such as criminal records and police's DNA data bases, data
may have a lifetime persistence [78].
To overview the ndings in this environment, the only revocation mechanism
that a data subject could apply, in terms of legislation, is the right to object to:
unfair/unlawful processing by withdrawing the existing consent i.e. re-
voke and optionally replace it with a new consent; terminating any
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relevant contract with the data controller/ processor; objecting on the
basis that the processing is prejudicial to the data subject's \rights and
freedoms" or \legitimate' interests.
Finding a balance between individuals' privacy and national security is an ongo-
ing debate [219]. As the requirements that emerge from this environment are more
of legal nature and were found also in the other three environments, this debate is
beyond the scope of this model presented in the thesis, but the legal issues were
assessed in the EnCoRe project.
3.4 The concept of informed revocation
There exist a lack of in-depth understanding of the dierent ways in which revocation
can be performed and/or implemented in practice. Participants at the focus-groups
perceived revocation simply as deletion of data, and they highlighted the need to be
informed about the nature of deletion and the privacy protection it can actually oer.
Furthermore, when they were denied the option of deletion, they were reluctant to
search for alternatives. I distinguished a signicant change in people's preferences
when by discussing and exchanging ideas, they were informed of all the available
types of revocation that they could perform in the context of a particular scenario.
People become more selective and seek the revocation mechanism closest to their
needs.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate data subjects' choices of revocation mechanisms
for a set of example scenarios. In Table 3.2 I have captured which revocation
mechanisms data subjects expected by default. Table 3.3 shows the revocation
mechanisms that data subjects chose after they were informed of their existence.
It is quite evident that, once data subjects are informed of the dierent variants
of revocation, they make more careful choices. Before being informed, they choose
either to have data deleted or left intact. When given a choice between the dierent
types of revocation identied in Section 3.2.2, they take advantage of the dierent
controls available.
In order to explain this phenomenon, I introduce the concept of informed re-
vocation, by analogy to Faden and Beauchamp's informed consent [89]. In their
research, they argue that consent of data subjects needs to be voluntary - not the
result of force or coercion - and they need to be informed about how their data is to
be used, and how they can exercise rights over it if needed. When these conditions
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Environments
/Types
Dele-
tion
Anony-
mity
Cascad-
ing
Revo-
cation
Revoke
pro-
cess-
ing
Revoke
shar-
ing
Consentless
revoca-
tion
No
Revo-
cation
Revoke
dele-
gation
Social net-
working
3
Medical En-
vironment
3 3
Private data
controller
3
Public data
controller
3 3
Legal envi-
ronment
3 3
Table 3.2: Initial/Default choices
are met, consent granted for a particular use is considered informed.
I dene informed revocation as a process that allows data subjects to remove
and/or change permissions associated with:
 Personal data held by an enterprise.
 The purpose for which personal data may be processed by an enterprise.
 The sharing or dissemination of data by an enterprise with third parties.
 The identity of a data subject (cf. anonymisation), even for the case where
consent has not been given initially.
The key characteristic of the concept of informed revocation is that the data
subject should be aware of all the available types of revocation that he or she can
perform, without being forced or coerced to give up any of these rights. The observed
alteration in choice is also in accordance with the paradoxical behaviour that data
subjects exercise when they are about to make decisions due to the psychological
barriers that they experience [147]. However, if the data subjects are informed
of all the possible revocation choices they may overcome the barriers presented in
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Environments
/Types
Dele-
tion
Anony-
mity
Cascad-
ing
Revo-
cation
Revoke
pro-
cess-
ing
Revoke
shar-
ing
Consent
less revo-
cation
No
Revo-
cation
Revoke
dele-
gation
Social net-
working
3 3
Medical En-
vironment
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Private data
controller
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Public data
controller
3 3 3
Legal envi-
ronment
3 3 3
Table 3.3: Informed Choices
Section 2.3.2 and address the issues that emerge from the decisional theory and the
concept of \subjective utility" [147].
3.4.1 Dierences from informed consent
The idea of consent is at the heart of codes of research ethics and the writings on that
subject [89; 269]. Consent may be regarded as the opportunity to decline to take
part or to withdraw from the process taking place without such decisions triggering
adverse consequences for them. According to the theory of informed consent, people
can only consent to something if they have received sucient information, have
understood it and have explicitly expressed agreement [89]. Its early adoption is
associated with medical practice and the right of patients to be informed about
the risks of medical procedures that might aect their well-being. Today its scope
has broadened to include, amongst other elements, the right of online service data
subjects to be informed of the way their online personal information is used.
A criticism of the concept of informed consent has been raised on the grounds
that, since consent is elicited only once -before personal data is processed- it can-
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not be considered \informed" throughout the lifetime of the data; in other words,
consent is granted on the basis of information available at a xed moment in time,
and whether that decision may be deemed \informed" depends only on how much
information was available at that moment. At a subsequent time, data might be
used for alternative purposes than the data subject initially consented to, so he or
she may not be fully informed.
Another concern towards achieving informed consent is how free the individuals
are to participate [134]. Particularly in medical environments, people often decide
to consent before they read the consent form. Patients see the process of giving
consent as a mere ritual and they sign the form more as a symbolic act rather
than a meaningful process that has illuminated them about the situation to be
experienced.
Fisher also argues that researchers experience the same phenomenon [134]. Re-
searchers perceive that participants share the same understanding and have the same
perception about the process of consent with them and incorrectly conclude that
the form they sign is informative enough for the patient to behave in an informed
manner.
The revocation model in itself cannot address the criticisms levied at informed
consent as a concept described in Section 2.3.2. However, I believe that an EnCoRe
methodology can, and so in the project we hope to achieve informed revocation
through the nature of the EnCoRe system since data subjects will necessarily engage
in a process of setting consent and revocation preferences; the nature of the process
tackles the problem of the non-experience of the situation. Imagine playing a game
of chess where consent is equivalent to making the rst move when the combination
of moves are almost innite and revocation is equivalent to deciding which move to
make when the game is ending when the combination of moves could be calculated
and the result predicted.
Thus, individuals are aware of the situation and do not experience the procedural
misconception eect because they have already evaluated the situation and they
want to exercise their right to revoke because of their experience. Furthermore, the
informed revocation concept is formed in such a way that the process of revocation
is unambiguous. The denitions are not open to interpretation as individuals only
need to be informed of the dierent revocation mechanisms that they may perform
and what each mechanism could achieve. However the implications that their act
of revocation may have to the data controllers cannot always be predicted.
3. The conceptual model of consent and revocation 84
3.5 Synopsis of the ndings presented in the chapter
In this chapter I illustrated the rationale for engaging qualitative methods to assist
the design of a novel conceptual model for consent and revocation. The literature
references on revocation are scarce and the favoured approach adopted to resolve the
issue was that of focus-groups, which were organised by Dr. Whitley. I was involved
in the preparation process of these focus-groups and I was allowed to acquire access
to the transcripts. The methodology followed to analyse the transcripts was a blend
of deductive and inductive content analysis.
Inspired by the existing theory of informed consent, I crafted the coding of
consent by identifying the key elements of the theory of informed consent and the
research ndings in the literature. The result of this analysis was an extended model
of consent as a new distinction when giving consent to disseminate data to third
parties was discovered.
Regarding revocation, the literature addressing the problem of withdrawing con-
sent is in its infancy and the inductive approach was followed. The codes were
initially designed bearing in mind the dual relation between consent and revoca-
tion. However, the nal model of revocation comprised of eight dierent guises of
revocation. In addition, the inductive approach enabled the inception of the term
of \informed revocation" in analogy to informed consent in order to explain the
phenomenon where data subjects alter their choices of revocation when they realise
the full range of controls available. The informed revocation concept does not share
the same fate as informed consent regarding its limitations and is able to address
the behavioural barriers that data subjects experience. It is easier for the data
subjects to become informed regarding revocation because they have experience of
the situation and their decisions can be more "informed" than those when they give
consent.
To conclude, the novel conceptual model of consent and revocation presented in
this chapter oers a holistic view of possible controls that may be oered to data
subjects to control the ow of their personal information. Furthermore, the model
ensures that the act of giving consent is an on-going process and not an one-o event,
able to cope with the dynamic nature of the online environment. The model was
validated in three dierent contexts, and all the requirements of the data subjects
regarding privacy preferences were catered for. It is worth noting that the consent
and revocation model extends the existing literature and contributes to knowledge
as I am not aware of any other work that specically addresses revocation and its
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variants.
CHAPTER 4
The logic for Consent and Revocation
In Chapter 1, the paramount importance of a system providing controls to data sub-
jects in order to express their expectations regarding the disclosure, use and further
dissemination of their personal data, has been illustrated. Literature presented in
Chapter 2 suggests that these controls, from an individual's point of view, can be
conceived as the ability to give consent and revoke the initial consent pertaining to
specic personal data. This dynamic process enables individuals to dene certain
privacy preferences regarding the storage, usage and further sharing of their data by
the enterprises. Chapter 3 extended the concept of consent with a new distinction
regarding the dissemination of data and dened dierent types of revocation. This
resulted in a conceptual model which is the rst step to address the acute need to
implement practical control measures.
The second and most important step, is the design of a model capable of han-
dling the specication process when eliciting requirements for a system oering such
controls in an unequivocal manner. In that direction, embracing techniques deriv-
ing from the eld of formal methods provides solid ground for the development
of a mathematical model. Tools and languages in formal methods are formed on
mathematical foundations and bestow rigidity and reliability when addressing the
specication and verication process. Their value stems from revealing inconsisten-
cies and ambiguities when reasoning about the correctness of a system [60].
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the application of formal methods to privacy
mainly focuses on translating privacy policies, which are mostly written in natu-
ral language, into machine readable formats [251]. Languages like P3P [64] and
EPAL [22] are examples of these. Many attempts focus solely on the disclosure or
usage of data, framing their solution to the boundaries of a single data controller,
while other researchers emphasise either transforming personal data to make it non-
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identiable or to limit its use to a specic context [26]. In addition, a stream of
literature extends models designed to capture security requirements and proposes
formal frameworks for privacy preferences, focusing on the initial negotiation be-
tween individuals' preferences and business requirements without considering the
life-cycle of data after a successful negotiation [32]. UCON ABC [203], in particu-
lar, is an interesting approach that combines elements from access control models
and digital rights management systems to formalise authorisations, obligations and
conditions pertaining to data. However, formalising privacy was not the initial pur-
pose of the model. Thus it can not provide dierent policies for every user of the
system, a limitation that the authors acknowledge in a position paper [204], and
the concepts of consent and revocation are not explicitly formalised. An example
of how the logic for consent and revocation can handle these situations is presented
in Section 5.2.10.
There is a general lack of work specically addressing the processes of consent
and revocation in the context of personal data. While the concept of consent has
been studied extensively in the social sciences [265], leading to work on the necessity,
meaning and consequences of informed consent [266], few computer scientists have
given the mechanics of such processes due attention. Acknowledging the gap in the
literature and contributing to knowledge, this chapter presents a novel logic that
will enable data controllers to more easily mitigate the risks associated with the
release, handling and dissemination of personal data across information networks.
The logic is designed to allow the formalisation of the eects of expressing data
subjects' consent and revocation preferences in a manner which is easily veriable
as their intention. Consent is dened to be a privacy preference when applied to
personal data; the act of giving consent represents a wish for personal data to be
collected, or processed, or disseminated, for a particular purpose. On the other
hand, revocation is any process which corresponds to a withdrawal of consent; it
is a wish for personal data to cease to be collected, processed, or disseminated.
There is an auxiliary use as a testing methodology, assessing the correctness of the
implementation of a system oering such preferences, can be dened based on the
logic. The design of a test methodology and derivation of test suites is discussed in
Chapter 8.
More specically, the novel logic is designed in a Hoare-style manner [120] and is
based on the conceptual model of consent and revocation, presented in Chapter 3.
The decision to adopt Hoare triples was informed by the fact that they can express
transformations of predicates. Consent and revocation is formalised as the dynamics
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of access and usage and Hoare logic provides the details of what is actually hap-
pening. The logic is agnostic to the data involved, focusing on the controls that the
data subject might wish to pertain to personal data.
In Section 4.1 I dene the core components of the logic which comprise of actions,
rights, variables and obligations, and present the formalisations of the expected ac-
tions to be performed in the system. The actions of the logic are only considered as
sequential, rendering the development of a concurrency model signicant for its com-
pletion. Section 4.2 explores the problems that occur when concurrent actions are
triggered in the system and proposes solutions. Section 4.3 elaborates on desirable
properties, called healthiness conditions, that should guide the design of the logic.
Furthermore, I give evidence that the conditions hold by illustrating the state model
that derives from the actions of the logic and by verifying it with a model-checker
software, named Maude. There has been an incremental renement of the logic and
Section 4.5 describes this exercise which resulted in an enriched version of the logic,
expressive enough to address the ambiguities encountered. The core elements of the
conceptual model informed the initial attempt to formalise consent and revocation
controls into a set of actions, constraints and obligations. However, when applied to
the pilot Employee Data case study [11] ambiguities emerged. Section 4.5 provides
an analysis of the addressed ambiguities created either by the complex notion of
privacy or by the translation of natural into formal language [11] and explains the
lessons learnt from the renement process, that aected not only the development of
the conclusive logic presented here, but the implementation of the EnCoRe project
as well. Finally, Section 4.6 provides a synopsis of how this Chapter contributes to
knowledge.
4.1 Hoare style consent and revocation logic
The logic formalises the consent and revocation processes in terms of Hoare triples.
It comprises a set of rights and facts that pertain to specic data for specic prin-
cipals, a set of actions appropriate to principals in the system and constraints that
pertain to data expressed with variables. Rights and facts are captured with pred-
icates that, once true, indicate that a right or a fact is true for specic data and
specic actors in the system. Action is a verb, parametrised by, typically, the prin-
cipal executing the action, the principal aected by it, and a package of parameters
setting values for consent and revocation variables. Actions describe a transition
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from one state of the system to another and denote the actors who participate in
this transition. The rst actor is the initiator of the action and the second is the
actor inuenced by this transition.The logic is parametrised by the details of the
space of variables and values, although some basic ones are required to support
certain actions.
The actions can be performed only when the actors involved have the appropri-
ate rights and specic facts are true, and can either aect the rights of the principals
and overwrite facts or create obligations for principals in the system, or both. Obli-
gations capture requirements that result from applying one of the actions in the
logic, denoting the necessity to apply further actions, and serve a dual purpose.
They are actions that need to be triggered in the future under certain conditions
(e.g., notify the data subject after ve months) or actions that should be cascaded
to third parties in order for the post-condition to be completed e.g., update user's
data and propagate the changes to all parties that you have shared her/his data
with). In the latter case, a third actor is also inuenced by the transition from one
state to another.
The rules of the logic are given in the form of Hoare triples, as follows:
fpre-condition(rights/permissions)g
action(a; b; )
fpost-condition(rights/permissions/obligations)g
The desirable initial state is captured by the pre-condition of the triple, the input
that triggers the transition is dened by the action and the expected nal state is
described in the post-condition. Outputs from the nal state, are captured with the
form of obligations.
The pre-condition is a Boolean combination of (statements about) rights, facts
and the values of consent and revocation variables in  constraints, which must
be satised before the action can be performed. Every right consists of a sequence
of three letters. The rst letter denotes the actor that pertains the specic right,
the second letter describes the nature of the right (right to process data or right
to share data) and the third letter denotes the data that the right applies to. The
constraints are expressed in variables, which constrain specic rights.
Every time an action is performed the state of the system changes from the one
described in the pre-condition to the one described in the post-condition. The post-
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condition, in analogy to the pre-condition, comprises of rights and permissions.
In addition, it could contain obligations. In a notational contrivance, rights or
predicates regarding the  conditions included in the pre-condition, if not negated
in the post-condition, remain true. Furthermore, rights that are not mentioned in
the post-condition are not aected by the action. The additional rights in the post
condition will be explicitly expressed positively and when removed from it, they will
be explicitly negated.
An obligation allows us to record the necessity of further actions consequent on
the one just performed. The post-condition of the obligation is in addition to and
should be consistent with the post-condition arising from the execution of the initial
action. For example, there cannot exist a right or fact in the post-condition of the
action and the negation of that right or fact in the post-condition of the obligation
pertaining to the post-condition of the action, as they would be inconsistent with
each other. An obligation is described as:
h	1i   h	2i
and it can be interpreted as: if state 	1 is satised, there is a requirement to apply
action   to transit to a new state 	2.
The state of the system is a set of principals, together with a set of atomic pred-
icates relating principals with data items and, in some cases, with other principals,
or with constraints giving values to consent variables. In the initial state of the
system, the only rights are those of the data subject who possesses full rights over
the data, while there is an assumption that both the data subject and the data con-
troller have reached an agreement regarding the consent and revocation options;
by denition, the data subject is the `owner' of the data and inherently possesses
all the rights that are dened in the logic.
The logic is designed in such a manner that has no gap between the abstract level
(that the logic describes) and the lower level (that actual programming captures).
This is due to the fact that the state space as described above consists of predicates
and the execution program could be the action between the pre and post conditions.
The eect of executing a programming code would be to change the state presented
in the pre-condition and captured with predicates, to the state expressed in the post-
The negotiation process between the data controller and the data subject is beyond the scope
of the logic and future work could embrace elements from other languages that eectively handle
this process (See Chapter 9)
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condition, captured in a similar vein. Thus, a program would simply assign the val-
ues of variables in each state. If, for example, (X1; X2; X3; X4 : : : Xn) are programme
variables then we could envisage a formula where the F [X1; X2; X3; X4 : : : Xn] is true
in a state s. The predicates described in the pre and post conditions of the Hoare
triples can be mapped to the variables described in programming, leaving no gap
between the abstract level and the lower level programming part.
A simple execution model is considered in the thesis, where obligations and
post conditions are assumed to run to completion. As a result, the inclusion of an
obligation in the post-condition of an action may be taken as an implicit shorthand
for the conjunction of the post-condition of the resulting actions. It is an important
healthiness condition of the logic that this should be independent of the order of the
execution of the obligation actions. However, allowing obligations from arbitrary
actions to interleave, may not always be possible and a more complex execution
model, supporting concurrency, would be necessary. A rst approach is presented
in Section 4.2.1. By including the obligations given in Hoare triples in the post-
condition, the logic becomes a higher order Hoare logic, since the obligations add
another task to be fullled in order for the action of the Hoare triple to run to
completion and reach the state described in the post-condition. One can imagine
a function that would map a Boolean variable to a specic obligation and would
return a \true value" every time the obligation is completed.
Although I believe to have captured an adequate set of actions, rights and facts
to represent the consent and revocation life-cycle, I do not claim completeness when
capturing the consent variables. On the contrary, new variables could be added
and dened to enrich the logic's expressiveness and to capture the environment
where the logic is deployed. The variables that have been used to formalise the
Employee case study presented in Chapter 5 are not the same as those that have been
used for the Biobank scenario illustrated in Chapter 6 or at the Identity Assurance
Programme depicted in Chapter 7. In addition, the values of the variables are
completely dierent and are customised to capture the needs of each deployment.
Legislation and business policies are considered in the logic and inuence the
options provided to the data subject. Since the logic is not designed to capture
negotiations between entities of the system, a change in business policy or law
enforcement cannot be formalised, but the result of such a change can be depicted
by the logic.
I should highlight that the logic treats all data as potentially personally iden-
tiable and therefore anonymisation is not considered. In addition, the issue of
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aggregation is partially addressed. Data could be aggregated either by processing it
for secondary purposes or by aggregating it with publicly available data and deriv-
ing new data. In the latter case, consent and revocation controls are not imposed
on the derived data.
The syntax of the logic is described by the BackusNaur Form below. In this
specication, c is a variable ranging over the actions dened in Table 4.1 P and Q
are predicates ranging over the rights and facts described in Table 4.2,  is a variable
ranging over, but not restrained to, the variables described in Table 4.3 and x is a
variable ranging over the possible data controllers captured in the system.
hrulesi ::= fPgcfQg
hP i ::= hrighti j hfacti j  j  P ; j P1 ^ P2 j P1 _ P2
hQi ::= hrighti j hfacti j hobligationi j 
j :Q; j Q; j Q1 ^Q2 j Q1 _Q2
hobligationi ::= hP i hQi j 8x:hP i hQi
 ::=  j : j (1 ^ 2) j (1 _ 2)
j 1 6= 2 j 1  2 j 1u2 j  3 
 ::= t j v j  j  : : :
Figure 4.1: Syntax of Hoare logic.
4.1.1 Rights, variables and actions dened in the logic
Table 4.1 presents all the actions in the logic. Table 4.2 illustrates the rights and
facts of the logic and Table 4.3 depicts all the variables that are used to formalise
the requirements for the three case studies.
Further to the actions listed in Table 4.1, I identify rights that will determine
whether the actions can be executed. Departing from the four core elements of the
conceptual model that have been captured as rights in the logic, the data subject
also has the right to be notied, the right to update data and the right to delegate
rights to other individuals. In addition, there exists the right of the data controller
to create and store meta-data and the right of the data subject to express preferences
dening the way that this meta-data will be treated. The last four rows of Table 4.2,
contain predicates that deviate from the notion of the other rights. In essence, they
describe facts and are used to denote that a particular situation occurs.
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grant(a; b;; ) a gives consent to b to process data  under
the conditions described in the formula 
grant1(a; b;; ) a gives consent to b to share one step fur-
ther data  under the conditions described
in the formula 
grant(a; b;; ) a gives consent to b to share data  tran-
sitively under the conditions described in
the formula 
granty(a; b; c;; ) a gives consent to b to share data  with c
under the conditions described in the for-
mula  and this happens (c has the data)
process(b;; ) b uses data  under  conditions
revoke(a; b;; ) a revokes from b permission to process data

revoke1(a; b;; ) a revokes from b permission to share data
 one step further
revoke(a; b;; ) a revokes from b permission to share data
 transitively
revokey(a; b; c;; ) a cascade-revokes permission from the
third party c to whom b has shared  with,
to process data 
revokey(a; b; c;; ) a cascade-revokes permission from the
third party c to share data  downstream,
one step further
delete(a; b;; ) a requests b to delete data  at b
deletey(a; b;; ) a requests b to cascade-delete data  at b
and third parties
change(a; b;0; ) a changes the consent conditions for data
 to 0 conditions
update(a; b; ; 0) a requests to update  with ' and b links
them
updatey(a; b; ; 0) a requests to update  with ' and b deletes
the previous data 
delegate(a; b;; ) a delegates to b under conditions  all
rights for 
revoke delegate(a; b; ) b ceases to act as a delegate on behalf of
data subject a for data 
setnotify(a; b;; ) a requires b to notify a under conditions 
for 
setnotifyy(a; b;; ) a requires b to notify a under conditions
 for  and also to propagate these pref-
erences to all the third parties that b has
shared data  with
notify(a; b; ; n; ny) b noties a that  has been handled in
accordance with n using communication
method ny
request(b; c; ;) b requests from c permission to process and
share data 
Table 4.1: Meaning of the actions in the consent and revocation logic.
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Right Meaning
aO a owns (originates) 
aL a knows (where to locate) 
aP a may process 
aS a may share  (one-step further)
aS a may share  transitively
aN y a may be notied for 
aNb a must notify the owner of , b
aU a may update 
aXb a has shared  with b
aRy a must accept  as conditions on 
aR a has accepted and will respect  as conditions on 
aXb a has shared data  with b
Table 4.2: List of rights and facts in the consent and revocation logic explained in English.
The variables illustrated in Table 4.3 set guards on the actions and are typ-
ically bound up in a `preference formula' .  can be interpreted as a stand
alone predicate, expressing that the execution environment does not violate any
of the constraints implied by the variables (no deadlines expired, etc). The logic is
parametrised with the details of .
Variable Meaning
t duration of consent (time-out)
u set of purposes for which data is held
 parties that data may be shared with
 parties prohibited to share data with
 parties that may acquire access to the data
 parties that are prohibited from accessing the data
t the number of times that data could be processed
p binary variable that when true indicates that data is not processed
by the data controller
p binary variable that when true indicates that data is not processed
by third parties
n the means via which the notication method will be executed
(email, telephone etc.)
ny the notication purpose (data processed, collected, shared)
x method to be followed when implementing deletion of data
Table 4.3: Sample of consent variables in the consent and revocation logic.
Various  constraints will be instantiated below, and some examples of how the
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variables should be used are given. The denition of the system state, as well as
the syntax of the logic, do not need to be modied to handle constraints. These are
treated abstractly but a partial order  is conceived, perhaps a constrained subset
relation. Generally, there is supposed a partial order on  constraints, where   0
denotes that 0 provides at least as many restrictions as , so that it is no more
permissive.
4.1.2 Semantics of the actions
When reading the axioms the following key should be used:
 The letter a refers to the data subject.
 The letter b refers to the data controller.
 The letter c refers to third parties, dened as data controllers who have re-
ceived data from other data controllers and not from the data subject directly.
Action to capture giving consent to process data
Giving consent to process the specic data  given by the data subject to a data
controller, is formalised as follows:
faO ^ bRyg
grant(a; b;; )
fbL ^ bP ^ bRg
This action is performed only by the data subject, which is formalised by re-
quiring the aO right. The pre-condition is fullled only if the data controller is
willing to respect a's conditions. The result of this action is that in the new state of
the system, the rights of the data controller alter and now comprise of the right to
locate the data  and the right to process this data. Furthermore, the constraints
expressed by the bR right ensure that the preferences of the data subject will be
enforced through out data's life-cycle.
4. The logic for Consent and Revocation 96
Imagine the situation where Alice (captured as a for this example) wishes to
give consent to Bob (b) to process her data () only for research purposes. Then
the formalisation would be:
faO ^ bRyg
grant(a; b;; )
fbL ^ bP ^ bRg
where  = purpose:u and u  fresearch purposesg.
I introduce a dierent denition of the same action to describe the case where it
is not the data subject but the data controller who gives consent to third parties to
process data subjects' data. The reason for distinguishing the two actions is that in
the later case there might be notication preferences expressed in a previous state
of the system by the data subject that must be included in the post-condition. This
is captured as:
fbS ^ bR ^ cRy ^   g
grant(b; c;; )
fbXc ^ cP ^ cR^
hbNai setnotify(a; c;0; ) htruei^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \shared"i notify(b; a; ; \shared"; n) htrueig
where 0 = ny ^ n.
Although the action is the same as the previous example, it is not semantically
overloaded because the actors of the action are dierent. The only dierence with the
previous denition is that when this action is triggered it creates also two obligations
that handle the notication process. If the data subject a has set notication
controls (captured by the bNa right in the rst bracket of the rst notication) and
if these conditions are met (the second bracket of the rst obligation is true) then the
data controller b noties a (captured by the second obligation). The permission 
given by a should be more permissive than the  given by the data controller to
third parties. This rule is introduced because when the data subjects' data are
disseminated to third parties, either the same or a less permissive  formula should
be enforced to the third parties.
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The action below denotes that the data subject requests from the data controller
to share her/his data with a specic third party.
faO ^ bRyg
granty(a; b; c;; )
fbP ^ bS ^ bR^
hcRyi grant(b; c;; ) hcL ^ cP ^ cRi^
hbNai setnotify(a; c;0; ) htruei^
hbNa ^ aN y ^ 0 3 ny 3 \shared"i notify(b; a; ; \shared"; n) htrueig
where 0 = ny ^ n.
When this action is triggered the data controller obtains the right to process and
share data and triggers an obligation to share data with a particular c. In the post-
condition b possess the right to share data with any data controller he/she wishes
to. In addition, there is an obligation to propagate any notication preferences to c
and notify a that her/his data is shared.
Action to capture giving consent to share data only one step-further
The case where the data subject gives consent to the data controller to share his
data one step further is formalised as:
faO ^ bRyg
grant1(a; b;; )
fbL ^ bP ^ bS ^ bRg
In the formalisation above, the data controller does not necessary possess the
right to process data before she/he obtains the right to share data. The right to
share data is considered to imply the right to process data, thus when an action to
share data is enabled by the data subject the right to process should be obtained as
well. This suggestion is a healthiness condition, explained and proven in Section 4.3.
In the post-condition, the data controller possesses the right to share and the right
to process the data subject to the  conditions.
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For example, if Alice (a) is giving Bob (b) consent to share her data () only
with Eve and for a period of 3 months, then the formalisation would be:
faO ^ bRyg
grant1(a; b;; )
fbL ^ bP ^ bS ^ bRg
where  = parties to share data with: ^ time duration:t and   fEveg, t= 3
months.
As in the grant action, I introduce a dierent formalisation to describe the case
where the data controller gives consent to third parties to share data subjects' data.
The formalisation is:
fbS ^ bR ^ cRy ^   g
grant1(b; c;; )
fbXc ^ cS ^ cR ^ bR^
hbNai setnotifyy(a; c;0; ) htruei^
hbNa ^ aN y ^ 0 3 ny 3 \shared"i notify(b; a; ; \shared"; n) htrueig
where 0 = ny ^ n. The rationale behind this formalisation is the same with the
action grant for the data controller and the obligations created serve the same
purpose. The dierence is that in the post-condition, c has additionally obtained
the right to share data.
Action to capture giving consent to share data transitively
A slightly dierent action is formalised below. The data subject gives consent
to data controllers to share the data  transitivelyy. It is captured as:
yIn the logic a change of consent that needs to ow transitively to all the third parties does not
happen directly by the data controller. There is an obligation created to the third parties that
have shared data further down the chain
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faO ^ bRyg
grant(a; b;; )
fbL ^ bP ^ bS ^ bS ^ bRg
Following the same rationale, the right to share transitively implies the right to
share one step further and the right to process data.The only dierence with the
grant1 action is that in the post condition b possesses both the bS and the bS
rights.
The formalisation when the data controller triggers the action is:
fbS ^ bR ^ cRy ^   g
grant(b; c;; )
fbXc ^ cL ^ cP ^ cS ^ cS ^ cR
^bR ^ hbNai setnotifyy(a; c;0; ) htruei^
hbNa ^ aN y ^ 0 3 ny 3 \shared"i notify(b; a; ; \shared"; n) htrueig
Again the dierence is that c has now the right to share data transitively.
Action to capture the processing of data
The next action captures the use of data by the data controller. Once she/he has
the right to process data and the  conditions are respected, then the processing of
data is allowed.
fbP ^ bRg
process(b;; )
f:bR ^ bR0g
In the post-condition, the  conditions according to the variables that contain
may become more restrictive and the data controller must conform with the new
values. Consider the case where the data subject demanded the personal data to
be processed only ve times. After this action, the  conditions should depict that
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only four more times will be allowed to the data controller to use the specic data.
Action to capture changing consent choices captured in the  conditions
Changes in data subjects' consent choices are formalised with the action change
by altering the initial choices captured in the  condition, while all other rights
remain intact.
faO ^ bR ^ bRyg
change(a; b;; )
fbR ^ :bR ^ 8c:hbXci change(b; c;; ) h:cR ^ cRig
In the post condition the right :bR denotes that b no longer abides  for 
but is now obliged to abide . Furthermore, there is an obligation for the data
controller to propagate the changes to all the third parties that data have been
shared with.
If for example Alice (a) requests from Bob (b) and from every party (c) that
Bob has shared her data with, to change the consent and revocation permissions
then the request could be formalised as follows:
faO ^ bR ^ bRyg
change(a; b;; )
fbR ^ :bR ^ 8c:hbXci change(b; c;; ) h:cR ^ cRig
where (for example)  = parties to share data with: ^ time duration:t
^ purpose for processing data:u and   fEve, Sadie, Michael, Nickg, t= 5 months
and u = fresearch purposesg and  = parties to share data with: ^
time duration:t ^purpose for processing data:u and   fEve, Sadieg, t= 3 months
and u = fresearch purposesg.
In the example above the some of the values of the  conditions have changed
to . More specically, the people with whom data could be shared with have
been limited to Sadie and Eve and the time available to process this data has been
reduced from 5 months to 3 months.
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Action to capture delegation of consent
With the action of delegation data subjects may delegate their rights to other
data subjects. This action can only be performed by the \owner" of the data and it
is the only action that allows the aU right to be shared. The recipient of the right
in the post-condition is the delegate. Thus, the right to update data is held only by
the owner or by the delegate.
faO ^ bRy ^ bLg
delegate(a; b;; )
fbU ^ bRg
In this action the post-condition includes only the bU right. The person who
holds this right is implied to also possess all the other rights available to the owner
of the data. The  condition could describe the reason why the delegation of rights
to another person took place. For simplicity reasons I will formalise the case studies
introduced in the following chapters without including in the pre-conditions the aU
right.
There is an action to formalise the revocation of delegation. With this action
the delegated actor ceases to act on behalf of the data subject. The formalisation
of the action is:
faO ^ bUg
revoke delegate(a; b; )
f:bUg
Actions to capture data updates
When the data subject updates z the data, the initial consent rights remain the
same and the only thing that changes is data. With the above description the new
data is linked with the existing data.
zIt is assumed that all updates on data and changes on restrictions are cascaded to the third
parties with whom data has been shared.
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f(aU _ aO) ^ bL ^ bR ^ bP ^ bS
^  bS  bNg
update(a; b; ; 0)
fbL ^ bR ^ bP ^ bS ^ bS
^  bN ^ bL0 ^ bR0 ^ bP0 ^ bS0 ^ bS0
^  bN0 ^ 8c:hbXci update(b; c; ; 0) htruei^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \updated"i notify(b; a; ; \updated"; n) htrueig
Here I make use of a notational contrivance: each predicate preceded by 
denotes that predicate or its negation, and that choice is made consistently for each
predicate letter; thus if bP occurs in the pre-condition, then the same right should
occur in the post condition both for the  and 0 data. In the above action, the
disjunction in the pre-condition allows the action to occur if the data subject(aO)
or a person to whom the right aU has been delegated triggers the action. The
principal b must have at least the bL because otherwise b would not possess any
data to be updated. All other rights that may exist in the pre-condition, should
exist in the post-condition as well.
This action does not inuence rights but simply provides exactly the same rights
for 0 that b has for . With this action, the previous data is not deleted. There
is also an obligation in the post-condition to propagate the updated data to all the
third parties that the data controller has shared data with. Furthermore, if there
are any notication choices regarding the update of data, a notication is send to
the data subject. An obligation to propagate the notication choices to third parties
is not included, since the update action do not aect rights.
The data subject may request the existing data to be replaced with the new
data. Notice that rights on existing data are revoked and existing data is deleted.
The formalisation is:
4. The logic for Consent and Revocation 103
f(aU _ aO) ^ bL ^ bR ^ bP ^ bS
^  bS ^ bNg
updatey(a; b; ; 0)
f:bL ^ :bR ^ :bP ^ :bS ^ :bS^
:bN ^ bL0 ^ bR0 ^ bP0 ^ bS0 ^ bS0
^  bN0 ^ 8c:hbXci updatey(b; c; ; 0) htruei^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \updated"i notify(b; a; ; \updated"; n) htrueig
This action does not inuence any rights, rather it provides exactly the same
rights that b had for data , with the dierence that the previous data  is deleted.
Following the same rationale with the update action, there is one obligation in the
post-condition to cascade all the updates to third parties, when the data controller
has shared data with them, and another to notify the data subject regarding the
update of the data.
Action to capture notication
With the action of setnotify the data subject is able to dene the reason of the
notication and the channels that the data controller should use to get in conduct
with the her/him.
faO ^ aN y ^ bL ^ bRyg
setnotify(a; b;; )
fbR ^ bNag
where  = ny ^ n.
In this action a sets the notication preferences. Principal a can trigger the
action only if he/she possess the aN y right. Also in the pre-condition the principal
b should at least possess the bP right. The more rights b possesses the more
options are available for a regarding the value of the ny variable (eg. only if b has
the right to share data may a request to be notied when data are shared). In the
post-condition, b is now aware of a's preferences (captured with the bLny and bLn
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rights) and has the right to notify a when the conditions  are met.
For example, if Alice (a) would like to be notied when Bob (b) is using her data
for research purposes via email, then this request can be captured as follows:
faO ^ aN y ^ bL ^ bRyg
setnotify(a; b;; )
fbR ^ bNag
where  = purpose of notication:ny ^
means via which the notication is executed:n while n  femailg and ny  fdata
processed for research purposesg.
The actual action when b noties a is formalised as follows:
fbNa ^ aN y ^ bR ^  3 ny ^  3 ng
notify(b; a; ; ny; n)
ftrueg
If the  conditions, described by the ny and n variables, are met then b noties
a (the post condition is true).
Action to capture revoking consent to process data
The options oered to data subjects that render the process of controlling per-
sonal data dynamic, are the dierent types of revocation. The rst revoking action
formalised in this section is the revoke action. The data subject may revoke from
the data controller the right to process data.
faO ^ bP ^ bS ^ bS ^ bRyg
revoke(a; b;y; )
fbL ^ :bP ^ :bS ^ bRy ^ :bS^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(b; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
where  3 p.
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In the pre-condition the only right that b should possess in order for a to trigger
the action is the bP right. However in the post condition, the rights to share onward
and transitively are revoked as well. Now b only possesses the bL right. If the action
is triggered, then the y condition should be respected (captured by the bRy).
The y could be dened such as the p variable, a boolean variable capturing whether
the data controller processes the data at that particular time, to be either true or
false, allowing the logic to express both prospective and retrospective revocation
respectively. Furthermore, there is an obligation to notify the data subject that the
consent given is now revoked.
For example, if Alice (a) would like to revoke from Bob (b) the ability to process
her data even if Bob is currently processing the data, then the action would be
formalised as:
faO ^ bPg
revoke(a; b;y; )
fbL ^ :bP ^ :bS ^ bRy ^ :bS^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(b; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
where  = purpose of notication:ny^means via which notication is executed:n^
data currently processed:p and n  femailg, ny  fpermission to process data
revokedg and p= fdata processed currentlyg.
The data controller could request revocation of consent for processing from the
third party, without the interference of the data subject. This is formalised as:
f(bS _ bS) ^ cRy ^ bXcg
revoke(b; c;y; )
fcL ^ :cP ^ :cS ^ :bS ^ cRy^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(c; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
where y 3 p.
Action to capture revoking consent to share data only one step-further
Similar to the action above, the data subject may revoke from the data controller
the right to share data one step further. Following the same rationale, if the data
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controller possesses the right to share data transitively, the right is also revoked.
faO ^ bP ^ (bS _ bS) ^ bRyg
revoke1(a; b;; )
fbL ^ bP ^ :bS ^ bR ^ :bS^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(b; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
where   fp; pg. Notice that the bP right is not revoked.
The data controller could request the revocation of the right to share data from
third parties, without the action being initiated by the data subject. This is for-
malised as:
f(bS _ bS) ^ cRy ^ bXcg
revoke1(b; c;y; )
fcL ^ cP ^ :cS ^ :bS ^ cRy^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(c; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
Action to capture revoking consent to share data transitively
The data subject may revoke from the data controller the right to share data
transitively. This action does not aect b's rights or duties with respect to processing
and sharing data one-step further.
faO ^ bP ^ bS ^ bS ^ bRyg
revoke(a; b;; )
fbL ^ bP ^ bS ^ bR ^ :bS^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(b; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
where  3 p.
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The data controller could request revocation of consent from the third party,
without the interference of the data subject. This is formalised as:
fbS _ bS ^ cRy ^ bXcg
revoke1(b; c;; )
fcL ^ cP ^ :cS ^ :bS ^ cR^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(c; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
where   fp; pg.
Actions to capture revoking consent to share and process data in a cas-
cade way
The action where a revokes in a cascading way from c the right to process data
is captured as:
faO ^ bXc ^ bRyg
revokey(a; b; c;; )
fbR ^ hbXc ^ cP ^ cS ^ cSi revokey(b; c; ) h:cP ^ :cS ^ :cSi^
hbNa ^ aN y ^ 0 3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(c; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
where  3 p.
The subtle but important dierence with the previous action is that in order for
 to be true the data should not be currently processed by c. The rights are not
revoked from the data controller. Also the cascading revocation is triggered only if
the rst bracket of the obligation is true. The result is that all the rights from c are
revoked. The bXc right is not revoked in order to enable the deletion of the  data
in a later state. It is worth mentioning that this formalisation with the bXc in the
rst bracket enables the revocation of rights from b without revoking them from c
since the (bXc) right is only revoked when c's rights are revoked. It is a function
that is not possible to express with the simple logic and enriches the granularity of
the dierent revocation actions.
The cascading revocation of the right to share data onwards or transitively is
formalised as:
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faO ^ bXc ^ bRyg
revokey(a; b; c;; )
fbR ^ hbXc ^ cP ^ cS ^ cSi revokey(b; c;; ) hcP ^ :cS ^ :cSi^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(c; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
where  3 p.
Again, in the second bracket of the obligation the bXc right is not revoked in
order to enable the revocation of the cP right in a later state. An action that will
allow the data subject to revoke the right to share data transitively is not dened.
As distinguished in the focus groups, participants felt that they had no control of
their data once the data controllers shared it further. I believe that allowing third
parties to share the data one step-further and not transitively does not have an
impact on the data subjects belief that data is still out of their control.
Actions to request deletion of data
Deletion of data is formalised as:
faO ^ bL ^ bP ^ bS ^ bS
^bR ^ bRyg
delete(a; b;; )
f:bL ^ :bP
^:bS ^ ^:bS ^ :bR ^ bR^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \deleted"i notify(b; a; ; \deleted"; n) htrueig
where  = x^ p and  describes the conjunction of all s that the data controller
should respect in the life-cycle of consent and revocation processes. At the end
when the data are deleted the only right that the data controller has is the \right"
to respect the conditions for deletion, thus providing a certicate that the data was
deleted with the appropriate manner. Also the data controller noties the data
subject, if there is a notication choice, that the data is deleted. It is still a matter
for debate how the notication could take place, because the data controller will
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need the email to send the notication, thus leading to a paradox!
The only right that b should have in order for the action to occur is to know
the location of data. Both in the pre-condition and in the post-condition, the bXc
right is not revoked. It is important to highlight that if a does not revoke the data
from c, then the data controller will still be obliged to propagate the \cascading
deletion" action to third parties. The action is triggered only if the  conditions
are true. Thus, the data should not be in use by b and a must specify which type
of deletion should be implemented.
The data controller could request deletion of data from the third party, without
the interference of the data subject. This is formalised as:
f(bS _ bS) ^ cRy ^ bXcg
delete(b; c;y; )
f:cL ^ :cP ^ :cS ^ :bS ^ cRy ^ :bXc^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \revoked"i notify(c; a; ; \revoked"; n) htrueig
The action for cascading deletion is:
faO ^ bXc ^ bRyg
deletey(a; b; c;; )
fhbXc ^ cLi deletey(b; c; ) h:cL:cP ^ :cS ^ :cS ^ :bXci^
hbNa ^ aN y ^  3 ny 3 \deleted"i notify(b; a; ; \deleted"; n) htrueig
where   fx; pg.
In the pre-condition it is important to stipulate that b possesses the bXc right
over the data . Thus, in the post-condition all the rights are revoked from c and
also the data is deleted. It is important to highlight the subtle dierence in  as
now c should not currently process data. In addition, the (bXc) right is now false,
indicating that the data controller has no more data shared with c.
Actions to request permission to process and share data
The action to request permission to process and share data is only used for the
third case study. It is a special action due to the dierent business model that the
project requires for the Identity Assurance Programme. The dierence is that for
authentication purposes the data subject gives consent to a third party to request
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data from the data controller, instead of providing the data her/himself. The action
is formalised as:
faO ^ bRy ^ cRg
request(b; c;; )
fbR^
hcS ^ bRyi grant(c; b;; ) hbL ^ bP ^ bS ^ bS ^ cXb ^ bR(u)ig
In the post-condition b has to comply with the restrictions posed both by the
data controller c and the data subject in order to be able to process and share data.
The notation u dene that the conditions ought to be respected by the data
controller comprise of the  and  conditions.
4.2 Concurrency issues and model
When the actions formalised in Section 4.1 are triggered simultaneously in a system
oering controls captured by the logic, conicts that need to be resolved emerge.
By developing a concurrency model, I specify how actions should be handled in
a concurrent manner to resolve problematic situations. It is worth noting that
the semantics of the logic presented in Section 4.1, are inherently \thread-safe".
Rather, the concurrency problems arise from the fact that dierent agents may
have inconsistent views of the system caused by a number of reasons ( e.g., due to
the network lay).
4.2.1 Problems challenging the concurrency model
A concurrency model for the consent and revocation logic is particularly challenging
for a number of reasons.
 Rapid changing of mind: Conceptually it must be possible for data subjects
to rapidly change their mind regarding their consent and revocation prefer-
ences, which means that the concurrency model must impart some ordering
on actions to ensure that the notion of the most recent set of preferences can
be maintained correctly.
 Identity of data: The data subject and data controllers may have subtly
dierent understandings of what constitutes an item of data to which controls
must be applied.
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 Dierent preferences for dierent data controllers: It must also be pos-
sible for data subjects to choose diering consent and revocation preferences
(for the same data) for each data controller that they interact with, after all
that is their prerogative.
 The unique case of deletion: The logic should provide sucient evidence
that situations where the conicting preferences include a deletion request are
handled.
 Circular chains of actions: If someone has to consider an ecosystem of data
controllers, then she/he has to allow for the creation of supply chains of data
sharing and associated service provision which can have circular connectivity.
4.2.2 The rapid changing of mind
The problem of rapid changing of mind occurs when the data subject decides to
change their consent choices so quickly that the system is not able to implement
the rst change before the action for the next change occurs. Thus, there is a risk
that the former action might not be implemented (or it could be implemented later
than the second action) and the nal result could be dierent from what the data
subject expects.
For example, suppose the data subject decides data to be shared with third
parties but regrets it soon after and decides to revoke that action by deleting data
from the third parties. If the decision to delete data is so rapid that the second action
in the system occurs before the sharing of data is implemented by the system, then
in the nal state of the system, the third parties will possess data from the data
subject (in essence the sequence of the actions is reversed).
To avoid such issues a concurrency model that will highlight which sequence of
actions could create problematic situations must be dened and a resolution policy
should be provided. What safely can be argued is that:
 All grant actions could run in parallel. The pre-conditions of the actions are
disjoint and the post conditions are compatible (i.e. do not interact).
 All revocation actions could run in parallel for the same reason that the grant
actions run in parallel.
 A single notify, a single change and a single update action could run in parallel,
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as they aect dierent rights and  restrictions. However, two of the same
kind cannot.
Since the consent and revocation logic is designed based on a user-centric per-
spective, the actions that derive from the data subject will always have the highest
priority. The obligations that occur from the data subject's wishes have the second
highest priority, whereas the actions that are triggered by the data controller have
the lowest priority. No actions can be triggered by third parties that could inuence
the state of the data controller's system.
Based on the above rationale and looking the system from a global view (i.e.
someone who can see everything), the concurrency model is as follows:
 When the grant, notify, change and update actions are triggered in parallel
(denoted by the k symbol) then the grant action is executed rst and then the
other actions are all executed simultaneously.
{ grant(a,b,)
{ notify k change k update
{ If the grant action is triggered by the data controller and the other actions
are triggered by the data subject, then the priority is reversed.
 notify k update k change
 grant(b,c,)
 When the revoke, notify, change and update actions are triggered in parallel
then the revoke action is executed rst and then the other actions are all
executed simultaneously.
{ revoke(a,b,)
{ notify k change k update
{ If the revoke action is an obligation, triggered by the data controller and
the other actions are triggered by the data subject, then the priority is
reversed.
 notify k update k change
 revoke(b,c,)
 When the actions revoke, grant update, change and notify are triggered to-
gether then:
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{ The actions with the highest priority are the \grant00 and \revoke00 ac-
tions. The actions then are ordered by using a time stamp and are
processed sequentially. The action with the least recent time stamp will
be triggered rst, followed upon completion from the second action.
{ The second action is triggered (either grant or revoke).
{ All the other actions are triggered simultaneously.
{ If a revoke action is an obligation, then the obligation is triggered rst,
the update, notify and change actions next and the last action to be
triggered is the grant action.
{ Based on the same rationale, if the grant action is triggered by the data
controller, the revoke action has the highest priority. The grant action
will be triggered rst, then the revoke action is triggered and the last
actions to be executed are the update, notify and change actions.
{ If the grant action is triggered by the data controller and the revoke
action is an obligation, then the update, change and notify actions have
the highest priority. Thus, the rst action to be triggered is the grant
action by the data controller, the second should be the obligation to
revoke and the last actions are the update, change and notify actions.
 In the case where grant, revoke, change, update and notify actions are trig-
gered by the data subject, revocation, change, update and notify actions are
triggered by obligations and grant and revoke actions are triggered by the data
controller, then the priority is:
1. Resolve the time issue between the grant and the revoke actions that
were triggered by the data controller and trigger the rst action.
2. Resolve the time issue between the grant and the revoke actions that
were triggered by the data controller and trigger the second action.
3. Resolve the time issue between the revocation or grant action that is
triggered by an obligation and trigger the rst action.
4. Resolve the time issue between the revocation or grant action that is
triggered by an obligation and trigger the second action.
5. The actions update k notify k change triggered by an obligation.
6. Resolve the time issue between the grant and revoke actions triggered by
the data subject and trigger the rst action.
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7. Resolve the time issue between the grant and revoke actions triggered by
the data subject and trigger the second action.
8. The actions update k notify k change triggered by the data subject.
4.2.3 The special case of deletion
The case of deletion is one aspect of the problem presented in Section 4.2.2. If the
data is deleted then no more actions could have an eect in the system. The solution
proposed for the rapid change of mind eectively addresses the issue of deletion.
4.2.4 Identity of data
The logic handles the consent and revocation preferences in a system. I assume that
the data subject's and the data controller's perceptions are in alignment, regarding
the policies of the system. The right bRy serves this purpose. Thus, the assump-
tion is that data subject and the data controller share a common understanding
of what data item is. Any negotiations between the data subject and the data
controller could be formally described with logics complementary to the logic, such
as SecPal [32] and create opportunities for future research which are presented in
Chapter 9.
4.2.5 The circular problem
When the unrestricted propagation of data is allowed, it could potentially lead to a
situation were a data controller will propagate obligations to the third party and the
third party will propagate the same obligations to the data controller, thus creating
an innite loop of obligations.
To avoid this situation, a possible solution will demand the restriction of the
propagation of data. A third party should only accept data from a data controller
or another third party, if she/he does not already possess the same data from the
same data controller. The collection of the same data is allowed so many times as the
number of the existing data controllers registered in the system. Data controllers are
considered those parties that have acquired data directly from the data subject. This
rule will enable the logic to describe situations where the data subject has expressed
dierent consent and revocation preferences for the same data to dierent data
controllers. In addition a hash list could be created when the data is stored to record
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Figure 4.2: The circular problem
restrictions posed by the senders of data. This hash list allows dierent consent and
revocation preferences for the same data without propagating obligations.
In Figure 4.3 the sharing of data from C to A is prohibited in order to tackle the
innite propagation of obligations. There is only one data controller, so the data
could be stored only one time.
Figure 4.3: Actions prohibited by the proposed solution
In Figure 4.4 the sharing of data from C to A is allowed since there exist two
dierent data controllers and the entity A has one copy of data. The data controller
will determine which data to use, based on whose behalf the data is processed.
4.2.6 Dierent preferences for dierent data handlers
The ability to set dierent preferences for dierent data handlers regarding the
same data is one aspect of the problems described in Section 4.2.5. It should be
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Figure 4.4: Actions allowed by the proposed solution
highlighted that only the data subject may choose completely dierent preferences
for the same data to dierent data controllers. Once these choices are set, then
the data controllers could only share the data further by posing the same or more
restrictive controls on the data. Once the data is received there is a list created to
keep track of the dierent constraints that should be respected by dierent parties.
Figure 4.5 below illustrates how the data handler D processes data for purpose 1
when the procedures concern data handler B and processes data for purpose 2 when
the procedures concern the data handler C.
Figure 4.5: List that contains dierent constraints for dierent parties
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4.3 Healthiness conditions
In the logic the actions are dened in a non-deterministic behaviour to describe
transitions in the system and the conjunction of predicates in every pre and post
condition indicates dierent states of the system. Furthermore, these predicates
could be constrained by variables comprising the  conditions. It is essential to
ensure that what is written in logical expressions is achievable, meaning that there
do not exist described behaviours that cannot be allowed by the system. In addition,
there are desirable behaviours and properties that are expected to be captured by
the logic. In order to address these issues, I dene several healthiness conditions as
desirable emergent properties of the logic.
A systematic approach to dene the healthiness condition, is followed. De-
parting from the initial state of the EnCoRe system for a specic data controller
I examine what actions are feasible from that state, what predicates describe the
reachable states mediated by these actions and which variables could constrain these
predicates. The same rationale is applied to all the states of the system and the
healthiness conditions are dened in order to connect the logical transitions with
the desired behaviour of the system in the real world. Counter-examples are used
to identify undesirable behaviour.
Healthiness conditions, albeit desirable, are irrelevant if they are not satised
by the models. In order to prove the healthiness conditions of the logic, I created
a state-model that comprises of all the dierent states that the system might reach
for a single data controller and for a single data. All the actions formalised in the
logic and the transitions they describe are included in the state model. The states
are dened according to the pre and post conditions of the actions. Figure 4.6
illustrates all the \grant and process" actions that are dened in the logic and the
transitions that these actions depict, while, in a similar manner, Figure 4.7 presents
all the \revoke and delete" that can take place in the system. Figure 4.8 describes
the actions that are independent, thus their transitions does not interfere with the
transitions of the \grant and revoke actions".
The proofs are performed using Maude [247]. Maude, is a \high-performance
reective language and system supporting both equational and rewriting logic speci-
cation and programming" [247] applicable to a variety of contexts. Rewriting logic
in Maude was preferred because, in concurrent change, the software can \naturally
deal with state and with concurrent computations" [247]. The healthiness conditions
that the logic satises are presented in the next section, while the proofs developed
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in Maude can be found in Section 4.4. All the healthiness conditions relating to
the characteristics of the actors are proven in Section 4.4, while only the fth con-
dition relating to the characteristics of the system is proven in the same section.
The remaining conditions either are axioms of the logic or are desirable properties.
Table 4.4 explains how the dierent states in the Hoare logic are captured in Maude.
Actions States in Maude Rights in the logic
1 grant(a,b,; ) O aO
2 grant1(a,b,; ) P bP
3 grant(a,b,; ) P,S bP ^ bS
4
any action providing
data to third parties
P,S,S bP ^ bS ^ bS
5 delete(a,b,; ) X,P bXc ^ bP
6 revoke(a,b,; ) X,P,S bXc ^ bP ^ bS
7 deletey(a,b,; ) X,P,S,S bXc ^ bP ^ bS ^ bS
8 revoke(a,b,; ) X bXc
9 revoke1(a,b,; ) Current State (CS) Any rights of the simple model
10
any action revoking
rights from third par-
ties
CS +Notifications aN y ^ aNb
11 process(b,; ) CS + Updates aU
12 change(a,b,0; ) CS + Notications + Updates aN y ^ aNb ^ aU
13 setnotify(a,b,; )
14 notify(a,b,; ; n; ny)
Table 4.4: Explanation of the state-machine's notations
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Figure 4.6: The state machine model depicting only the \grant and process" actions
examined in Maude
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Figure 4.7: The state machine model depicting only the \revoke and delete" actions
examined in Maude
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Figure 4.8: The state machine model depicting the \notify, update actions and the 
conditions" examined in Maude
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4.3.1 Healthiness conditions relating to the characteristics of the sys-
tem
There are three dierent kinds of healthiness conditions that relate to the charac-
teristics of the system. These are:
1. Conditions that are axiomatic for the logic.
(a) The initial state of the system for a specic user of the system contains
the rights aO and bRy for particular actors a, b and particular 
conditions.
(b) Rights change from true to false and vice versa only with actions.
(c) The  conditions must be consistent. For example if a data subject gives
consent to a data controller to share data with a specic third party,
there cannot exist a variable in the same  that constrains the action
denoting not to share the data with the same third party. Not all the
variables of the  constraints are dened in the thesis, thus a proof that
these must be consistent cannot be presented.
2. Desirable properties that derive from the axioms of the logic.
(a) The sequence of the actions that do not refer to the same data is commu-
tative (Action A() ; Action B(0) = Action B(0) ; Action A()). This
condition holds because the pre-conditions of these actions are disjoint
and the post-conditions are compatible (i.e. do not interact).
(b) Actions that refer to dierent data items are independent. This condition
holds because the pre-conditions of these actions are disjoint and the
post-conditions are compatible (i.e. do not interact).
(c) bS =) bS =) bP =) bL.
(d) When data is shared with third parties, at least the restrictions described
in , are imposed on third parties as well.
4.3.2 Healthiness conditions relating to the actors of the system
1. Data subjects can always delete (theoretically) all of their data, except where
law dictates otherwise. For any data item, a state must be reachable, in which
no data is stored by data controllers or third parties.
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2. Third parties cannot revoke rights from data controllers.
3. Data subjects can request revocation of rights and deletion of data from the
third parties, without requesting revocation of rights or deletion of data from
the data controllers.
4. Data subjects can revoke rights and delete data from the data controllers,
without revoking rights or deleting data from the third parties. But they still
have control over their data stored in third parties.
5. Data controllers can store data without exercising any process or sharing due
to law obligations (for example Internet Service Providers).
6. Data subjects' updates cannot inuence the rights that a data controller has
over that data.
7. Data subjects cannot impose controls on data that derived from processing or
aggregation of their data.
4.4 Proofs for healthiness conditions in Maude
This section presents the proofs of the healthiness conditions described in Sec-
tion 4.3. The state-model is tested with the application of counterexamples to
identify undesired behaviour, to reveal possible forbidden transitions in the system
and to provide proofs that every transition described by the formalised actions is
achieved. The code developed for the Maude software can be found in Appendix A.
4.4.1 Right to share implies right to process
The fth healthiness condition in Section 4.3.1 denotes that bS =) bS =)
bP =) bL, a condition that is also implied by the inner circles in Figure 3.1.
Figure 4.9 illustrates the results obtained from Maude. The command \search a
=> M:State" seeks all the transitions from the initial state to such a state where
bS =) bS =) bP =) bL is true. This is achieved with the use of an
invariant that when true the healthiness condition holds.
In addition I sought a counterexample which requested Maude to reach a state
where the condition bP =) bL is not true. The results are presented in Fig-
ure 4.10. From the results one can safely assume that there does not exist a state
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Figure 4.9: States where sharing implies processing is true
where the condition bS =) bP does not hold, while there are four states where
the condition holds, verifying the holding of this healthiness condition.
Figure 4.10: States where processing implies storing data is not true
4.4.2 Deletion of data from every state of the system
The rst healthiness condition presented in Section 4.3.2 stated that \data subjects
can always delete (theoretically) all of their data, except where law dictates other-
wise. For any data item, a state must be reached, in which no data is constrained
by rights". In order to prove this condition, the transitions from each state of the
system to the initial state were tested in Maude. The results are illustrated in
Figure 4.11 and in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.11: The results that Maude produced when the transitions from all states to the
initial were tested
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Figure 4.12: The results that Maude produced when the transitions from all states to the
initial were tested
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It is clear from the results that one can successfully transit from any state of
the system to the initial state, where no rights pertain to the data, thus there does
not exist a situation where personal data can be handled without the data subject
being able to delete it.
4.4.3 Third parties cannot revoke rights from data controllers
The second healthiness condition in Section 4.3.2 requires that third parties are not
allowed to revoke data from data controllers. In order to prove this condition, I
searched for a counterexample where there would exist a state such that the third
party would possess at least one of the rights to store, process, share or share
transitively data (the T right in Maude code) while the data controller would have
no knowledge of that possession (the X right in Maude code). The results are
presented in Figure 4.13 and such a state does not exist.
Figure 4.13: Requesting to reach a state where the third party would possess rights but
the data controller would not
4.4.4 Revoking rights from third parties without inuencing the rights
of the data controller
The third healthiness condition in Section 4.3.2 stated that \data subjects can
request revocation of rights and deletion of data from the third parties, without
requesting revocation of rights or deletion of data from the data controllers". In
order to prove that such a condition is possible, a transition from a state where
the data controller possess the rights L, P, S and the third party at least one of
the L, P, S rights to a state where the rights of the data controller will remain
untouched while the third party will possess no rights at all, is sought. The results
are presented in Figure 4.14 and such a transition is achievable.
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Figure 4.14: Revoking rights from third parties without inuencing the rights of the data
controller
4.4.5 Revoking rights from a data controller without inuencing the
rights possessed by third parties
The fourth healthiness condition in Section 4.3.2 stated that \data subjects can
request revocation of rights and deletion of data from data controllers, without
requesting revocation of rights or deletion of data from parties". In order to prove
that such a condition is possible, a transition from a state where the data controller
possess the rights L, P, S and the third party at least one of the L, P, S rights
to a state where the rights of the data controller are revoked while third parties
still possess rights, is sought. The results are presented in Figure 4.15 and such a
transition is achievable.
Figure 4.15: Revoking rights from data controller without inuencing the rights of third
parties
4.4.6 Store data without being able to process
The fth healthiness condition presented in Section 4.3.2 required that data con-
trollers can store data even without being able to process it. A transition from
the initial state to a state where the data controller will possess only the right L
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is requested to prove the condition and the results are presented in Figure 4.16,
illustrating that such transition is possible.
Figure 4.16: Reaching a state where the data subject can only store data
4.4.7 All the achievable states and the rights that pertain to them
To conclude with the Maude proofs, I present all the states that can be reached
from the initial one and the rights that pertain to these. The results are presented
in Figure 4.17 and there does not exist a state which has not been considered by
the logic.
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Figure 4.17: Achievable states from the initial state and the rights that pertain to them
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4.5 Lessons learnt and implications for EnCoRe
The process of designing the logic was dynamic and the nal version presented in
the thesis was reached by rening the logic to address issues and ambiguities that
emerged through out the life-cycle of the thesis. This process of rening the logic
also resulted in presenting solutions at an operational level for the EnCoRe project
and the lessons learnt would have remained undiscovered without the logic. The
main renement occurred as a response to the ambiguities that emerged when the
requirements of the pilot case study were formalised.
4.5.1 Ambiguities
The ambiguities that emerged from the formalisation of the requirements can be
categorised into two classes. The rst class comprises the ambiguities created from
the application of the details of law, regulation, policy and social factors by computer
scientists [259]. The second class consists of ambiguities emerge from the complexity
of the notion of privacy and the gap that exists between the data subject's demand
to control the ow of their data and the data controller's desire to reduce data
subjects' interference. The detection and resolution of these ambiguities requires
the use of formal methods.
Ambiguities of the rst kind
In the rst class ambiguities occur when the data subject performs actions to
update, delete, revoke or change his or her given consent. More specically, in the
case where the data subject wishes to update their personal data, there can be
ambiguities emerging as to whether previous data should be deleted or linked with
the new data. Furthermore, in the case where the organisation has shared this data
transitively it is not clear whether the changes should aect the third parties as
well.
Revocation of consent, even though it is analysed in detail in the model, obtains
dierent meanings depending on the circumstances and purposes that the data is
being held for. In the case of deletion, ambiguities emerge from dierences on how
higher level people perceive the notion of deletion and how it could be technically
implemented. For example deleting data could have multiple meanings. One could
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render the data useless, scramble data, delete it from the back-up system or physi-
cally destroy the hard discs.
Ambiguities of the second kind
The second class of ambiguities highlights the complexity of the privacy problem
and underlines the conicts that emerge between a data subject and a data con-
troller. The most interesting issues, but at the same time most dicult to address,
are that of aggregation and anonymity. The complex nature of these issues could
lead to a situation where it may be technically infeasible to express data subjects'
preferences or the privacy regulations in place.
Aggregation unveils more information about the data subject, by combining it
with information already available. Data could be processed and shared in the
proper way by the data controller, but when aggregated, this data could create new
information that can compromise data subject's privacy. The logic is designed in
such a manner that every time data is shared it can be aggregated by the data
controller, meaning that as long as they have permission to store or process data,
they have the potential to aggregate that data. A possible solution to the problem
of aggregation is for the data subject to dene the purpose for which the data is
shared and also control what further personal data the data controller collects.
The ambiguities that arise in the case of anonymity concern the way which data
is anonymised. These ambiguities where unveiled when I tried to formalise a use
case where the data subject requested her medical records to be anonymised if
shared with another third party. Although the data subject may consent to share
the anonymised medical records, the danger of the identity to be unveiled always
lurks, as \data can either be useful or perfectly anonymous but never both" [195].
\There is growing evidence that data anonymisation is not a reliable technical mea-
sure to protect privacy. The development of more powerful re-linking technology
capabilities and the wider access to increasing amounts of data from which to drive
these are reducing its eectiveness" [84].
Even if methods such as k-anonymity [195] become ecient, the link between
the data controller and the third party captured by the logic can lead to de-
anonymisation of the data. The logic can capture data subjects' requests to anonymise
data rst and then disseminate to a data controller if the anonymised data is treated
as new data. If this is the case, the data subject has no controls on that data and
further sharing of the old data between the data subject, the data controller and
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the third parties that have access to the anonymised data should be forbidden.
Diculties also emerge when the data subject exercises their right to revoke
consent but at the same time the data controller is unable to perform such an action.
For example a data subject may request his data to be deleted but the organisation is
still processing his data. To address these issues a variable allowing the data subjects
to express transparency in their decisions is required. Additionally, the conicts
that occur between the data subjects and the data controllers are addressed by
introducing a combination of permissions and obligations under certain conditions.
For example, a data subject's request regarding the revocation of consent to process
data is executed under the condition that the data controller does not process the
specic data at that time.
Further ambiguities occur with the handling of meta-data. In the logic, meta-
data mainly comprises of variables and ranges of values that set the context and
describe data subject's consent and revocation preferences. In the conceptual mod-
els it is not clear what happens with the data subject's control preferences. An
interesting example is that of notication. How can an enterprise notify a data
subject that their data was deleted completely if they do not keep their email and
the consent and revocation preferences describing the conditions for the action of
notication?
4.5.2 Renement process
Tackling the ambiguities created both from the formalisation of law, regulation
and social factors and from the complexity of the notion of privacy, enhanced the
eectiveness of the logic by introducing new actions and rights that enriched its
descriptiveness. Thus, more options are can be captured and oered to the data
subject to express their preferences.
The renement of the logic comprised of novelties that allowed the eective
and unambiguous formalisation of all the requirements not only for the pilot case
study but for those described in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. More specically, in
relation to the conceptual model presented in Chapter 3, four actions are introduced
for updating data, enabling data subjects to update data either by: deleting the
previous data; by linking data with the new; or by propagating the updates to third
parties as well. In addition an action for notication is dened and an obligation
is created for the data controller providing the means to the data subjects to be
notied under certain conditions and through certain communication channels (e-
mail etc.).
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Further to the introduced actions, rights that determine whether the actions will
be completed are dened. The data subject now has the right to be notied, the right
to update data and the right to delegate rights to other individuals. Furthermore,
the data controller has the right to know the location of every meta-data, enabling
the data subject to express preferences on the way that the meta-data will be treated.
Last but not least, the eectiveness of the actions is increased by the variables
dened in dierent contexts. Variables can determine when the data subject is
allowed to revoke permissions from the data controller, the way to delete data and
the purpose for which the data will be used in order to address the problem of
aggregation. Figure 4.18 illustrates why and how the extended Hoare logic presented
here is a renement of the simple Hoare logic.
Figure 4.18: Renement of the logic
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4.6 Synopsis of the ndings presented in the chapter
In this chapter I have presented a novel Hoare-style logic of consent and revoca-
tion. This is the second, and most signicant, step following the conceptual model,
towards a system capable of providing data subjects with consent and revocation
controls. The logic is given in the form of triples comprising of pre conditions, trig-
gered actions and post conditions. Since, to my knowledge, there does not exist a
logic that addresses the issues of consent and revocation in the current literature,
the logic is the main contribution of this thesis to knowledge. The core elements
of the logic are rights that principals of the system possess under certain circum-
stances; actions that describe transitions between states of the system; obligations
that capture the necessity of future actions (consequent on the one just performed);
and  constraints that pertain to data and comprise of variables that dene fur-
ther parameters of consent and revocation preferences. All the rights and actions
are presented and the formalisations of the desirable transitions in the system are
provided.
Maude was used to check that several important properties of the logic, such as
evidence that no more transitions could be achieved in the system or no undesired
behaviour is expected, always hold. I achieved this by exploring all possible reach-
able states. These desired properties formed the healthiness conditions that the
logic satises and verify the correctness of the mathematics. In addition, because
the Hoare-style favours sequential actions, a concurrent model was illustrated, to
identify problems that emerge when actions run in concurrent manner and solutions
were provided to the acknowledged issues.
The logic was underpinned by the elements dictating the conceptual model and
the initial attempt to specify the requirements of the pilot case study resulted in
ambiguities on the formalisation. These ambiguities were addressed and a rened
version of the logic occurred. The designing process was a gradual renement of the
logic and the version presented in this Chapter is the nal version, applied to all
three case studies of the EnCoRe project. The chapter concludes with the addressed
ambiguities and the lessons learnt from the formalisation, that otherwise would have
remained veiled.
CHAPTER 5
The Employee case study
Having designed a language able to capture the eects of data subjects expressing
consent and revocation preferences and having proven with the use of Maude the
healthiness conditions satised by that language, the next step is to verify its rich-
ness and eciency when applied to diverse contexts. As shown in Chapter 3, data
subjects have dierent privacy expectations, which depend upon the power relations
developed when they initiate a relationship with a data controller and the type of
data they disclose. The logic must adequately formalise the dierent requirements
elicited from diverse environments.
In order to verify the expressiveness of the logic, I adopted the research method-
ology of case studies. The case studies presented in this thesis were designed by
the EnCoRe consortium for the purposes of the EnCoRe project. I was fortunate to
acquire the benets of using the EnCoRe case studies, because they were inspired by
real world scenarios and driven by business needs. The names of the enterprises that
the case studies were designed to serve will not be revealed, due to condentiality
issues.
Orlikowski et al [196] argue that the case study methodology is the most popular
approach to be followed in the eld of IS because it is \an empirical inquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context" [272]. My
decision to apply the logic on the EnCoRe case studies was informed by the fact
that there are three dierent power relations created between a data controller and
a data subject. Each of the three case studies of the EnCoRe project is designed
to capture one of the three dierent types of relations that craft the data subjects'
consent and revocation expectations.
In this Chapter, I present the formalisation of the pilot case study, named the
Employee case study. The choice for the rst EnCoRe case study was informed by
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the fact that the management of employee data in organisations is a well-understood
problem, and employees' privacy oers interesting issues in terms of managing con-
sent and revocation controls in a context where dierent business and legal require-
ments need to be taken into account.
The case study describes a number of use case scenarios and elicits from these a
list of requirements. The implications of invoking consent and revocation controls
are explored. These use cases are meant to illustrate key points aecting the man-
agement of consent and revocation, such as the provision or revocation of consent by
a data subject; enforcing consent and revocation preferences; dealing with the over-
all consent and revocation controls and its impact on data including notications,
updates, etc.
In the employee data scenario, the focus is on types of personal data, such as
trade union membership, nancial/payment detail, home address details, family de-
tails, etc. Personal data can be gathered by dierent sub-organisations within the
enterprise (e.g. HR department, Payroll, Occupational Health department etc.) or
can be shared with third parties (web services to sell products, etc.). The concept
of collaboration among employees, referred as Workbook, is introduced to the case
study to capture the situation where a data subject interacts and shares data with
another data subject. Although this scenario is far from what can be achieved
today in terms of consent and revocation controls, I believe that the emerging re-
quirements, with reality checks, contribute to the understanding of these controls
and could indicate problems and ambiguities when implementing them.
In Section 5.1 bellow, the methodology followed to elicit the requirements for
capturing consent and revocation preferences is presented. In Section 5.2, the use
cases and their formalisation are discussed. In addition, the ambiguities which
emerged from applying the rst version of the logic are mentioned and the rened
actions and rights that addressed them are illustrated. I will also give a few examples
of what values the variables may take and how data subjects' choices could be
changed or revoked. Section 5.3 provides a synopsis of the results presented in this
Chapter.
5.1 Eliciting requirements
Requirements usually describe the necessary or expected behaviour of the system in
place, or the constraints to behaviours which would be observed in the system. The
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preferred approach for eliciting requirements in this thesis was to study the relevant
academic literature, to analyse the legacy systems already in place and to gain an
in-depth understanding by analysing the results of user requirements workshops,
specically designed for the needs of the EnCoRe project. However, it was not
feasible to undertake all these steps to elicit requirements for all the case studies
and dierent approaches were adopted.
The focus groups for this case study were generic and not designed for the
specic scenario, unlike the focus groups for the Biobank case study. For this
reason, the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [145] was used to elicit and analyse
the main requirements for a system managing consent and revocation preferences.
This notation is useful for expressing safety-related requirements and it provides
means for describing the desired functionality of a system. The six steps involved
in the development of a goal structure are:
1. Identify goals to be supported;
2. Dene basis on which goals are stated;
3. Identify strategy to support goals;
4. Dene basis on which strategy is stated;
5. Elaborate strategy (and therefore proceed to identify new goals - repeat the
process for the new goals);
6. Identify the basic solution.
The requirements are expressed in terms of the dierent types of information
needed at each level of the system and the GSN is used to break down overall
system goals. Firstly, I identify which standard messages would be exchanged in
a consent and revocation management system and models of how, and in which
sequence these messages are transmitted, are built.
5.2 Formalising the Employee case study
The description of the use cases, which are independent of each other, is captured
in italics and the symbols used in the following formalisations are:
 m denotes Mary.
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 b denotes her boss
 h denotes the enterprise's Human Resources department.
 z denotes Phil
 , 1, 2 represent data.
 c denotes a third party with whom the enterprise shares data.
 c1 is the company that Mary shares data with when she is abroad.
 y is the Company for which Phil works.
 k is the next of kin.
 s is a variable to denote that Mary is sick.
 q is a variable to denote the reason for the delegation process to take place.
5.2.1 Mary is hired
Consent for processing and sharing one step further
Mary is hired at Company X. She has to go through the hiring process and provide
personal data: address, nancial details, etc. Before starting to work, she lls out
forms for the Human Resources (HR) department. These reports require the disclo-
sure of health information, next of kin references, etc. She signs a form agreeing to
these terms and conditions which are then stored by HR.
fmO ^ hRyg
grant1(m;h;; )
fhL ^ hP ^ hS ^ hRg
where  = parties to access data: and   fHR department, Bossg.
In this formalisation, Mary discloses  to the HR department. She also gives
consent to the HR department to process her data and share it only one step further.
There is no further information on what data Mary discloses to the HR department.
If this information was available, each data could have been set as 1; 2; 3 and
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controls could pertain to each data separately. Data can also be classied into
larger groups and controls can be posed over a set of data. However, the issue
of scalability should be considered because it may not be feasible for real-world
systems to cope with controls in every single datum stored. There are implications
both for the data subject (how could they be eciently informed on how to control
each piece of data) and for the data controller (is it cost eective or even technically
feasible to provide such scalable controls? Are there any complications or delays for
the business operation?).
Note in the formalisation the constraint regarding the processing of data, as
only the HR department and Mary's boss may obtain access to process it. As
formalised in later use cases, Mary could set additional  conditions pertaining to
the processing or sharing of data and the notication procedure.
HR shares Mary's data with her boss
Some of the information, which Mary provided to the HR department during
her interview (CV, presentations, application and interview forms, etc.), might be
relevant to Mary's boss.
With the action below the HR department provides to Mary's boss access to her
personal data. The previous use case formalised Mary's choice to allow her boss
to access her personal data. In the above formalisation, since the  conditions are
respected, Mary's boss b obtains access to Mary's data and process it.
fhS ^ bRy ^ b 2 [:parties to access datag
grant(h; b;; )
fbL ^ bP ^ hXb ^ bRg
This formalisation denotes that the HR department can only share Mary's data
 when in the pre-condition the HR department has the right to share the data .
Mary has expressed her preference to allow her boss to obtain the data and this
is captured with the b 2 [:parties to access data notation. Maybe the HR could
impose some default controls on Mary's boss since Mary has not so far expressed
any other preferences. I will demonstrate how this formalization could be applied
in a following example.
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The processing of data from Mary's boss is captured in the formalisation below:
fbR ^ bPg
process(b;; )
ftrueg
The post-condition denotes that the action of processing has taken place and
since  conditions do not exist, the restriction in  that may happen, as demon-
strated in Chapter 4, does not apply in this scenario.
Mary allows the HR department to share her data with third parties
Mary gives consent to other services to process and share transitively her data
only if they notify her. She is asked to join a few mandatory enterprise services, such
as the employee portal, pension scheme, travel service, etc. She is oered the op-
portunity to express notications preferences about access/internal usage/disclosure
to third parties of the data.
fmO ^mN y ^ hP ^ hR ^ hRyg
setnotify(m;h;; )
fhLny ^ hLn ^ hR ^ hNag
where  = notify-how:n ^notify-what:ny and n  femailg and ny  fshared data
with third partiesg.
In this formalisation Mary sets her notication choices and she selects to be
notied via email when the HR department shares her data.
fhS ^ hR ^ cRy ^ c 2 [:destination ^   g
grant(h; c;; )
fcL ^ cP ^ hXc ^ cR^
8c:hhNa ^ \shared" 2 [:notify-what ^ \email" 2 [:notify-how
i notify(h;m; ; \shared", \email") htrueig
where  = purpose:u
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^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t and u  finternal usageg, t= 5 months and
t= 100 times processed and c  fthe employee portal, pension scheme, travel
serviceg.
In addition, the HR department shares her data with third parties and imposes
controls regarding the usage of data. There is an obligation included in the post-
condition, which is triggered only if Mary has set notication requests. Note that
the sequence in which the two actions will be executed in irrelevant, since the nal
result is the same in both possible combinations.
5.2.2 Mary is enrolled in other services
Mary allows third parties to process her data and sets notication re-
strictions
Mary decides to voluntarily join a few initiatives oered by the Company, including
a HW&SW purchase schema (oered by an external company), Sport and Social
Club (SSC) and Holiday Cottage Service - all provided by third party companies.
Mary's personal data, including address, employee references and nancial details,
has to be disclosed to these companies. She is also required to express her notication
preferences.
fhS ^ hR ^ cRyg
granty(m;h; c; ;)
fcL ^ cP ^ cR^
hmO ^mN y ^ hRy0i setnotify(m;h;0; ) hhNa ^ hR0i^
8c:hhNa ^mN y ^ \shared" 2 [0:notify-what
^\email" 2 [0:notify-howi notify(b; a; ; \shared"; \email") htrueig
where  = purpose : u and u finternal useg and 0 = notify-how:n^notify-what:ny,
n  femailg, ny  fshared data with third partiesg and c  fHW&SW purchase
schema, SSC, Holiday Cottage Serviceg.
In this use case, a similar formalisation with the previous use case is presented.
The subtle dierence is that Mary requires from the HR department to disclose
her data to specic third parties. If Mary has not set her notication preferences,
there is an obligation for the data controller to request from Mary her notication
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options. Once these options are in place, an obligation to notify Mary is triggered
when the data is shared with the third parties.
5.2.3 Data outsourced
Mary is oered the opportunity to express degrees of consent about some of the
personal data aected by these activities. This might include notications about
access/internal usage/disclosure to third parties of this data. Otherwise default set-
tings might apply. Mary decides to withdraw from the voluntary SSC service. She
revokes her consent to use her personal data and expresses the preference that her
personal data should be deleted.
The actions of expressing degrees of consent or setting notication preferences
can be formalised as in previous use cases. Below is formalised Mary's decision to
revoke consent and delete data from the Sport and Social Club.
fmO ^ hR ^ bXcg
deletey(m;h; )
f8c:hhXc ^ cLi deletey(b; c; ) h:cL ^ :cP ^ :cS ^ :cR ^ :bXcig
In this formalisation Mary requests her data to be deleted by all third parties.
The logic can also capture situations where Mary denes from which third party
in particular her permissions will be revoked. This example is formalised in use
case 5.2.10.
Ambiguities in deletion
Considering deletion, ambiguities emerge from the diversity with which people
perceive this issue. Further complexity occurs from the dierent ways which deletion
can be technically implemented. For example, the multiple meanings that deleting
data may have is: data can be rendered useless; data can be scrambled; data can be
deleted from the back-up system; request the hard discs to be physically destroyed.
This type of ambiguity is addressed in the logic with the use of the x variable,
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dening the specic technical implementation for deletion.
5.2.4 Mary withdraws from some services
Mary revokes permission to process her data from services and requires her data
to be deleted. Over time, She reassesses her aliation to a few voluntary services
which had joined in the past. She decides to leave a few of them, including the stock
purchase program but not the pension fund service. Thus, she requests the revocation
of consent regarding the use of her personal data by these services and requires her
data to be deleted where possible.
The formalisation is similar to that of the previous use case. The only dierence
is that the pension scheme is not included in the c set.
fmO ^ hR ^ bXcg
deletey(m;h; )
fhhXc ^ cLi deletey(b; c; ) h:cL ^ :cP ^ :cS ^ :cR ^ :bXcig
where c  fstock purchase programg.
Mary changes her notication preferences
Mary decides to change her notication preferences regarding the Holiday service,
whilst still using this service.
fmO ^ hR ^ hRyg
change(m;h;; )
f:hR ^ hRg
where  = notify-how:n^notify-what:ny and n  ftelephoneg and ny  fshareg.
In the formalisation presented above, Mary alters her notication preferences
and requests to be notied with a phone-call every time her data is shared.
5.2.5 Mary is getting married
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Mary updates her data
Mary is getting married. She has to update her personal data stored in Company
X and propagate these updates to some of the third party services (including change
address, nancial details, indication of next of kin, etc.).
fmO ^ hL ^ hR ^ hRy0 ^ hP
^hS ^ bNg
update(a; b; ; 0)
fbL ^ bR ^ bP ^ bS ^ bN ^ bL0
^bR0 ^ bP0 ^ bS0 ^ bN0 ^ 8c:hhXci updatey(h; c; ; 0) htrueig
In this formalisation, Mary updates her data but her previous address for ex-
ample, is not deleted by the data controller. An obligation in the post-condition
is included, in order to propagate the updated data to the services which the HR
department has shared data with.
An example where previous data is deleted and the updated data is
propagated to third parties
Once married, Mary must update her data but expresses the preference to delete
the old data, whilst the same consent preferences should remain intact. In the case
where the company X or the third parties have the right to share Mary's data onward,
Mary could request her changes to be propagated to all the parties who share her data.
fmO ^ hL ^ hR ^ hRy ^ hP ^ hS
^hNg
updatey(m;h; ; 0)
f:hL ^ :hR ^ :hP ^ :hS ^ :hS
^  hN ^ hL0 ^ hR0 ^ hP0 ^ hS0 ^ hS0
^  hN0 ^ 8c:hhXci updatey(h; c; ; 0) htrueig
In this formalisation, Mary updates her data but her previous address, for ex-
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ample, is deleted by the data controller. The dierence with the previous use case
is that all the previous data is deleted.
Ambiguities occurring when updating data
When the data subject wishes to update his or her personal data, there are
ambiguities emerging as to whether previous data would be deleted or linked with
the new data. Furthermore, in the case where the organisation has shared their data
transitively it should be claried by the data subject whether the changes should
aect the third parties as well. I decided to design the logic in such a manner
that all the updates would be propagated to the third parties with whom data has
been shared with. My decision is based on the fact that legislation, as depicted in
Chapter 2, requires the data acquired by any data controller to be kept always up-
to-date. If necessary, the logic could be recongured to address dierent priorities.
With the logic one can formalise requirements that allow data subjects to control
what information is updated, how it is updated, who will process the updated
information. In addition guards can be set on these controls, expressed via the
values of the variables chosen by the data subject. Similar to the process of update,
when an individual changes the  conditions that constrain the initial consent,
these changes will aect the third parties. The healthiness condition requesting the
 conditions to be consistent is crucial for this functionality.
Mary delegates consent to next of kin
Mary decides to delegate her controls over her personal data to her husband while
she is abroad.
The case of delegation is formalised as follows:
fmO ^ hRy ^ hLg
delegate(m; k; )
fkUg
where  = reason for delegation:q and q  fRequest to delegate permissions to
husband while abroadg.
In this formalisation k denotes the next of kin, who after the action is now able
to act on Mary's behalf. The reason that this process took place is also captured in
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the  conditions.
5.2.6 Mary gets promoted
Mary consents to HR to process and share additional data
Mary's internal role is changed. She is promoted and as a result she has a team
to supervise. She has new duties and responsibilities. Becoming a manager implies
further access to internal services (e.g. .Project Management tools, Performance
Evaluation services, etc) who are going to be aware of her personal data.
fmO1 ^ hRy1g
grant1(m;h;; 1)
fhL1 ^ hP1 ^ hS1 ^ hR1g
 = purpose : u and u  fProject Management tools, Performance Evaluation
servicesg.
This formalisation is similar to the rst use case. Mary is giving consent to
the HR department to obtain, process and share new data further. However, she
allows the processing of her new data only by project management and performance
evaluation tools.
Mary sets notication preferences on her new data
She is oered the opportunity to give consent about some of the personal data
aected by these activities. This might include notications about access/internal
usage/disclosure of this data to third parties. Thus, notication preferences should
be propagated to third parties as well. Otherwise default settings might apply.
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fmO1 ^mN y1 ^ hP1
^hR1 ^ hRy1g
setnotify(m;h;; 1)
fhLny ^ hLn ^ hR1 ^ hNa1
^8c:hhXc1 ^ cRy1i setnotify(h; c;; 1) htrueig
where  = notify-how:n ^ notify-what:ny and n  femailg and ny  fshare data
with third partiesg.
The post-condition in this permission contains an obligation which will be trig-
gered only if the HR department has shared Mary's data. The pre-condition involves
only the data controller to whom Mary consented to disclose her data and this is
the reason why the action in the obligation contains the  conditions. In this way,
these conditions will be propagated to the third parties as well.
5.2.7 Mary moves to a dierent country
Mary updates her data
Mary is asked to temporarily move in a new department, in a dierent country.
Some of her data needs to be updated (temporary address).
fmO ^ hL ^ hR ^ hP ^ hS
^hNg
update(m;h; ; 2)
fhL2 ^ hR2 ^ hP2 ^ hS2 ^ hS2
^  hN2 ^ hL ^ hR ^ hP ^ hS ^ hS
^  hN ^ 8c:hhXci update(h; c; ; 2) htrueig
Mary updates her address by disclosing an alternative temporary address to the
HR department. Her updated address is propagated to all third parties.
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Mary adds new data
New information added (local bank account, health care service, etc.) as well.
fmO1 ^ hRy1g
grant1(m;h;; 1)
fhL1 ^ hP1 ^ hS1 ^ hR1g
where  = purpose:u^ time duration:t^ times processed:t and u  finternal useg,
t= 5 months and t= 100 times processed.
The formalisation of this use case denotes that the new information which is
available only for internal use, will be stored up to 5 months and will be processed
no more than 100 times.
Mary's data is shared abroad
She also uses new local services that are provided in the new country by local
service providers. Some of her personal data might need to ow across national
borders.
fmO1 ^ c1Ry1g
grant1(m; c1;; 1)
fc1L1 ^ c1P1 ^ c1S1 ^ c1R1g
where  = purpose:u^time duration:t^times processed:t and u  fUse for compa-
nies abroadg, t =1 month, t = 10 times processed and c1  fCompanies Abroadg.
When Mary sends her data abroad an assumption that the controls will be
stricter is made. Thus, she decides to specify that this data is only for companies
that are not based in the UK. Furthermore, the data will be stored for one month
and it will be processed up to 10 times. The c1 notation is used to denote the
company abroad.
Mary sets notication preferences
She is oered the opportunity to express degrees of consent about some of the
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personal data aected by these activities. This might include notications about
access/internal usage/disclosure regarding third parties which handle her data.
fmO ^mN y ^ c1P ^ c1R ^ c1Ryg
setnotify(m; c1;
; )
fc1Lny ^ c1Ln ^ c1R ^ c1Nag
where  = notify-how:n ^ notify-what:ny and n  femailg and ny  fshared
with third partiesg.
Mary chooses to be notied by the company abroad via email, when her data is
shared with third parties.
Mary revokes permissions from UK based services
She might temporarily revoke access to her personal data from services she had
joined in UK, whilst she is abroad.
fmO ^ hR ^ hXcg
revokey(m;h;; )
f8c:hbXc ^ cP ^ cSi revokey(b; c; ) hcL ^ :cP ^ :  cSig
Since the data to the services was shared by the HR department, Mary requests
from the HR department to get in conduct with all the services that have shared
her data with and revoke permissions to process and share her data. Notice that
the services will still store her data. In addition the rights of the HR department
are not revoked.
Ambiguities occurring when revoking data
Ambiguities emerge when the data subject exercises their right to revoke consent
but at the same time the data controller is unable to perform such an action. For
example a data subject may request their data to be deleted but the organisation is
still processing the data. To address these issues the use of variable p is introduced,
which allows the data subjects to express transparency in their decisions. The
conicts that occur between the data subjects and the data controllers are tackled by
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introducing a combination of permissions and obligations under certain conditions.
For example in order for a data subject to revoke their consent to process data,
there is a condition that the data controller does not process the specic data at
that time (p, p variables).
5.2.8 Mary gets sick
Mary gets sick. She needs to stay away from her work for 6 months; she might have
limited access to enterprise services. She might have expressed her preferences in
terms of consent and revocation on how to handle this situation, in particular in
terms of accesses to her data whilst away when she is sick.
fmO ^ hR ^ hRyg
change(a; b;; )
f:bR ^ bRg
where  = destination: ^ :forbidden destination: ^ purpose:u
^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t ^ notify-how:n
^notify-what:ny^reason for changes:r and   fpension schemeg,   fcompanies
abroadg, u  finternal useg, t= 1 month, t= 10 times processed, n  f g
,ny  f g and r  fsicknessg.
In the above formalisation Mary changes her consent and revocation choices and
the reason for this change is that she is sick. She decides not to be notied while she
remains sick and she restricts the accessing of her data to internal use only, while
prohibits the sharing of data to companies abroad.
Alternatively, this use case can be formalised by using an obligation which will
be triggered when Mary is sick. In order to use obligations it would be necessary
to include in the rst use case, where Mary shares her data, the s variable in the 
conditions. In the case where Mary is sick, the s variable will become true, resulting
in the obligation to be triggered.
5.2.9 Team is expanding
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Mary obtains rights to process and share data
Mary is expanding her team. Phil, a contractor, joins this team from company Y.
Company Y has already a copy of Phil's personal data. Phil might have expressed
degrees of consent and preferences about this data. Now part of this data (address,
nancial information, etc.) might need to be disclosed to Company X.
fyR ^ yS ^ hRyg
grant1(y; h;; )
fhL ^ yP ^ yS ^ yRg
where  = destination:^:forbidden destination:^purpose:u^ time duration:t^
times processed:t and   fpension schemeg,   finsurance companiesg, u 
finternal processg, t= 5 months and t= 100 times processed.
In this formalisation Company Y sends Phil's data to the HR department of the
Company X, along with Phil's choices.
Mary allows company X to use the new tool to process her data
Company X decides to introduce a new data analytics tool, a tool able to process
emails exchanged by employees and produce graphs and information describing the
ow of information and intensity. This includes linkage back to individuals (e.g.
reecting work or personal-related exchanges of emails, on work machines).In par-
ticular this applies to Mary's and Phil's email trac.
fmO2 ^ hRy2g
grant(m;h;; 2)
fhL2 ^ hP2 ^ hR2g
where  = purpose:u ^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t and u  fUse for the
new toolg, t= 1 month and t= 10 times processed.
Mary discloses personal data to the HR department, specically to be processed
only by the new tool.
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Mary changes permissions for various organisations via \WorkBook"
Mary has a bad week at work and every day nds an email message oering
insurance from a company associated with the \WorkBook". She notices from her
daily reports (sent by \WorkBook") that her current prole is primarily viewed by
\dubious" organisations (including marketing and nancial sites). She is annoyed
by this intrusion and as a result accesses the \WorkBook" control panel to alter her
consent parameters. She sets her preferences, regarding the type of oers received,
to decline oers relating to nancial services.
fmO2 ^ hR2 ^ hRy2g
change(m;h;; 2)
f:hR2 ^ hR2g
where  = forbidden destination: ^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t and
  f Insurance companies, Finance companies g, t= 1 month and t= 10 times
processed.
In this formalisation, Mary changes her consent choices and the new tool can-
not share her data with insurance companies or with companies oering nancial
packages.
5.2.10 Termination of contracts
Mary terminates Phil's contract
Mary is notied about Phil's abnormal behaviour, both in terms of emails exchanged
with external people and access to gambling sites. This is against Company X poli-
cies. Phil cannot justify the reasons of this behaviour. Mary has to terminate his
contract. Phil might still be entitled to revoke consent to use his personal data from
the Company X. Alternatively this could be done automatically, based on Phil's pref-
erences.
Since Phil was an employee of Company Y, before employed by company X for a
short-term position, I assume that Company X had acquired data from Company Y
and not directly from Phil. Thus, the action formalised denotes that Phil requested
from Company Y to get in conduct with Company X in order to revoke from them
the permissions to share and process his data.
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fzO ^ hP ^ hS ^ hRy ^ yXhg
revokey(z; y; h;; )
fhyXhi revokey(y; h; ) hhL ^ :hP ^ :hS ^ yXhig
The formalisation describes Phil's choice to revoke permissions from the Com-
pany X to process and share his data. However, the Company X still possess his
data, while the rights of the Company Y remain intact.
The situation where Phil sets an automated process to request the revocation of
permissions once he stops working for Company X, can be captured with a boolean
variable in the  conditions that once Phil is made redundant, will become false
and trigger an obligation in the system similar to the action formalised above.
Mary is getting demoted
Mary is unhappy with the working environment. Her team is shrinking and she
is frustrated with her inability to deliver. She is eventually demoted. She feels there
has been a breach of trust. She decides that the consent she gave regarding her
personal data should be revoked along with the revocation of subscription to a few
corporate services (e.g. stock purchase scheme, etc.).
fmO ^ hR ^ hXcg
revokey(m;h;; )
f8c:hbXc ^ cP ^ cSi c:revokey(b; c; ) hcL ^ :cP ^ :  cSig
This formalisation is similar to the one described in the use case 5.2.7. Mary
decides to revoke permissions from all the third parties.
Mary sees advertisement for skiing holidays in \WorkBook"
Mary accesses the \WorkBook" site one day and sees an advert for a group skiing
holiday in the Alps. She discusses this with some employees through \WorkBook"
and they agree it is an oer which can not be refused. The group decides to sign up
for the skiing holidays.
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fmO ^ hRy ^ bP ^ bS^g
granty(m;h; c;; )
fhP ^ hS ^ hR^
hcRyi grant(b; c;; ) hcL ^ cPi^
hbNai setnotify(a; c;0; ) htruei^
hbNa ^ aN y ^ 0 3 ny 3 \shared"i notify(b; a; ; \shared"; n) htrueig
where 0 = notify-how:n ^ notify-what:ny and n  femailg ,ny  fwhen data is
processedg.
The formalisation of this use case is similar to the cases where Mary grants
permissions to the HR department to process and share data. Although via the
Workbook Mary has the opportunity to communicate and share information with
other data subjects, resulting in a balanced power relation, the only dierence in
the formalisation derives by the business requirements. According to Sandhu et al,
social networks require a single policy for every user, a business requirement that
UCONABC as they have recognised is not able to capture yet [204]. In their position
paper, they indicate their intentions to address the issue but as proven with these
formalisations, the logic for consent and revocation can eectively capture unique
policies for every user [204].
Mary leaves the company
Mary eventually decides to leave the company. She decides to revoke all (op-
tional) permissions on usage of her data and requires deletion of data where possible.
Since Mary leaves the company, data both stored in Company X and in third
parties must be deleted. The deletion of data from third parties is formalised as:
fmO ^ hR ^ bXcg
deletey(m;h; )
f8c:hhXc ^ cLi deletey(b; c; ) h:cL ^ :cP ^ :cS ^ :cR ^ :bXcig
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The action that deletes Mary's data from Company X is formalised as:
fmO ^ hR ^ hLg
delete(m;h; )
f:hL ^ :hP ^ :hS ^ :hRg
Notice that the sequence which the actions will take place is irrelevant, since the
result always remains the same.
5.3 Synopsis of the chapter
Every attempt to develop a novel language requires a verication process to evaluate
the nal result. The methodology which was deemed appropriate to reach the
desired level of verication was the case study approach. According to the literature
presented in Chapter 3, data subjects' privacy expectations are crafted based on
power asymmetries which they experience when interacting with data controllers.
There exist three dierent types of power asymmetries. In order to capture all the
possible expectations of consent and revocation for systems implemented in dierent
contexts, thus serving dierent business models with dierent legacy requirements
in place, I applied the logic on three dierent case studies.
In this Chapter, the rst attempt to verify the expressiveness of the logic is
illustrated. The case study to provide the specication requirements for the consent
and revocation controls was the Employee case study, which was the pilot study
where the rst primitive form of logic was tested. The aim of the chapter, which was
successfully achieved, served a dual purpose. The rst aim was to demonstrate that
the ambiguities, emerging from the interpretation of the natural logic to machine-
readable format and from the complex nature of privacy when the rst version
was applied, were tackled. The second was to verify that all the eects of consent
and revocation preferences in a system oering controls were adequately formalised
without any further reconguration of the logic.
More specically, through a number of dierent use cases, dierent expectations
of consent and revocation were eectively formalised, giving the opportunity to
demonstrate examples of various  variables and obligations. In addition, with the
design of the ctional WorkBook, the power asymmetries of the rst kind, between
two data subjects were also examined. To conclude, the nal version of the logic
presented in Chapter 4 was successfully applied to the Employee case study and
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all the requirements were unambiguously formalised, without any further issues
emerging.
CHAPTER 6
The Biobank case study
Following the formalisation of the pilot case study which veried the eectiveness
of the logic in an environment where data subjects disclose personal data to various
third parties and share data amongst them, the second case study where the logic
is applied on is a Biobank based in the United Kingdom. The purpose of this case
study is to formalise the diverse consent and revocation preferences that occur in a
context totally dierent from the pilot case study, in order to test the expressiveness
of the logic. The focus is on medical data treated in the Biobank and on the
power relations between the patients and the researchers that are in favour of the
researchers. Patients have the sense that their hopes for receiving a treatment
depends on their participation. More issues emerge from the existence of the legacy
system in place, whose requirements need to be cater for in the formalisations.
In the following Section 6.1, I present the details of the Biobank case study
and the methodology followed to elicit the requirements for consent and revocation
controls in this environment. Section 6.2, describes the use case in italics and
illustrates their formalisations followed by explanatory text for each of them. The
nal Section 6.3, concludes the ndings of this Chapter.
6.1 Requirements elicitation
A Biobank is a \resource of tissue and blood samples donated by patients for use
in medical research" [199]. As a result, Biobanks collect and store samples in ac-
cordance with regulatory requirements and provide access to researchers in order
to improve diagnosis and treatment, and ultimately patient care. The Biobank
case study oers interesting issues in terms of managing consent and revocation
controls in a context where sensitive information is handled, whereas legislation
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imposes strict controls and patients' preferences need to be addressed. The aim is
to verify that the logic is rich and expressive enough to allow the formalisation of
requirements in a dierent context without adding new actions and rights.
I analyse a number of use cases that provide an overview of the environment
where a system oering consent and revocation controls will be implemented. From
these use cases, a list of requirements to explore the implications of invoking consent
and revocation controls is elicited. The use cases that are formalised in this chapter
are:
 The IT administrator creates consent and revocation options that will be
presented to the patient both for the sample and the data.
 The IT administrator creates privacy access control policies.
 The IT administrator creates privacy obligation policies.
 The IT administrator sets consent and revocation default choices.
 The data subject (patient) or technician makes consent and revocation choices
for specic study/studies.
 The technician is registering a sample and/or personal data in a spreadsheet.
The requirements regarding the consent and revocation functionality for the use
cases in the Biobank case study were elicited from descriptions of the current legacy
system in place and further information provided by the focus groups. The content
analysis [154; 126; 190; 81] methodology was adopted to analyse the transcripts from
the focus groups. The themes used in the content analysis were generated based
on the consent and revocation actions dened in the logic which emerged from the
conceptual consent and revocation model and from the application of the logic to
the rst case study. Both researchers associated with the biobank and patients
participated in these focus groups.
6.2 Formalising the Biobank case study
This section illustrates the application of the logic to the use cases and provides
evidence that the ambiguities identied and tackled in Chapter 5, do not emerge in
the Biobank case study. In the formalisations below the letter a is used to denote
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the patients of the Biobank, the letter b to denote the Biobank itself and the letter
c to denote a researcher.
The data handled in this case study is hierarchised by creating three dierent
domains in order to capture generic requirements (delete all data about my sample)
by applying a single action to more that one datum, in a similar rationale to the
one described in [43]. Each datum  can only be allocated in one domain. The
letter  refers generally to all data that may exist in this case study. In addition,
three dierent domains are created and all  data that may occur will belong only
to one of these domains. The letter 1 denotes the physical sample, the letter 2 the
data derived from the sample and any measurements undertaken in the Biobank
regarding the sample and the letter 3 denotes any personal data of the patient such
as demographic data, name etc.
6.2.1 The IT administrator creates consent and revocation options
that will be presented to the patient
In this use case the administrator, using the consent form designed by researchers
and approved by the Research Ethics Committee (REC), writes the set of consent
and revocation options to be oered to patients. The options derived from the
current consent form that the patient needs to sign before the donation of the
sample to the Biobank, and from the results of the focus groups. Only the actions
available that could be triggered in the system are described.
Based on the analysis of the data generated by focus groups, the options available
to patients concern the purpose for which the sample is given, the notication
process, the ability to revoke permissions and delete data deriving from the sample
and the request for the destruction of the sample. Thus, the patient may give
consent to the Biobank to store, process and share data, constrain these choices by
specifying the purpose of use and the parties that the data/sample will and will not
be shared with. Furthermore, the patient could set notication preferences. It is
not decided yet by the Biobank, whether there will be permitted an option enabling
the patient to delegate consent to the next of kin and if the patient will be able to
update some of her/his data.
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Dene the options for sharing data with researchers
The rst option that a patient may express is to allow the Biobank to share the
sample to researchers and provide restrictions regarding the purpose of the research,
the background of the researchers and the duration of consent. This is formalised
as:
grant(a; b;; )
where  = destination: ^ : ^ purpose:u ^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t
and   fPharmaceutical companies, Universityg,   fDr. Evilg, u  fteaching,
cancer research, DNAg, t 2 fOne year - 40 yearsg and t 2 fOne time - 100 timesg.
Notice that I use the letter  for data, thus the options refer to all the available
data. More options could be provided to the patients to choose from and apply these
options only for a specic domain of data e.g the purpose for which the sample will
be used for.
With this formalisation the patient may choose to share data with researchers
working in university laboratories, with researchers working for pharmaceutical en-
terprises but not with researchers working for Dr. Evil. Furthermore, they could
control the purpose of the research and choose to share their data with researchers
for teaching purposes, for cancer research, and to allow DNA analysis. The variable
 includes the parties that the Biobank is allowed to share data with, the variable
 the parties that the Biobank is not allowed to share data with and the variable
u describes the purposes for which data may be shared. The Biobank may also
provide the option to the patient to choose the duration of consent and how many
times the data/sample may be processed.
Dene revocation and deletion options
Four dierent classes of revocation, symmetrical to what the patients give consent
to, are distinguished. These options could aect the Biobank, the researcher or
both and could be enabled either with a prospective or retrospective eect. It is
worth noting that these options impact the business model of the Biobank and there
might exist situations where the option of revocation would be prohibited due to
legislation. The options for prospective revocation that a patient may ask for are
presented below:
 Revoke permission to process sample /data after the Biobank has nished
processing it.
Since Biobanks are repositories of samples, the term processing refers to the measurements
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 Revoke permission to share sample/data from the Biobank after the Biobank
has nished processing it.
 Revoke permission to process sample/data both from the Biobank and the
researchers after the completion of the research.
 Destroy the sample/ Delete data.
Based on the same rationale, the dierent options of retrospective revocation
oered are:
 Revoke permission to process sample /data from the Biobank before the
Biobank has nished processing it.
 Revoke permission to share sample/data from the Biobank before the Biobank
has nished processing it.
 Revoke permission to process sample/data both from the Biobank and the
researchers before the completion of the research.
 Destroy the sample/ Delete data after the completion of the research.
The options of revoking consent and destroying/deleting the sample/data are
formalised below. Whether the act of revoking consent will have a retrospective or
prospective eect, is dened by the value of the variable p. If the variable is true
the revocation is retrospective, otherwise the revocation is prospective.
With the option below, the patient revokes the right to process the data/sample
from the Biobank. If the Biobank is in the process of transferring the sample/data
to other researchers they should request it back. Samples and data shared to re-
searchers previous to that action are not inuenced. The option is formalised as:
revoke(a; b;; )
where  = currently processed : p and p = ftrueg.
With the option below, the patient revokes from Biobank the right to share
data/sample. If the Biobank is in the process of transferring the sample/data to
other researchers they should request it back. The subtle dierence with the previ-
ous formalisation is that in this case the Biobank may still process the data/sample.
undertaken in the Biobank to specify the meta-data of the sample (Disease etc.)
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Samples and data shared to researchers previous to that action are not inuenced.The
option is formalised as:
revoke1(a; b;; )
where  = currently processed : p and p = ftrueg.
With the option below, the patient revokes from the researchers who collaborate
with Biobank the right to process the data/sample. Samples and data shared to
researchers prior to that option should not be processed further. The option is
formalised as:
revokey(a; b; c;; )
where  = currently processed : p and p = ftrueg.
With this option below the sample/data that is stored to Biobank is deleted/destroyed.
delete(a; b;; 2)
where  = disposal:x ^ currently processed : p and x  fDestroy sample, delete
datagand p = ftrueg.
The action that requires from the researchers to delete the acquired samples/data
is:
deletey(a; b; c;; 2)
where  = disposal:x ^ currently processed : p and x  fDestroy sample, delete
datagand p = ftrueg.
A retrospective revocation is described, as the patient wishes to revoke rights
while the data is currently processed by inserting the variable p. Furthermore, the
variable x has been introduced to provide the patient with the opportunity to decide
either to destroy the sample or to delete the data that derived from that sample.
Some of the revocation actions create obligations and all of them require actions
to happen in the future before the patient may invoke them. For example, a pa-
tient cannot revoke permission from researchers to process their sample unless the
Biobank has initially shared their sample with them.
Change of consent
The patient may also decide to change his initial consent. In this formalisation
the change of restrictions is captured in the patient's initial consent. For example,
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changing the time allowed to process data to 5 months:
change(a; b;; ; )
where  = use by:t and t = 150.
Set notication options
There is also the option for a patient to be notied under certain conditions.
setnotify(a; b;; )
where  = notify-how:n ^ notify-what:ny and n  femail, general practitioner,
Biobank websiteg and ny  fresults of the research, implication for health, new
research, sample dispatched to researcher, sample destroyedg.
In this formalisation the patient may choose to be notied either by email, or
via their GP or via the Biobank's website. Furthermore, the patient may choose
to be notied when the results of the research are published, if the researchers by
examining the sample believe that there could be further implications to her/his
health, when the sample is dispatched for research or when it is destroyed.
IT administrator creates Biobank privacy access control policies
In order to create Biobank privacy access control policies the administrator needs
to: dene, or select one of the templates oered by the Biobank, and deploy them
into the system. The privacy policies will be created from the allowed actions and
the variables that will provide further constraints and information regarding the
implementation of those actions. The suggested policies for the Biobank case study
are:
1. I fconsent/revoke consentg for Biobank to fcollect/store/useg my personal
data for f any research (provided it has been approved by Biobank and met
all ethical standards of research); DNA specic research; selected clinical tri-
als [list]; not at allg with access by fthe research team that contacts me;
pharmaceutical companies; othersg (subject to time constraints/notication
constraints).
2. I fconsent/do not consent/revoke consentg for Biobank to fcollect/store/useg
my fsample and associated digital representationsg for fSpecied purposeg
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(subject to time constraints/notication constraints).
3. I fconsent/do not consent/revoke consentg for Biobank to share my sample
(or its digital representations) for fSpecied purposeg to fdirect contacts of
the researcher, anyoneg.
4. I fconsent/do not consent/revoke consentg for Biobank to share data for fany
research (provided it has been approved by Biobank and met all ethical stan-
dards of research); selected clinical trials [list]; only the research team that
contacts meg.
In the logic all the actions and the variables create a policy. The policy describes
how the system will cope with each action and each variable and the patients' choices
will dene the values of the variables.Thus, the option of
grant(a; b;; )
where  = destination: ^ : ^ purpose:u ^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t
and   fPharmaceutical, Universityg,   fDr. Evilg, u  fteaching, cancer
research,DNAg, t 2 fOne year - 40 yearsg and t 2 fOne time - 100 timesg is con-
verted into a policy as: I fconsentg for Biobank to fshareg my sample for fteaching,
cancer research, DNAg to fPharmaceutical, Universityg and not to fDr Evilg for
the next f100 yearsg or being processed f100g times.
Each of the actions described in the previous section will create a separate policy
with the same rationale. Some of the options include obligations which will be
formalised in the section below.
The IT administrator creates Biobank privacy obligation policies
To create Biobank privacy obligation policies the administrator denes a set of
obligation policy templates (and/or uses the templates oered by the Biobank).
The privacy obligation policies are perceived in two dierent ways in the logic:
 Those created to ensure that upon completion of an action, another action
will be triggered in the future (notication requirements, delete data after 5
years).
 Those created by the obligation of a data controller to request further action
from third parties with whom data has been shared, for the initial action to be
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completed (request to propagate consent and revocation changes to all parties
that process data).
The form of obligation policies for notication requirements is:
1. I fconsent/do not consent/revoke consentg for Biobank to contact me about
my data or sample via femail, phone, post, GPg when fmy sample is shared,
results of the research have gone publicg.
The option for notication formalised as:
setnotify(a; b; ;)
where  = notify-how:n ^ notify-what:ny and n  femail, general practitioner,
Biobank websiteg and ny  fresults of the research, implication for health, new
research, sample dispatched to researcher, sample destroyedg will be converted into
an obligation policy as: I fconsentg for Biobank to contact me about my data
or sample via femail, general practitioner, Biobank websiteg when fresults of the
research are nalised, implication for health, new research, sample dispatched to
researcher, sample destroyedg.
The IT administrator sets consent and revocation default choices
To set the default consent and revocation choices the administrator accesses the
\admin tool" box which propagates conguration changes to required components.
faO2 ^ bRy2g
grant1(a; b;; 2)
fbL2 ^ bP2 ^ bS2 ^ bR2g
where  = destination: ^ : ^ purpose:u ^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t
and   fPharmaceutical, Universityg,   fDr. Evilg, u  fteaching, cancer
research, DNAg, t 2 fOne year - 40 yearsg, t 2 fOne time - 100 timesg and 3 is
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data concerning the patient's prole (registration number, further information).
6.2.2 The data subject (patient) or Biobank technician makes con-
sent and revocation choices for specic study/studies)
For specic studies the data concern the sample only. A new variable could also be
introduced to denote that the patient is participating in a study and he/she requires
more options regarding, for example, the purpose of using the sample.
faO1 ^ bRy1g
grant1(a; b;; 1)
fbL1 ^ bP1 ^ bS1 ^ bR1g
where  = destination: ^ : ^ purpose:u ^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t
and   fTeam that consults meg,   fAnyone elseg, u  fDNAg, t 2 fOne
year - 40 yearsg, t 2 fOne timeg and 1 is a sample collected due to the patients'
participation in a specic study.
Patient registration
When a new patient (data subject) registers, or more likely an authorised Biobank
employee is acting on his behalf by interacting with the Biobank's system, it will
assign a new patient ID, and then a new ID all linked to the new trial. This action
is formalised as:
faO3 ^ bRy3g
grant1(a; b;; 3; )
fbL3 ^ bP3 ^ bS3 ^ bR3g
where  = destination: ^ : ^ purpose:u ^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t
and   fPharmaceutical, Universityg,   fDr. Evilg, u  fteaching, cancer
researchg, t 2 fOne year - 40 yearsg, t 2 fOne time - 100 timesg and 3 is data
regarding the patient's prole (registration number, further information).
When the patient registers with the Biobank she/he discloses personal data and
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obtains a registration number. Upon this data, the patient has the options to restrict
the usage of the data, the destinations to where the data will be shared and specify
the time that data will be stored for.
During tissue sample collection and data entry
This use case is very similar to the one described in the section above, with
the dierence that before locally storing the data subject's sample, the Biobank
technician is asked to dene preferences for the new sample collected. When a
Biobank technician collects a sample, he logs onto the system, selects the Samples
tab and clicks Add Sample. He then lls in the required Sample details on the
Sample Data Entry Page.
faO1 ^ bRy1g
grant1(a; b;; 1)
fbL1 ^ bP1 ^ bS1 ^ bR1g
where  = destination:^:^purpose:u^time duration:t^times processed:t and
  fPharmaceutical, Universityg,   fDr. Evilg, u  fteaching, cancer research,
DNAg, t 2 fOne year - 40 yearsg and t 2 fOne time - 100 timesg.
Because it is a sample for trial the introduction of new variables may better
describe the purpose of the research, such as DNA purposes. The patient may also
choose to set notication requests.
6.2.3 The data subject (patient) or Biobank technician changes con-
sent and revocation choices for specic study/studies
In this use case the Biobank technician logs into the system and changes on the
patient's behalf her/his choices.
faO1 ^ bRy01 ^ bR1g
change(a; b;0; 1)
f:bR1 ^ bR01g
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where 0 = destination: ^ : ^ purpose:u ^ time duration:t ^ times processed:t
and   fUniversityg and u  fDNAg, t 2 fOne yearg and t 2 fOne timeg =)
obligation.
With the action above the patient chooses to change her/his consent regarding
the sample and to limit the parties having access to it, the duration of consent
and the times that it is allowed to be processed. This action implies an obligation
because when the existing consent is no longer valid the patient should choose to
delete his/her sample or to change his consent.
6.2.4 Tissue sample collection, data and consent and revocation choices
entry
When the sample is collected by the Biobank, the patient expresses specic consent
and revocation choices that should be enforced and respected by the Biobank and
any researcher that may acquire the sample.
faO ^ bRyg
grant1(a; b;; )
fbL ^ bP ^ bS ^ bRg
where  = destination :  ^ purpose:u and  = fUniversityg and u  fcancer
research, DNAg =) obligation.
In the above formalisation the patient donates a sample to the Biobank. The
pre-condition declares that the donor of the sample is also the owner of the sample
(aO), and that the Biobank must be willing to accept their consent and revocation
choices (bRy). The sample is then registered in the Biobank. As a result in the
post condition the Biobank has stored the sample (bL) and it may process it (bP),
share it (bS) but must always respect the restrictions the patient has imposed. In
this case, the sample may only be shared with the university laboratories, specically
for cancer research purposes and DNA analysis.
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6.2.5 The Biobank technician is sharing a sample and/or personal
data in a spreadsheet
In this use case, the Biobank is sharing data about a sample with a researcher in
digital form. A researcher requests measurements of data from a sample and the
Biobank provides the data in a spreadsheet. This is personal data, so all the controls
which a patient may have imposed on the sample, should be passed on.
fbS ^ bR ^ c 2 [:destination ^    ^ cRyg
grant(b; c; ;)
fcL ^ cP ^ cR^
hbNai setnotify(a; b;0; ) htruei
^8c:hbNa ^ aN y ^ \shared00 2 [:notify-what
^\email00 2 [:notify-howi notify(b; a; ; \shared00; \email00) htrueig
where  = purpose : u and u= fcancer researchg.
Note that the use of an action which only allows the researcher to process the
data but not to share it is preferred. Also, all the controls which are appropriate
for the right to process, are cascaded to the researcher. Furthermore, as the patient
had set notication requirements, an email is sent to notify the patient that the
data has been shared with the researcher.
The focus groups highlighted the importance of notication in such cases. If
notication choices are available, then there is an obligation triggered requiring
from the data controller to notify the patient. It is crucial to make a decision which
will determine the Biobank's strategy regarding the notication process. Possible
options could be notication by email, using a link on the Biobank's website pointing
to the published papers of the researchers, or requesting the contribution of the
patient's GP.
There will be cases where the consent given by the patient will not be specic
enough for the Biobank to determine whether the sample should be shared or not.
Therefore, the consent will be implied. The patient could decide whether she/he
wishes to be informed if such circumstances occur. Thus, depending on her/his
choices she/he might choose to allow sharing of data by default or to be asked for
approval. The focus groups conducted with researchers pointed out that any noti-
cation may disturb the patients and their family, while on the other hand enabling
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researchers to continue their research by using the same samples for dierent pur-
poses is of signicant importance. There are conicting needs to be catered for
and to-date the Biobank has not resolved the issue. Unfortunately, there does not
exist any functionality to handle the notication process. The standard procedure
requires researchers to get in conduct with the patients. However, it is a time-
consuming process and most of the times the patients never reply to researchers'
emails. Instead of annoying patients by allowing researchers to conduct them, the
Biobank could incorporate the functionality described in the use cases, to allow
them to explicitly specify under which circumstances the Biobank may get in con-
duct with them.
6.3 Synopsis of the chapter
Following the successful formalisation of the Employee case study with the applica-
tion of the consent and revocation logic, this chapter sought to raise new challenges
and novel consent and revocation expectations. A context dierent from the rst
case study, since it required the elicitation of dierent requirements not only for the
data subjects but for the legacy system which handled personal data as well, was
chosen and the Biobank was considered the ideal case study to question the appli-
cability of the logic. The power asymmetries regarding the Biobank are dierent
from the rst case study, since the Biobank's patients believe that they reside their
hopes for a treatment on their participation to new trials. Thus, they feel that they
are in a disadvantageous position when it comes to give consent to disclose data, a
factor that is depicted in their consent revocation expectations and enhanced the
decision to choose the specic case study.
The aim of the chapter was to validate the expressiveness of the logic in a dier-
ent case study, in a manner that would not raise further ambiguities or require any
further renements. Based on the focus groups conducted by the EnCoRe project
that were specically designed for the Biobank case study, I gained a better under-
standing of the environment which the controls should be invoked. The generated
data from the focus groups was analysed adopting the same methodology followed
for the development of the conceptual model and facilitated the process of elicit-
ing requirements. Thus, resulting in more detailed consent and revocation options
available to the patients with respect to the requirements elicited from the analysis
of the legacy system in place and the demands of the recipients of the medical data
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who are the researchers of the Biobank.
The application of the logic to the demanding second case study, enhanced my
condence regarding the richness of the logic and it was the rst successful step to
demonstrate the capability of the logic to formalise requirements in dierent con-
texts, for dierent business models and for dierent data subjects' expectations. The
formalisation was concluded without any ambiguities emerging and all the speci-
cations for the legacy system were eectively captured. It is worth noting that new
variables were used to capture the changes in the context, providing evidence that
allowing the dening of new variables increases the exibility and the expressiveness
of the logic, while retaining its rigid and correct mathematical form.
CHAPTER 7
The Identity Assurance Programme case
study
Having established the richness of the logic in two dierent contexts, where no fur-
ther ambiguities emerged and no need for a further renement of the logic presented
in Chapter 4 occurred, the next challenge is to apply the logic in an environment
where data subjects are requesting to express controls on data disclosed to govern-
mental services. The Identity Assurance Programme case study, serves the purpose
for that task. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, data subjects respond to the power
asymmetries that occur when they interact with the governmental sector, by per-
ceiving privacy preferences dierently. In addition, the business model followed in
the case study diers from the business models of the aforementioned formalised
case studies, raising new challenges for consent and revocation controls. The aim of
this Chapter is to provide evidence that the logic is expressive enough to adjust to
the power asymmetries and formalise the specication of requirements adequately,
without any further ambiguities emerging.
The next Section 7.1 provides the description of the Identity Assurance Pro-
gramme case study and explains the methodology followed to elicit the requirements
for this environment. In Section 7.2, the descriptions of the use cases are presented
in italics, followed by the formalisations and their explanation. The nal Section 7.3
provides a summary of the results presented in this Chapter.
7.1 Requirements elicitation
The Identity Assurance Programme case study describes an identity ser-
vice concept facilitating a government to certify the identity of data sub-
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jects. It is based on the development of a consistent, customer-centric
approach to digital identity assurance across all public services. This
will allow service users to log on safely to digital public services in a way
that ensures personal privacy, reduces fraud and facilitates the move to
online public services.
Online services have the potential to make life more convenient for ser-
vice users as well as delivering cost savings. However, currently cus-
tomers have to enter multiple log-in details and passwords to access
dierent public services, sometimes on the same website. This involves
signicant duplication, is expensive to operate and is highly inconvenient
for users. It acts as a deterrent to people switching to digital channels,
hampers the vision of digital being the primary channel for accessing
Government information and transactions, and provides an opportunity
for fraudsters.
The intention is to create a market of accredited identity assurance ser-
vices delivered by a range of private sector and mutualised suppliers. A
key improvement will be that people will be able to use the service of
their choice to prove identity when accessing any public service. Iden-
tity assurance services will focus on the key imperative to ensure pri-
vacy [252].
To mitigate the risks associated with transacting online, almost all services re-
quire the user to go through some form of initial registration and subsequent login
procedure. These procedures need to acquire consent from the citizens.
As summarised in the EnCoRe internal report \3rd Case Study user's Require-
ments Workshops" [184], the principles of the Identity Assurance Programme in-
clude the following statements:
 Customer focus: an identity assurance solution must be based around the
needs of the individual otherwise it will not be used or valued. People have
dierent and changing needs. No one \big brother" solution will meet the
needs of all customers in all contexts.
 Customer control: the use of a customer's identity and personal data should
be fully transparent and controlled by the customer.
These are core principles that must be fully supported by a system when the goal
is to enable data subjects (customers, citizens) to express and change their consent
7. The Identity Assurance Programme case study 175
(on their personal data) and organisations to explicitly enforce the management of
consent and privacy preferences.
Figure 7.1 below illustrates how a system, and in this case EnCoRe, can be de-
ployed within a business model addressing identity assurance issues and how it inu-
ences the key players in the environment (Identity Providers, Attribute Providers,
Hub, Service Providers) providing the required consent and privacy management
functionality [184]:
Figure 7.1: EnCoRe in the Identity Assurance Programme architecture. A picture created
by HP laboratories in Bristol [184]
The use cases described in this case study aim to address the problem of han-
dling dynamic consent and therefore enable the benets of public services delivered
through digital channels to reach all parts of society, with respect to citizens' pri-
vacy. All the key players of the system are formalised in the use cases. The aim is
to verify that the logic can be applied to formalise all the requirements without any
additional actions and without any further ambiguities emerging.
Eliciting requirements for the Identity Assurance Programme raises several chal-
lenges. The business model is still a matter of debate and the project's proposition
was not denitive at the time when I wrote the thesis. Thus, the requirements
were elicited from analysing documents and discussions from the research commu-
nity which was assigned to assist those people that initiated the Identity Assurance
Programme.
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7.2 Formalising the Identity Assurance Programme case study
A number of use cases is identied that provide an overview of the environment
where the system will be implemented and a list of requirements to explore the
implications of invoking consent and revocation controls is elicited from these use
cases. The use cases which are formalised in this section are driven from discussions
among the research community which is participating in the Identity Assurance
Programme.
7.2.1 Semantics of the use cases
There are three dierent types of data subjects that could request access to public
services:
 a citizen or individual customer
 an employee of a business
 an agent authorised to act on behalf of a person or business
The symbols used in the formalisation of the following use cases are:
 a denotes a data subject (an individual, an employee of a business or an agent
authorised to act on behalf of a person or business).
 ip denotes an Identity Provider.
 ap denotes an Attribute Provider.
 sp denotes a Service Provider.
 h denotes the Hub
  represents a Minimum Identity Data Set (MIDS). MIDS, for the needs of
this case study, consists of:
{ Identier
{ First name
{ Surname
{ Date of birth
{ Gender
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{ House number
{ Post Code
 1 represents further attributes provided by the Attribute Providers.
 k is next of kin
 c is a business which requests the services of the Service Providers
7.2.2 Use cases related to consent and revocation
Customer registers with an Identity Provider
An Identity Provider is requested to create a \digital identity" by a data subject,
that will be used to acquire access to public services. The identity is produced, since
the Identity Provider veries the credentials of the citizen to the acquired standards.
faO ^ ipRyg
grant(a; ip;; )
fipL ^ ipP ^ ipS ^ ipRg
where  = destination :  ^ purpose:u ^ time:t and  = fHubg, u = fto be shared
with the hubg, t= 1 year =) obligation.
In this formalisation the data subject has given consent to the Identity Provider
to process and share the "MIDS" only with the hub and for the period of one year.
The time restriction implies an obligation for the system, which will be triggered
after the designated time has elapsed. A variable that will allow the data subject
to dene which action should be triggered by the obligation (prompt to re-consent,
delete data etc) can be included.
Pre-condition variations:
 the customer:
{ is under 18 years of age. In this case a variable g is added to denote age.
When the age of the data subject is less than 18 years old an obligation
is created to request consent of the next of kin. This is formalised as
follows:
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hidL ^ g  18i delegate(a; k;; ) hkUi
{ is non-British. It is similar to the rst formalisation. An extra variable
nationality is included to denote the nationality of the data subject.
Thus the formalisation is:
fhS ^ ipRyg
grant(h; ip;; )
fipL ^ ipP ^ ipS ^ ipS ^ ipRg
where  = destination : ^purpose:u^ time:t^nationality : nationality
and  = fHubg, u = fto be shared with the Hubg, t = 1 year and
nationality = f Greek g =) obligation.
Customer uses an Identity Provider to access a public service
A customer wishes to access a public service and is rst asked to provide a \digital
identity" from an accredited Identity Provider. The customer authenticates to the
Identity Provider who then provides the customer's minimum identity data set to
the public service provider. The customer is then able to access the public service.
As the customer has not used the Identity Provider to access the public service on
a previous occasion, the public service requires some additional piece of information
before it can provide access to the service. Once this has been provided then the
customer is then able to access the public service.
The assumption in this use case is:
 The data provided by the Identity Provider is not sucient to access the public
service automatically.
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The formalisation of this use case is as follows:
faO ^ spRy0g
request(sp; h;0; )
fspR0^
hhRy0i request(h; ip;0; ) hhR0^
hhRy ^ ipSi grant(ip; h;; ) hhL ^ hP ^ hS ^ hR^
hhS ^ spRyi grant(h; sp;; ) hspR ^ spL ^ spPiiig
where  = destination :  ^ purpose:u ^ time:t and  = fHubg, u = fto be shared
with the Hubg, t = 1 year =) obligation.
0 = purpose:u and u = ffor electoral purposesg.
In this use case, the user is requested to provide evidence of their identity in
order to access a public service. Through the service provider's website she/he
chooses an Identity Provider that has already veried their identity. The hub is the
mediator who forwards the request of the user to the Identity provider and then
the data from the Identity provider to the service provider. Notice that the Service
provider is obliged to conform with both  and 0 restrictions and that the hub has
the ability to understand and forward the policies of the Identity Providers or the
Attribute Providers and not the ability to store or \understand" the data subjects'
data.
Customer uses an Identity Provider to access a public service but must
provide additional information
The public service requires some additional piece of information before it can
provide access to the service. Once this has been provided then the customer is
able to access the public service. First the customer is asked to provide a \digital
identity" from an accredited Identity Provider. The customer authenticates to the
Identity Provider who then provides the customer's minimum identity data set to
the public service provider.
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The formalisation of this use case is:
faO ^ spRy0g
request(sp; h;0; )
fspR0^
hhRy0i request(h; ip;0; ) hhR0^
hhRy ^ ipSi grant(ip; h;; ) hhL ^ hP ^ hS ^ hR^
hhS ^ spRyi grant(h; sp;; ) hspR ^ spL ^ spPiiig
where  = destination :  ^ purpose:u ^ time:t and  = fHubg, u = fto be shared
with the Hubg, t = 1 year =) obligation and 0 = purpose:u and u = ffor
electoral purposesg.
But since \MIDS" is not enough to allow the data subject to acquire access to
the services, there is a request send to the attribute provider to disclose further
information.
faO1 ^ spRy01g
request(sp; h;0; 1)
fspR01^
hhRy01i request(h; ap;0; 1) hhR01^
hhRy ^ apS1i grant(ap; h; 1;00) hhL1 ^ hP1 ^ hS1 ^ hR001^
hhS1 ^ spRy0001i grant(h; sp;00; 1) hspR001 ^ spL1 ^ spP1iiig
where 00 = destination : ^purpose:u^ time:t and  = fHubg, u = fto be shared
with the Hubg, t= 2 years =) obligation.
0 = purpose:u and u = ffor electoral purposesg.
In order for the action to be fullled, the attribute provider must have obtained
consent for the veried data from the data subject. This is formalised as:
faO1 ^ apRy001g
grant(a; ap; 1;00)
fapR1 ^ apL1 ^ apP1 ^ apS1 ^ apS1g
where 00 = destination : ^purpose:u^ time:t and  = fHubg, u = fto be shared
with the Hubg, t= 2 years =) obligation.
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Notice that in this use case the Service Provider should accept data subject's
choices of consent  that dictate the data received from the Identity Provider and
those 00 conditions that dictate the data received from the Attribute Provider. In
addition, there are further restrictions 0 which must be imposed to the overall data.
The customer wishes to move from another public service
Successfully having authenticated with an accredited Identity Provider in order to
access a public service the customer now wishes to move to a separate public service
provided by another Service Provider.
The formalisation of this use case is as follows:
faO ^ spRy0g
request(sp1; sp;
0; )
fsp1R0^
hspSi grant(sp; sp1;; ) hsp1R ^ sp1P ^ sp1Sig
where  = destination :  ^ purpose:u ^ time:t and  = fHubg, u = fto be shared
with the Hub and other service providersg, t = 2 years =) obligation. and
0 = purpose:u and u = ffor taxationg.
Notice that the user must have consented to the service provider to share the
data with another service provider. If the hub mediates to complete the transaction
then the request is made to the hub and the formalisation is similar to the one
described in the 7.2.2 use case.
Customer creates, modies or removes an authority for another user
A customer wishes to create, modify or remove authority for another person to
conduct particular transactions with a public service.
In this use case the data subject decides to revoke the delegation rights. This is
formalised as:
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faO ^ cUg
revoke delegate(a; c; )
f:cUg
After the action the c company will not have access to the system to handle the
consent procedures on behalf of the data subject.
A customer requires a proxy to access a public service on their behalf
The customer informs the public service provider of the contact details of their
chosen proxy plus a shared secret that will be required by the proxy to complete the
process.
This is formalised as:
faO ^ spRyg
delegate(a; c;; )
fcU ^ spRg
where  = willing to accept : w and w = fc companyg. With this formalisation,
c company may acquire access and act on behalf of the data subject. There is a
restriction in the pre-condition that the Service Provider is willing to accept c as a
delegated party.
Customer removes an authority for another user
A representative of an organisation modies / suspends / revokes the authority of
a representative of the organisation to act on behalf of the organisation in particular
capacities.
faO ^ kUg
revoke delegate(a; k; )
f:kUg
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Customer closes a relationship with an Identity Provider
A customer requests to close a relationship with an accredited Identity Provider
and to ensure that all personal data is deleted as per agreed terms and conditions.
Prior to closing the relationship, the Identity Provider will ensure that the customer
is the real owner of the identity via credential authentication and proof of ownership
of their contact details. The customer's appropriate transaction history is retained
for audit purposes.
The formalisation for this use case is:
faO ^ ipL ^ ipP ^ ipS ^ ipRg
delete(a; ip;0; )
f:ipL ^ :ipP ^ :ipS ^ :ipRg
where 0 = deletion : x and x= fretain data for audit purposes for as long as
legislation permitsg.
It is still undened whether the Service Provider will request new data from
another Identity Provider and what will happen in the event where further informa-
tion has been disclosed by an Attribute Provider. There are two possible scenarios.
In the rst scenario the Service Provider is no longer oering the service to the data
subject, rendering the information redundant. A possible solution could be to send
a notication to the Attribute Service stating that the data is no longer processed
and that it is deleted. This is formalised as:
faO ^ spL ^ spP ^ spS ^ spRg
delete(a; sp;0; =delta)
f:spR ^ :spL ^ :spP ^ :spS^
hhXspi notify(sp; h; ) h:hXsp^
hapXhi notify(h; ap; ) h:apXhiig
where 0 = deletion : x and x= fretain data for audit purposes for as long as
legislation permitsg.
In the second scenario, the Service Provider requests from the data subject to
choose an alternative Identity Provider. In this case there is an obligation created
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and the formalisation is similar to the 7.2.2 use case.
Customer closes a relationship with a Service Provider
A customer requests to close a relationship with a Service Provider and to en-
sure that all personal data is deleted as per agreed terms and conditions. Prior to
closing the relationship, the Service Provider will ensure that the customer is the
real owner of the identity via credential authentication and proof of ownership of
their contact details. The customer's appropriate transaction history is retained for
audit purposes.
The formalisation of this use case is:
faO ^ spL ^ spP ^ spSg
delete(a; sp;0; )
f:spL ^ :spP ^ :spS^
hhXspi notify(sp; h; ) h:hXsp^
hapXh1i notify(h; ap; 1) h:apXhi
^hipXhi notify(h; ip; ) h:ipXhiig
where 0 = deletion : x and x= fretain data for audit purposes for as long as
legislation permitsg.
Before the termination of the service, a notication is sent by the hub to the
Identity and Attribute Providers to notify that the data is not used by the Service
Provider any more. It is crucial that the service provider is in a position to identify
which data  acquired from the ips is related to which data delta1 acquired by the
aps. The hub, although state-less must be able to bundle the preferences and the
data from the ip and the ap.
7.2.3 Use cases loosely related to consent and revocation
Customer cannot establish a trustworthy identity with an Identity Provider
A customer requests an accredited Identity Provider to establish a \digital identity"
to enable the customer to access a public service. The Identity Provider is unable
to verify the customer's identity to the level of assurance required by the Service
Provider.
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This use case is not related to consent or revocation options but it is used to
demonstrate the notication possibilities. The data subject may have chosen to be
notied when a connection is not established.
faO ^ aN y ^ ipP ^ ipR ^ ipRyg
setnotify(m; ip;; )
fipR ^ ipLny ^ ipLn ^ ipNag
where  = notify-how:n ^ notify-what:ny and n  femail, via hubg and ny 
fUnable to verify identity with the current datag.
Customer is already registered with the Identity Provider
A customer requests an accredited Identity Provider to establish a \digital iden-
tity" to enable the customer to access a public service. However, the customer's
identity has already been registered with the Identity Provider.
faO ^ aN y ^ ipP ^ ipR ^ ipRyg
setnotify(m; ip;; )
fipLny ^ ipLn ^ ipR ^ ipNag
where  = notify-how:n^notify-what:ny and n  femail, via hubg and ny  fThe
identity is already registeredg.
Customer cannot access a public service using the identity from an Iden-
tity Provider
A customer wishes to access a public service and is rst asked to provide a \digital
identity" from an accredited Identity Provider. The customer authenticates to the
Identity Provider who then provides the customer's minimum identity data set to
the public service provider. However, the public service is unable to provide access
to the service. A customer wishes to access a public service for which the customer
has already established an account using an identity issued by an acceptable Identity
Provider.
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The customer accesses the public service and is asked to present valid creden-
tial(s) in order to be authenticated to the Identity Provider. The public service does
not allow access to the service either because of a failure at the public service, or
because of a failure at the Identity Provider.
In the rst case, the customer is presented with an explanation that the service
was unable to authenticate the credential, and the customer is directed to contact
the Identity Provider.
faO ^ aN y ^ ipP ^ ipR ^ ipRyg
setnotify(m; ip;; )
fipLny ^ ipLn ^ ipR ^ ipNag
where  = notify-how:n ^ notify-what:ny and n  femail, via hubg and ny 
fUnable to authenticate credentialsg.
In the second case, the customer is presented with an explanation that the
service is experiencing problems and the customer is directed to contact the service
administrator through other alternatives.
faO ^ aN y ^ ipP ^ ipR ^ ipRyg
setnotify(m; ip;; )
fipLny ^ ipLn ^ ipR ^ ipNag
where  = notify-how:n^notify-what:ny and n  femail, via hubg and ny  fThe
service is experiencing problems, you will be redirected to an alternative serviceg.
Customer cannot authenticate using his or her credentials
A customer wishes to access a public service and is rst asked to provide a
\digital identity" from an accredited Identity Provider. A customer wishes to access
a public service and is rst asked to provide a \credential" from an accredited Identity
Provider. The customer's attempts to authenticate fail.
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faO ^ aN y ^ ipP ^ ipR ^ ipRyg
setnotify(m; ip;; )
fipLny ^ ipLn ^ ipR ^ ipNag
where  = notify-how:n ^ notify-what:ny and n  femail, via hubg and ny 
fCannot authenticate credentials from the identity providerg.
In the post condition the customer has been issued with a replacement credential.
An audit trail, record of the data provided and process has been retained by the
Identity Provider.
Customer interaction with the Service Provider is interrupted
For example internet connectivity is lost when on a train.
faO ^ aN y ^ ipP ^ ipR ^ ipRyg
setnotify(m; ip;; )
fipLny ^ ipLn ^ ipR ^ ipNag
where  = notify-how:n^notify-what:ny and n  femail, via hubg and ny  fThe
interaction was interrupted. Please try again.g.
In the post-condition the customer has completed the access to the public service.
7.3 Synopsis of the chapter
The formalisation of the rst two case studies boosted my condence regarding
the logic's expressiveness and adaptability to diverse environments and to dierent
business models. The new challenge that this chapter raised, aimed in proving the
expressiveness and richness of the logic in a context where data subjects interact
with governmental services. The challenge in this context was two-fold, since it
was not only the power-relations that overwhelmingly favour any government due
to security reasons but the demanding business model whose requirements must
be catered. The Identity Assurance Programme, a mock system inspired by a real
project, oered the aforementioned challenges and was chosen as the third and nal
case study to verify the logic's eciency.
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The requirements for the this case study were elicited by analysing documents
from discussions among the research community assisting the design of a system
for the Identity Assurance Programme. The aim of the chapter was to formalise
the specications for the consent and revocation expectations of data subjects in
such a system without any further ambiguities or inconsistencies emerging. An aim
that was fullled in a satisfactory percentage. The formalisations of this case study
successfully addressed requirements regarding data subjects' preferences of consent
and revocation. However, I deemed appropriate to introduce the new action request
to capture the needs of the complex business model. The specication where the
data subject requests from the Identity Service to acquire their personal data from
the Identity provider could have been formalised in a satisfactory manner without
any further renements. However, I decided to rene the logic with a novel action.
The reason for this renement is that the new action provides the advantage of
capturing the fact that the request for acquiring the personal data is given to the
Identity Service and the data subject (at least for the business model suggested
so far in the project) does not conduct the Identity Provider. The formalisation
without the new action would imply that the data subject had given consent to the
Identity Provider to forward the data to the Identity Service.
As a synopsis, the challenge to apply the logic in three dierent contexts, with
dierent business models and various consent and revocation preferences was suc-
cessfully addressed. The formalisations eectively and unambiguously captured
both the specications of consent and revocation requirements and the specica-
tions of the legacy systems existing in the environment, ensuring the richness and
expressiveness of the logic. This expressiveness informed the requirements for the
EnCoRe project, allowing us to help people understand what possible controls may
be available to them, understand how their choices would aect and protect their
privacy and enable them to express their expectations.
However, formalising the requirements necessary for oering consent and revoca-
tion controls and verifying mathematically the correctness of a system by excluding
any undesirable behaviour is not enough to promise a successful implementation.
Mistakes in the implementation may occur, resulting in functional problems and
compromising the integrity of the system. Test methodologies can be dened based
on the logic and the derived test suites can identify any erroneous behaviour, ensur-
ing that the system's implementation will eectively correspond to the requirements
formalisation. A novel testing methodology for generating tests suites in an auto-
matic manner is presented in the next Chapter 8.
CHAPTER 8
The testing strategy
The concept of privacy is a fertile area and provides several opportunities for con-
ducting research in diverse disciplines. Enabling data subjects to control the disclo-
sure, use and further dissemination of their personal data in order to mitigate their
privacy concerns raises several challenges. The initial step requires the development
of a conceptual model that will underpin the second and most decisive step, the
design of a language, able to formalise the specications of requirements privacy
controls.
In Chapter 3 a series of controls was discussed that encompass the notions of
consent and revocation and a novel model was presented. In Chapter 4 the proposed
model was the cornerstone for the development of a Hoare-style logic able to capture
and formalise consent and revocation requirements. The logic's expressiveness and
richness was proved by applying it to formalise three dierent case studies, namely
the Employee case study in described in Chapter 5, the Biobank presented in Chap-
ter 6 and the Identity Assurance Programme case study illustrated in Chapter 7.
The data subjects expressed dierent consent and revocation preferences in each
case study while the business models in the three contexts varied, raising dierent
requirements every time. The successful formalisation of the totality of the data
subjects' expectations in these three contexts and the eciency with which the
diverse business requirements were captured, veried the eectiveness of the logic.
However, concluding this thesis by proving that the design process of a system
can achieve the proposed functionality without any ambiguities occurring would
have left the purpose of this thesis incomplete. Equally important to the design
process of a system is the implementation process. Errors in the implementation
may instigate problematic behaviour of the system and result in misinterpretations
of data subjects' consent and revocation expectations. An appropriate solution to
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identify errors during the implementation process is the generation of a series of
tests, to verify the integrity of the system. Since the logic can eectively capture
all the requirements in a mathematical manner, it must be the basis of the testing
strategy to ensure that any errors identied by the tests will be the result of a
mistake in the implementation and not a misinterpretation of a requirement or an
ambiguity emerged at the design process.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a strategy for creating test suites to
gather evidence of the correctness of the consent and revocation controls oered
by any system. The strategy combines two procedures: Procedure 1 uses a novel
formal language to elicit and document unambiguous requirements. Procedure 2
uses such formal descriptions of requirements to generate test suites. Translating
the method into machine-readable language will allow the creation of automated
test suites for a specic system. The strategy is demonstrated here by application
to an aspect of the Employee case study. The intention is to create a testing strategy
that could be applied to any system required to handle the life-cycle of consent and
revocation controls imposed on data. Since there is a gap in the literature and no
privacy testing methodology has been designed, this thesis extends the literature by
developing a novel testing strategy which is the nal contribution of this thesis to
knowledge.
In what follows, the next Section 8.1 explains the value stemming from using
the logic to underpin the attempt for a novel testing strategy and identies the gap
in the literature. In Section 8.2 the novel testing strategy is presented and more
specically, two procedures which generate the nal testing suites are discussed.
In Section 8.3 the novel testing strategy is demonstrated by applying it on the
Employee case study to verify that the appropriate test suites are generated. To
further verify the strategy, I adjusted it for the needs of the EnCoRe project and
applied it on the rst EnCoRe prototype implementation, designed for the Employee
case study.The results of the testing methodology and the limitations which the
strategy experiences are presented in Section 8.4. Finally, in Section 8.5 I briey
mention the key elements of this chapter.
8.1 Why formal methods in testing
The challenges raised in creating privacy test suites for a user-centric system are two-
fold. They derive from the important role which the data subject has in controlling
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how their personal data is handled by the system, and from the privacy issues that
need to be addressed to ensure that the data will be handled in accordance with
the data subject's wishes expressed in the form of consent and revocation controls.
A formal language is used to describe test requirements rather than natural lan-
guage in order to provide clear and unambiguous results. This clarity is guaranteed
by the existence of mathematical semantics.
In the literature there are limited references to testing privacy properties. To
my knowledge the most comprehensive privacy-testing methodology is proposed
by the PRIME Project [52], which championed the development of common criteria
and privacy-protection proles. They proposed core privacy properties, well-dened
within the academic community, such as: anonymity, unlinkability, unobservability,
undetectability, and pseudo-anonymity. However, the assessment of these attributes
is still unsuccessful. There are no test suites designed to assess the eectiveness of
consent and revocation controls for the handling of personal data, thus the test
strategy is considered to be novel.
8.2 Presenting the testing strategy
The aim is to perform automated tests to ensure correctness of the implementation,
by reference to a set of requirements derived from the case studies. The strategy will
generate tests to assess functional requirements, specically by focusing on ensuring
that the consent and revocation related functions behave as expected. The tests
will also be applied in the rst implementation of the EnCoRe system, enabling the
EnCoRe project to gain condence in the integrity of the EnCoRe system. Proving
correctness for the EnCoRe system is \elusive" [92] and in this strategy the focus is
only on privacy requirements. Non-functional requirements exceed the purpose of
this thesis and are not addressed.
The strategy comprises of two novel procedures. The rst one aims in eliciting
testing requirements based on a formal language, while the second processes the re-
sults of the rst procedure to generate a list of tests in a machine-readable format,
suitable for automation within a test harness. I believe that functional testing com-
plements the requirements formalisation [11]. The requirements have been identied
 The neglected non-functional requirements have two dierent sources. They derive from the
assessment of the security properties, which is not relevant to privacy properties and from the
complexity of privacy features, such as aggregation or anonymity, which created ambiguities in an
attempt to formalise the requirements for the rst EnCoRe case study [11].
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and expressed using the Hoare logic described in Chapter 4. The Hoare logic is able
to express all the states of a system capable of handling consent and revocation
controls. Actions are given in the form of triples that describe a transition from one
state to another.
The testing strategy model comprises of initial states, transitions and nal states.
The states are identiable, nite in number and expressed with the Hoare logic.
According to a testing report of the British Computer Society (BCS) [130], a
strategy for testing a state transition system should specify:
 The starting state
 The input to that state
 The expected output
 The expected nal state
With the novel Hoare logic presented in Chapter 4 all the aforementioned at-
tributes for a successful testing strategy can be described with clarity. The desirable
initial state is captured by the pre-condition of the triple, the input that triggers
the transition is dened by the action and the expected nal state is described in
the post-condition. Outputs from the nal state, are captured with the form of
obligations.
In order to clarify how the requirements are expressed, the notation used is
reminded. Each action corresponds to a requirement of the following form:
fpre-condition(rights/permissions)g
action(a; b; )
fpost-condition(rights/permissions/obligations)g
The pre-condition comprises of rights and permissions. Every right consists of a
sequence of three letters. The rst letter denotes the actor that pertains the specic
right, the second letter describes the nature of the right (right to process data or
right to share data) and the third letter denotes the data that the right applies to.
The permissions are expressed in variables which constrain specic rights.
The action describes a transition from one state of the system to another and
denotes the actors who participate in this transition. The rst actor is the initiator
of the action and the second is the actor inuenced by this transition.
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The post-condition, in analogy to the pre-condition, comprises of rights and
permissions. In addition, it could contain obligations, which are two-folded. They
are actions that need to be triggered in the future, under certain conditions or
actions that should be cascaded to third parties in order for the post-condition to
be completed. In the latter case, a third actor is also inuenced by the transition
from one state to another.
The state of the system comprises of:
 Actors.
 Rights, predicates of the logic that are either true or false.
 A number of consent and revocation variables, that dene the dimensions in
which restrictions can be imposed on data use.
 The actual values of these variables.
Each action can be triggered when the pre-condition is met and when completed
could either
1. Alter rights on one actor
 Alter rights on more than one if there exists an obligation in the post-
condition
2. Update data
3. Change variables
4. Set notication rules
5. Send notications
8.2.1 Procedure 1: Eliciting test requirements
With the procedure illustrated below, requirements for the testing suites are elicited.
Based on the formalisation of the system's requirements, every requirement is anal-
ysed and the derived factors and results will dene the test suites on the next
procedure. More specically, the actors of the system and those that participate in
the specic formalisation are identied, the rights that are altered by the action and
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Figure 8.1: The state of the system
the values of the variants that restrict every right are claried. Finally, any notica-
tions or obligations that require further action from third parties, are distinguished
and taken under consideration.
Below is illustrated the schema of the rst model:
1. Identify the actors of the system (from the state of the system).
2. Identify actors participating in the action (grant(a;b; ) implies that the ac-
tors involved are a and b ).
3. Identify whose actor's rights are inuenced by the action (grant(a;b; ) im-
plies that the actor whose rights are inuenced is b ).
(a) Check for obligations in the post condition.
4. Identify the class that the action belongs to. Five dierent classes have been
identied, namely:
(a) grant actions.
(b) revoke, delete actions.
(c) notify actions.
(d) change consent and revocation variables actions.
(e) update actions.
8. The testing strategy 195
5. Identify which rights are inuenced from the action. According to the class
that actions belong, rights may be added, reduced or remain the same.
6. Identify the variables of consent and revocation that are inuenced and the
attributed values that these have. According to the class that actions belong
to, variables could be added, removed or result in a change of their values.
8.2.2 Procedure 2: Producing test suites
The factors and results identied from the previous procedure, are used as variables
that inuence the creation of the test suites. In order to produce test suites the
following must be considered:
1. Verify that the pre-condition of the action is true.
2. Verify that only the identied actor has been inuenced from the action and
not the other actors of the system.
3. The rights have been altered appropriately when actions belong to the a, b
and d class, data changed when actions belong to the c class and variables
changed when actions belong to the e class.
4. No more/less rights have been added/reduced to/from the actors.
5. The values of the variables that constrain the rights are respected by actors.
6. Notication was sent/ not sent to the appropriate actor after the action was
completed.
The test suites are designed to exercise \valid transitions" between states. Since
the nal state of the system has been formalised, based on Hoare rules and axioms
one could test only the actions that are allowed to be triggered from that state.
However, test cases may also be designed to test that \unspecied transitions"
cannot be triggered [130]. This distinction allows the testing strategy to be simple
by only testing the valid transitions or more thorough by verifying that transitions
prohibited by the Hoare rules, are also denied by the implementation of the system.
The test suites generated for each action of the Hoare logic provide a black box
of tests, meaning that every time a specic action is triggered and the transition
from one state to another is completed, the tests required to validate the correctness
of such a transition will remain the same.
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There are though limitations to the model. For testing sequential actions 1,2,3
leading from state A of the system to state D, the system should generate tests for
each action separately, testing the transition from state A to B, from B to C and
from C to D.
Concurrency of actions is another limitation. When two or more actions are
triggered simultaneously, or an action is triggered before the system has reacted on
a previous transition, the testing suites generated by the model should be comple-
mented with further tests to provide ecient assessment.
8.3 Applying the testing strategy to the Employee case study
Tests for all the dierent use cases of the scenario have been generated, but for the
purpose of this thesis I will apply the strategy and develop the testing requirements
for two use cases only. In the rst use case, Mary has just been hired by a company
X. In the second use case, Mary resigns from company X. These use cases provide
complex situations and conicting actions, since in the rst use case Mary is con-
senting to the use and sharing of her data, whereas in the second use case, Mary
requests her data to be deleted.
Testing veries that the interactions of the system under examination with the
environment through \points of control and observation" [92] conform with speci-
cations. The consent and revocation specications, for this particular case study,
have been identied and formalised in 5. The environment of the system must be
captured and according to Armando et al [21], in order to describe the testing envi-
ronment one needs to dene the System Under Test (SUT). The actors who use the
specic EnCoRe system are dened as SUT and all the other actors are simulated
by the tester. In this case study, the SUT is HR department of the X company,
which is represented by the actor h in the system model. The actors Mary, Mary's
boss and third parties are all simulated by the tester and comprise the environment
of the system.
8.3.1 Mary is hired by company X
Before Mary is about to start in her new position she lls out various forms for the
Human Resources (HR) department, including necessary health information. She
signs a form agreeing to the terms and conditions which are stored by HR.
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fmOg
granty(m;h; ;)
fhL ^ hP ^ hSg
where  = destination:^:^purpose:p^time duration:t^times processed:t and
  fMary's bossg ,   fthird partiesgand p  finternal purposesg, t  fOne
year - ve yearsg and t  fOne time - 100 timesg
The semantics of the formalisation are: m= Mary, h= HR department, =
health information.  is a variable that allows the HR department to share data
only with Mary's boss,  restrains the HR department from sharing Mary's data
with third parties while p denes the purpose for which the data should be processed.
Furthermore, there are variables describing the duration of consent, t denotes the
years that data should be stored for, and t the number of times the HR department
may process the data.
All the actions performed in the system are dened by the system administrator
and in this specic case study, the HR department. Thus, the options which Mary
can choose from are pre-dened by the HR department. Furthermore, all the actions
may invoke changes in the rights of the actors. In the above formalisation, before
the action Mary was the owner of the data. After the action, there is a transition to
a state where the HR department possesses the right to process Mary's data (hP),
the right to store Mary's data (hL) and the right to share Mary's data(hS), all
of which are restrained by conditions described in .
By applying the rst procedure, what is identied are the actors of the system,
the rights that each actor has, the variables that restrict the rights and which rights
should be altered. In essence, requirements that allow to dene the initial state ,
the triggering action and the nal state of the system are elicited.
The actors of the system are four, namely:
1. Mary
2. HR department
3. Mary's boss
4. Third party
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Figure 8.2: Transition from the initial state to the nal state with the grant action
From these actors, those implicated into the action are Mary and the HR de-
partment. The latter actor is inuenced by this action. The action is part of the
\grant" class and there are no obligations created. With this action the rights that
are inuenced are three, namely:
1. Right to collect
2. Right to process
3. Right to share
The data pertaining to the action is Mary's health data and the variables dened
are ve, namely:
1. Destination (Mary's boss) and not (Third parties)
2. Purpose (internal use)
3. Time of consent (Up to ve years)
4. Times data processed (up to 100 times)
These results are presented in the Table 8.1:
Procedure 2 is then applied to the results of Procedure 1, recorded in Table 8.1,
and produce the test requirements described in Table 8.2.
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Table 8.1: Results from the application of the rst procedure
Actor Rights on data Rights to change by the action
Mary owner of the data none
HR department none store, process, share
Mary's boss none none
Third parties none none
It is essential to verify that only the HR department has obtained the appropriate
rights and that Mary's choices are enforced. Thus, the creation of tests to verify
whether the HR department has obtained the right to collect, process and share
Mary's data and if her choices (variables) are enforced, is necessary. Further testing
is required to examine if the HR department has obtained more rights than those
mentioned and if any other actor of the system was inuenced. The last tests aim
at verifying that transitions prohibited in the Hoare logic are not allowed by the
implementation.
Table 8.2: Testing suites generated by the application of the second procedure
Actor Test Pre-condition Post condition
Third party Attempt to access Mary's data as
other users
No Access No Access
Mary's boss Attempt to access Mary's data held
within the HR department
No Access No Access
HR department Attempt to process Mary's data for
99th time
No Access Access Granted
HR department Attempt to process Mary's data for
101th time
No Access No Access
HR department Attempt to process Mary's data
after ve years
No Access No Access
HR department Attempt to share Mary's data with
Mary's boss
No Access Access Granted
HR department Attempt to notify Mary No Access No access
HR department Attempt to release Mary's data to
third parties
No Access No Access
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Each row eectively describes a single test of the system: a test harness must rst
establish a correct system state (satisfying the pre-condition), attempt the access
specied, and then observe whether the resulting system state meets the postcon-
dition. If it does, the test is considered to be passed; if not, a failure is registered.
Of course, given all the unconstrained factors that contribute to the system state,
there is no guarantee that this result is completely determined; the same test might
give the opposite result in other circumstances. The role of testing, however, is to
contribute to evidence-gathering about the correctness of any implementation, not
to be the sole arbiter, and tests passed will contribute to condence.
The testing suites are executed once in every transition. Firstly, it is tested if
the triggering of the action from the initial state was valid. The expected result for
the tests is described in the third column of the Table 8.2 above. The second set
of tests aim to verify that the transition has resulted in reaching the desirable nal
state and the result for each test is dened in the fourth column of the Table 8.2.
8.3.2 Mary leaves the company
Mary decides to leave the company. She wishes to revoke her consent regarding the
use of her data and requires all data to be deleted.
fmO ^ hL ^ hP ^ hS ^ hRg
delete(m;h; )
f:hL ^ :hP ^ :hSg
When the transition is completed, in the nal state of the system the only actor
with rights should be Mary.
The semantics of the formalisation are: m=Mary, h= HR department, = health
information. hR is a right denoting that the HR department respect the choices
( variables) which Mary gave in the past and restrict the process and sharing of
her data.
By applying the rst procedure, the information presented below is gathered:
The actors of the system are four, namely:
1. Mary
2. HR department
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Figure 8.3: Transition from the initial state to the nal state with the delete action
3. Mary's boss
4. Third party
From these actors, those implicated into the action are Mary and the HR de-
partment.The latter actor is inuenced by this action. The action is part of the
"revoke" class, meaning that the rights are removed and there are no obligations
created. With this action the rights that are removed from the HR department are
three, namely:
1. Right to collect
2. Right to process
3. Right to share
The data pertaining to the action is Mary's health data and the variables which
were dened by Mary in previous transitions are ve, namely:
1. Destination (Mary's boss) and not (Third parties)
2. Purpose (internal use)
3. Time of consent (Up to ve years)
4. Times data processed (up to 100 times)
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Table 8.3: Results from the application of the second procedure
Actor Rights on data Rights to change by the action
Mary owner of the data owner of the data
HR department store, process, share none
Mary's boss none none
Third parties none none
These results are presented in Table 8.3.
Procedure 2 is then applied to the results of Procedure 1, recorded in Table 8.3,
and produce the test requirements described in Table 8.4.
It is important to verify that the appropriate rights were revoked by the HR
department and that Mary's data is deleted. Thus, the creation of tests to verify
whether the HR department still possesses the right to collect, process and share
Mary's data is essential. Further testing is required to examine if the HR department
has any other rights and if any other actor of the system was inuenced.
Table 8.4: Testing suites generated by the application of the second procedure
Actor Test Pre-condition Post condition
Third party Attempt to access Mary's data as
other users
No Access No Access
Mary's boss Attempt to access Mary's data held
within the HR department
No Access No Access
HR department Attempt to process Mary's data for
99th time
Access Granted No Access
HR department Attempt to process Mary's data for
101th time
No Access No Access
HR department Attempt to process Mary's data
after ve years
No Access No Access
HR department Attempt to share Mary's data with
Mary's boss
Access Granted No Access
HR department Attempt to notify Mary No Access No access
HR department Attempt to release Mary's data to
third parties
No Access No Access
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The test suites designed for this formalisation, and presented in Table 8.4, are
the same with the previous use case, but the results of the tests are dierent. The
testing is successful because the actions described transitions from state A to state
B and backwards. The transitions were only between these two states of the system
and the tests should remain the same, since the pre-condition for the one transition
was the post-condition of the other and vice versa.
8.4 Results from the application of the strategy on the En-
CoRe prototype implementation
The testing strategy was further applied on the EnCoRe prototype implementation,
serving a dual purpose. The rst aim was to further validate the testing strategy on
a real system, able to capture data subjects' consent and revocation expectations
and the second was EnCoRe-related and aimed to validate the integrity of the
rst EnCoRe prototype implementation. I adjusted the strategy to the EnCoRe
specications and matched the two procedures with the components that comprise
the EnCoRe's technical architecture. The explanation of the process for conguring
the testing methodology can be found in the next Section 8.4.1. In addition, I
designed a pseudo-code, allowing the automated generation of tests for every action
dened in the logic and implemented in the EnCoRe system.
The pseudocode was implemented by HW Communications Ltd, the EnCoRe
partners responsible for the implementation of the EnCoRe system and without
their valuable help the results presented in this thesis would not have been achieved.
I spent several days in Lancaster, assisting in the development of the testing suites
and ensuring that the tests generated with the logic, will be the same with those
generated in the system.
The result was a successful generation of testing suites, adequate to address the
system's integrity for the Employee case study. Although the implementation of
the EnCoRe system eectively responded to the majority of the automatically gen-
erated tests, a misinterpretation of the technical architecture was revealed. More
specically, both in the technical architecture and in the logic, when the data sub-
jects extend their initial consent, their initial preferences are not revoked but these
are still enforced in the system. In the implementation, the initial preferences were
deleted and only the recent consent was tracked and enforced. The problem oc-
curred because the action of granting any type of consent initiated a format in the
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data base storing the consent and revocation preferences. Slight modications were
deemed appropriate to ll the gap between the architecture and the implementation.
8.4.1 Mapping the \logic-derived tests" to the EnCoRe architecture
In the logic of consent and revocation, there is a series of actions that add and
remove rights to the state of the system. Although there are several \rights" dened
in the logic fL \rights" (encoding knowledge of location) and R \rights" (encoding
commitment to respect conditions on specic datag, for the testing the focus will
only be on three dierent rights namely:
 Right to Process data  (aP : \a" has the right to process )
 Right to Share data one step further (aS :"a" has the right to share  one
step further)
 Right to share data transitively (aS : \a" has the right to share  \transi-
tively", i.e. each recipient then has the right to share it onwards in subject to
the same restrictions so there may be multiple hops)
By performing the action grant(a,b,), a gives b the right to process . By
performing the action grant1(a,b,), a gives b the right to (process and) share 
with anyone one-step further. When b shares  with c, say, then c thereby gets
the right (bP) to process  (not also to share ). In the case of grant(a,b,), c
would additionally get the right to share  either one-step further (if b performed
grant1(b,c,)) or transitively (if b performed grant(b,c,)). If b decides to share
 further then the third party obtains the right (bP) to process , and either the
right (bS) to share  one step further or the right (bS*) to share it transitively,
according to whether b performed grant1(b; c; ) or grant(b; c; ). All the rights
may be constrained by  conditions. These conditions that are described in detail in
the logic, are mainly expressing data subject's choices and could create obligations.
(Process  for a specic time, delete after specic time, share only with party c,
etc. . . )
System design
The system design is based on access control policies (ACPs), access requests
(ARs) and obligations (Obs). ACP policies comprise Policy Decision Point (PDP)
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policies and Data Registry (DR) policies. A PDP policy is an overarching policy
for the organisation, including whether or not to refer to the Data Subject's policy,
which is stored at the DR. An obligation is created from an ACS and could be a
time-event obligation or a notication obligation. Access requests may occur in the
system and their result should be as dictated by the ACPs. A result of an access
request could be either \Allow" or \Deny".
The ACPs, Obs and ARs comprise a number of attributes. Some of these at-
tributes needed to be dened for the testing. Others are 'wild cards', meaning that
all possible values should be used in turn. Other attributes (marked Do not Care)
do not inuence the tests, so each can take an arbitrary value.
Mapping from logic to system design
The three actions described in the logic each create an ACP for the PDP and if
there are  conditions then they create an ACP for the DR as well. The number of
ACPs the action will create depends on the number of rights that are added.
Every single right creates an ACP. If the purpose is identied in the  condition
then that ACP should be written as many times as there are dierent purposes, in
order to have a unique ACP for each purpose. Thus, the only attribute that will
dier among these policies will be the purpose (aside from any wild-card attributes).
The actions may also include obligations in the post-conditions. If there is a
notication request or a time-request dened in the  condition, then in addition
to the ACP, an Ob is created.
Data controller shares further
In the case where data controller \b", say, decides to share the data further
(triggering one of the actions grant(b,c,), grant1(b,c,) or grant(b,c,)) then an
AR is created at \b's" system and an ACP is created at \c's" system. The rules
described above dictate the creation of the ACPs in \c's" system as well. It can be
argued that:
 the grant(a,b,) action cannot lead to an action that can create ACPs for third
parties.
 the grant1(a,b,) action may lead to the creation of ACPs in \c's" system
similar to those created by the action grant(a,b,) on \b's" system.
 the grant(b,c,) action may lead to the creation of ACPs in \c's" system
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similar to those created by the grant1(a,b,) or grant(a,b,) in \b's" system
(since \b" is able to share data either one step further or transitively).
All the tests will be executed as ARs and the attributes of these ARs will be
informed by the testing strategy presented in Section 8.3. Specically:
1. The testing strategy involves deriving a set of tests from the logic of the form:
 Actor of the action.
 The action under test.
 Desirable response before the action (Access-Deny).
 Desirable response after the action (Access-Deny).
2. The \logic-derived" tests will be translated to \architecture-level" tests in the
form of ARs by:
 Checking that the system is in the desirable state.
 Apply AR to test the state of the system.
 Creating an ACP for the action and dening the attributes of the ACP
according to the  conditions and the predicates of the post condition of
the action (as described above).
3. The ARs will be submitted to the system and in each case the system response
will be compared to the required response (Accept or Deny).
8.4.2 Limitations to the testing strategy
The novel testing strategy, although successfully applied to the EnCoRe system, has
limitations. Since the testing strategy has been used to devise test suites adjusted
to the EnCoRe system for one of the three case studies, some validation of its
utility can be claimed. However, only a small subset of the test suite has been
deployed to-date, which means that there is not enough evidence to understand the
appropriateness of the strategy. Of particular concern is whether there have been
tested enough components of the system, or whether instead there will remain many
\dark corners" left to be explored. At the time of writing the project has not been
able to deploy the strategy in earnest; some components of the system formalised by
the logic and referred in the technical architecture have not been implemented yet.
As a result the notication processes, the obligation actions and the actions resulting
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in sharing data with other data controllers have not been tested yet. However, it is
the intention of project partners in case of an EnCoRe sequel to continue developing
this method further.
In addition, the strategy inherits the limitations deriving from the nature of
testing. Some of the tests might have been successfully passed by the system due
to the factor of luck, resulting in misleading conclusions. Furthermore, the eect
of concurrent actions has not been considered in the testing strategy. The testing
harness cannot probe state resulting from concurrency. In addition, there are situa-
tions where the concurrency model presented in Section 4.2.1, although it provides
the desirable answer, this answer can be reached with dierent ways. For example,
an update and an action to share data further, if executed concurrently will result
in a nal state where the third party will have obtained the updated data. How-
ever, according to the execution sequence, the third party may or may not acquire
temporally the old data. Thus, there is an opportunity for future work to evolve it
to probe such circumstances.
8.5 Synopsis of the chapter
Following the design and the successful implementation of the logic to the three
dierent case studies, this chapter explored an auxiliary use of the logic, which
completes the purpose of this thesis. Since the eective formalisation of require-
ments for consent and revocation cannot ensure the correct implementation of a
system oering data subjects controls to mitigate privacy concerns and endanger-
ing its integrity, the nal step to provide a holistic solution to the problem that
this thesis sought to address, was to design a testing strategy, agnostic to technical
implementation, that will generate testing suites.
The novel strategy presented in this chapter comprises of two procedures. The
rst procedure, based on the formalisations of the logic, elicits the requirements for
the tests suites, while the second procedure, uses the results of the rst procedure
as inputs and generates the appropriate testing suites. The strategy was applied
on the Employee case study and generated tests , verifying the testing methodol-
ogy and estimating that any fail in the testing process will possible be a result of
an erroneous implementation. To further verify the testing strategy, the method-
ology was adjusted to the needs of the rst EnCoRe prototype implementation.
The majority of the tests were successfully implemented by HW Communications
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Ltd, the company responsible for the implementation of EnCoRe. The application
of the strategy revealed a \misinterpretation" of the technical architecture in the
implementation process and highlighted the need for slight modications.
CHAPTER 9
Conclusions and future work
There have existed times in history when technological developments crafted the
way people communicated, causing changes in societal norms in such a manner
that the world was a dierent place afterwards. The advent of the Internet and
its reception from our society has not been an exception as it has opened novel
channels for communication, inuencing the social, business and economical aspects
of our lives; people can obtain access to services and products online, participate
to social networks or conduct their businesses on the web. Therefore, individuals
are disclosing more personal data than ever, while enterprises have the potential to
store, process and share vast amount of data.
However, exploiting the benets oered via the internet comes with compro-
mise. The control which data subjects might have over their personal information
is eroded, raising privacy concerns regarding the handling of their data. The im-
plications of such lack of controls are profound and have been manifested with the
increasing number of incidents where data has been lost, mistreated or shared fur-
ther without the data subjects' knowledge. Thus, privacy as a research topic has
gained in popularity in recent years, since the need to provide users with mecha-
nisms enabling them to control the storage, use and dissemination of personal data
is more imminent than ever.
The importance of privacy has been advocated in the majority of literature from
scholars in a wide range of research interests, arguing that if we do not act upon
the contemporary privacy threats, we will remember the privacy right with a sense
of nostalgia [236]. The most prominent perception of privacy construes it as a right
whose purpose is to protect individuality and exclude people from social obligations.
Its value stems from safeguarding human dignity, enhancing individual creativity
and catering for positions opposing the dominant [82; 45; 41; 101]. Framing privacy
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to individualistic terms, although catering for valuable elements, provokes criti-
cism due to the emerging conicts with other primary rights and societal interests.
Privacy is considered to threaten societal solidarity [86; 119], as it is deemed antag-
onistic to civil liberties, human rights and freedom of speech [274], while hindering
social surveillance by concealing malicious activities [243; 212]. In addition, fem-
inists dispute privacy as a right claiming that it alters the authoritative relations
between sexes in favour of men, concealing domestic violence [166; 236]. Others at-
tach an economic perspective to their criticism, suggesting that privacy hinders the
disclosure of information critical for businesses to operate in a free market, resulting
in a loss of trust and sharing of discredible information[211; 85].
This thesis, has adopted a dierent approach to privacy and perceived it as a
right that has social value whose importance stems not only from the individualis-
tic benets but from the benets it oers to the common good and the prosperity
of society. Loss of privacy results in loss of freedom, openness and transparency
in social life and since privacy is critical for the protection of a plethora of inter-
ests, its value should be assessed depending on the issue that is addressed each
time [236; 44]. These values should be balanced against the value of contradicting
interests and the optimal solution for the society must prevail. The perception of
privacy adopted in this thesis implies a balancing approach which was identied and
eectively addressed.
I decided to construct and address privacy concerns as a problem of achieving
a balance between individuals' benets and the public good. As several exam-
ples in history have demonstrated, legislation endeavours to establish functions to
balance individuals' right to privacy and the common good. However, the use of
technological innovations alters the power relations and creates a constant need for
re-establishing the balance. It is impossible for the legislators to anticipate techno-
logical developments and eliminate privacy concerns which emerge from this vicious
circle, thus alternatives must be sought. The research presented in this thesis en-
deavoured to maximise the benets both for the individual and the public good,
while eectively addressing privacy concerns.
By focusing on the concepts of consent and revocation, this thesis has aimed
to mitigate the problem of privacy concerns by developing a logic able to capture
data subjects' expectations to control the ow of their personal data. Since privacy
is a fertile area for conducting research, the successful solution presented in this
thesis contributed to knowledge in multiple ways. The next section discusses the
core novel aspects of this thesis.
9. Conclusions and future work 211
9.1 Contributions to knowledge
The goals of this thesis were achieved by following a demanding and rarely adopted
approach as it combined elements from both social and computer sciences disci-
plines, oering an interesting blend. The combined approach created opportunities
for contribution to various layers. Departing from the literature, the rst aim was
to obtain a holistic understanding of privacy. To that end, I classied the literature
in privacy conceptions and identied their limitations. The most dominant con-
ception in the literature, conceives privacy as controls and a further examination
of the controls identied by researchers was conducted, resulting an observation of
a lack of more dynamic controls able to capture the volatile nature of the online
environment. In addition, the most prominent means to provide these controls was
the concept of consent. Once again, studying the literature on consent revealed a
gap, since common practice treats the process of giving consent as an one-o event,
remaining oblivious to the notion of revocation that can, as proven in the thesis,
introduce a dynamic element. In addition, recent legislative eorts were presented
and provided evidence for the legal need of a system able to handle consent and
revocation controls, since the European Union has shifted the focus from the right
to be let alone, to the right to be forgotten [80].
The gap in the literature on revocation and the legal evidence for developing
such a concept, was the basis for the rst contribution to knowledge achieved in the
thesis. Based on the literature presented in Chapter 2 and on the analysis of data
generated by focus groups, I developed a conceptual model of consent and revocation
and coined the term of \informed revocation" in Chapter 3. The focus groups, were
conducted for the needs of the EnCoRe project and were designed by the team of
the London School of Economics, led by Dr. Whitley, to whom I am most grateful
for allowing me to have access on the transcripts of the focus groups. It should be
noted that I participated in shaping the questions posed to the participants of the
focus groups, since those were decided in the general EnCoRe meetings.
To analyse the data in a systematic and rigorous manner, elements from quali-
tative research were embraced. The content analysis approach was considered the
optimal methodology to serve the purpose and the generated data was categorised
based on the literature on consent. The analysis revealed a new dimension for
consent which was implicit in some researchers' treatment [47] and identied dif-
ferent types of revocation resulting in a novel conceptual model of consent and
revocation. The model details the dierent kinds of control that users desire to
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exercise over personal data concerning them that is held by an enterprise. Fur-
thermore, a phenomenon was identied where the data subjects altered their choice
of revocation when informed of the many dierent kinds that exist. The term of
informed revocation was introduced to capture this change of behaviour. I also ar-
gued that the notion of informed revocation, although coined in analogy to Faden
and Beauchamp's [89] term of \informed consent", does not inherit its limitations,
rather assists on addressing parts of its criticism.
The second contribution of this thesis involved elements from the computer
science area. The study of the stream of literature concerning formal methods
which address privacy issues, revealed a lack of languages that focus on formalising
the concepts of consent and revocation. So far, approaches to formal methods
for privacy management were either high-level, relying on legal compliance, risk
assessments and addressing privacy in already implemented systems (such as Barth
et al [26]), or low-level, focusing on technical implementation and often disregarding
important legal and business considerations. A characteristic example of a low-level
approach is P3P [257], which translates privacy policies written in natural language
into machine-readable formats. There was, however, a gap between implementing
various policies at the high level, and being able to provide traceability into the
low-level policy implementations. Thus, this thesis contributed to a niche space
in the eld of formal methods and their use, since none of these attempts tried to
address the issues of consent, revocation and deletion of data.
I designed and presented a novel Hoare-style logic, providing the means for
reasoning about consent and revocation controls, via which data subjects can express
their privacy preferences, and formalising the specications of such processes in
a system. Controls for consent are dened as data subjects' privacy preferences
pertaining to specic personal data, while revocation controls are dened as the
process that corresponds to the withdrawal of consent. The logic comprises a set of
rights for principals in the system, a set of actions that express a transition in the
system from one state to another and  conditions which set the values for consent
and revocation variables. The rules of the logic are given in the form of triples, where
the pre-condition containing rights and factors denes the initial state, the action
describes the activity in the system and the post-condition denes the concluding
state of the specic activity and constitutes of rights, facts and possibly obligations.
Obligations dene sequential to the activity actions which must be performed in the
system either to complete the initial action or as a consequence of it.
I have provided an exhaustive list of rights and actions that successfully cap-
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tured all the specications not only for the data subjects' consent and revocation
expectations, but for the business and legal requirements as well. Regarding the 
conditions comprising of consent and revocation variables, I deliberately attached
to those restrictions an elasticity, allowing the creation of new variables that can
eectively capture diversities regarding the contexts where the logic is applied on.
The logic is designed to satisfy healthiness conditions, dened in such a manner
which veried that every valid behaviour described in the logic can be achieved,
while ensuring that undesirable behaviour is prohibited. The use of the Maude
software was deemed necessary to construe proofs for the validity of the healthiness
conditions. Due to the nature of the Hoare-style logic, where actions are consid-
ered to be sequential, the need for a concurrent model was acknowledged, since it
is highly unlikely that all the actions in a system will be executed in a sequential
manner. Problems occurring due to concurrency reasons were identied and a rst
approach to solve those was proposed.
The logic was not designed in a single attempt, rather it was subjected to a
gradual renement. The case study methodology was preferred to underpin the re-
nement process and to validate the nal form of the logic presented in Chapter 4,
in terms of richness and expressiveness. The case studies where the logic was ap-
plied, albeit designed for the needs of the EnCoRe project, were deemed appropriate
to serve the purpose of validation, because they capture the three dierent kinds
of power asymmetries described in Chapter 3. When adopting a data subjects'
perspective, there exist three dierent contexts where the power relations between
the data controller and the data subject dier in such a degree that the privacy
expectations in each of these environments vary. The three case studies illustrated
in this thesis, captured the power asymmetries of the three dierent contexts, in
an attempt to identify and formalise as many dierent privacy expectations and
business models as possible.
The Employee case study was the pilot scenario and the application of the logic
revealed ambiguities which were categorised into two kinds, according to the source
of their existence. Furthermore, these ambiguities were addressed and their solutions
resulted in the nal version of the logic. In Chapter 5, the application of the nal
version of the logic served a dierent purpose, as the aim was to verify the richness
of the logic by eectively formalising all the requirements elicited for the specic
case study, in an unequivocal manner and without any further ambiguities emerging.
The adequate formalisation of all the use cases provided evidence for these claims.
The second case study described in Chapter 6 raised further challenges and its
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aim was to question the ability of the logic to capture requirements for a dierent
context, with dierent consent and revocation expectations that also involved legacy
systems in place whose requirements must be catered for. The Biobank, was the
perfect candidate as the treatment of medical personal data requires specic pri-
vacy preferences and the presence of the Biobank's researchers ensures a demanding
audience arguing for specic business requirements. In order to elicit the neces-
sary requirements, content analysis was used to analyse transcripts of focus groups,
specically designed to identify and capture patients' and researchers' expectations
of a system operating in the Biobank.
The logic was successfully applied in the new context and was used to formalise
all the new privacy preferences and business requirements with minor adaptations.
Those adaptations were the introduction of new variables that enhanced the richness
of the logic. A subsequent number of formalisations with various dierent examples
of consent and revocation controls provided evidence of the successful application of
the logic to the Biobank case study. I illustrated how diverse mechanisms of consent
and revocation may allow donors of the Biobank to express their preferences and
acquire control of their samples and data. Furthermore, with the formalisation of
the requirements for such a system, I eectively validated that patient choices are
unambiguously described in order to be translated into privacy policies and enforced
into the system.
The third and nal case study, described in Chapter 7, considered the power
asymmetries when the data subject interacts with governmental services. The Iden-
tity Assurance Programme, a mock system inspired by a real project, provided all
the necessary situations to reveal the various privacy preferences which data sub-
jects expect to be allowed to request, as well as a novel business model which raised
new challenges. The requirements were elicited by analysing the documents pro-
vided by various researchers, that formed the team assisting the implementation of
the project.
All the consent and revocation requirements were successfully formalised without
any further ambiguities emerging, boosting my condence regarding the richness
of the logic and its applicability in diverse environments with minor adaptations.
However, the novel business model required the slight modication of one action,
resulting in the introduction of a new action to the logic. The new action captures
the request of a third party, on behalf of the data subject, for acquiring access to
personal data stored in a data controller's database. The formalisation of the three
case studies veried that the novel logic is general applicable and the emerging
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ambiguities are minor and solved without subsequent renements.
The nal contribution of this thesis to knowledge is a novel testing strategy
which provides evidence that the implementation of a system designed to capture
the management of consent and revocation controls is valid. The stream of literature
studying testing strategies for privacy-enhanced systems is still in its infancy and
little has been achieved so far regarding the development of a methodology for
testing privacy properties. Thus, this thesis also lled a gap toward this direction.
The proposed model in Chapter 8 comprised of two novel procedures designed
based on the logic of consent and revocation. These procedures develop automated
testing suites which eectively validate the correctness of consent and revocation
controls, while remaining agnostic to the technical architecture of the system. The
strategy was applied on the Employee case study to prove its practicality, at least
as far as individual actions were concerned.
In addition, I congured the procedures to match the technical architecture of
the EnCoRe prototype implementation designed for the Employee case study and
provided a pseudo-code to automate the process of generating testing suites. The
pseudo-code was implemented by the HW Communications Ltd, the EnCoRe part-
ners responsible for the implementation of the EnCoRe system, to whom I am most
grateful for their assistance. The aim of applying the testing strategy to the real
system was two fold. To further validate the applicability of the strategy and to test
the correctness of the EnCoRe system. Since the logic was proven valid, any failures
in the testing process would have been the result of a faulty implementation. The
testing suites were successfully generated, testing several activities in the EnCoRe
system. The strategy produced a number of tests in every occasion and resulted in
identifying a misinterpretation of the technical architecture in the implementation
of the EnCoRe's database.
9.2 Contributions to the EnCoRe Project and Dissemination
of Project Results
The logic had a protagonist role for the EnCoRe system, ensuring that everything
the EnCoRe prototype implementation oers can be achieved without further am-
biguities and undesired behaviour. The EnCoRe project ran to conclusion on June
2012 and is the pioneer of a system enabling users to express their privacy expecta-
tions by delivering a wide range of technology and procedural controls designed to
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provide data subjects with consent and revocation life-cycle management over their
personal data.
The solutions oered by the project provide novel technical, legal and compli-
ance aspects. A number of core concepts have been dened and classied and the
relationships and linkages between these concepts have been identied creating a
common language for people to use, in order to be on common grounds when the
issue raised is privacy controls.
Regarding the technical architecture, a composure of diverse elements, both
software and service components, capture the data ows between data subjects,
data controllers and other technical systems, cater for compliance and regulatory
environments while all the technical procedures necessary to manage and enforce
data subjects' privacy expectations are encompassed. The implementation of the
EnCoRe technical architecture, resulted in user interfaces oering consent and re-
vocation options and notication capabilities to inform data subjects of their data
handling.
Drawing on legal and regulatory aspects, the EnCoRe consortium commissioned
a position document, reviewing the new EU General Data Protection Regulation, to
the public consultation that the Minister of Justice in the United Kingdom organised
to garner view of interested parties [50]. In addition, departing from the latest
social science research, a document describing a compendium of how consent and
revocation is exercised in current business and research practices was published.
Another important contribution that the EnCoRe project achieved, was a novel
compliance framework able to provide evidence for assessing a system's standards
when oering consent and revocation controls. The project innovated compliance
tools to support evidence demonstrating that data subjects' choices are enforced
within the system. Amongst various periodic and time-bound or continuous de-
signed tools, test suites based on the logic are some of the most important elements
of the compliance framework. In addition, the evidence gathered from the compli-
ance process provides input for the novel privacy risk assessment methodology.
9.3 Future work
The research ndings presented in this thesis provide opportunities for various paths
of future work either by drawing upon and addressing the limitations of the thesis,
or by extending the use of the key contributions, assisting in the growth of the
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research eld. The rst opportunity for future research derives from addressing
limitations of the existing logic. Although the logic provided a mechanism to for-
malise requirements and illustrate proof of correctness for systems managing consent
and revocation controls, it could still benet from advancements in the concurrency
model and the automated generation of testing suites. In particular, its concurrency
model does not account for time delays that will inevitably exist in an implemen-
tation of a real system. If users are able to make rapid changes in their choices,
then delays in the system may mean that the system handles data according to
out-of-date choices, so it would be unreasonable to require instantaneous changes
in how data is handled. A rst approach was presented in Chapter 4 but I believe
that this can be rened by further work, perhaps by explicitly allowing for system
delays with the use of recent snapshots. A rst approach is presented in an EnCoRe
public deliverable [6].
Limitations on the concurrency model have also an impact on the testing strat-
egy. A key research development could be to consider the eects of concurrency
and how the test strategy should evolve to probe them. Further application of the
testing method to other case studies can assist in a detailed assessment of the ap-
plicability of the approach. In addition, the method could be complemented with
other compliance mechanisms, such as run-time monitors, to provide an holistic
compliance approach [6]. To-date, systems that provide similar functionalities to
EnCoRe have not been designed yet. However, if in the future a similar system
exists it could provide an opportunity to verify my intention to design the testing
strategy in a manner agnostic to the technical architecture and implementation.
The logic merely addresses the issue of aggregation by restraining the purpose
of processing data. I do not claim to have solved the issue thoroughly, due to the
fact that data controllers may derive new data from processing and link it with data
publicly available. Future research could focus on imposing consent and revocation
restrictions on data that is derived from aggregation. Embracing elements from
other variations of logics to include, for example epistemic and temporal modalities,
may further assist in addressing the problem of aggregation. Additionally, tempo-
ral modalities may enable the formalisation of time and dene the  conditions
in a mathematical form. Furthermore, future research focusing on these modali-
ties could provide the foundation to formalise models that attribute liability and
ownership of data, providing concrete solutions to the conicting requirements of
anonymization and traceability. Establishing compliance to privacy requirements is
an elusive but necessary task under the threat of either nancial penalties posed by
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privacy regulators or reputation damage caused when consumers' trust evaporates.
Thus, the attribution of liability when privacy breaches occur, proof of conformity
to legislation regarding data protection and reasoning about data ownership pro-
vide opportunities to mitigate risk and ensure compliance with regulation and best
practices.
A dierent approach to future work could draw upon the achievements of this
thesis and elaborate further. There exists a niche space in the eld of formal methods
to contribute to the comprehension of the complexities in the relationships between
users and organisations. In the logic, an assumption expressed by the \bRy" right
suggests that the data subject has reached an agreement with the data controller
regarding the available controls. Conicts in privacy requirements emerging from
dierent stakeholder interests should be further examined with the aim to provide
a renement of high-level policies. Further research could focus on developing a
conceptual model for data usage policies that will take into consideration diverse
privacy requirements from users, as well as legal, business and technical stakeholders.
The logic can be used to translate privacy policies and form a strategy to resolve
policy conicts. Towards this aim, embracing other languages such as SecPal [30],
can assist in reasoning about policy renement and trade-os between stakeholders.
In addition, while this thesis has considered the perspective of the user, another
direction of investigation is to adopt an enterprise's perspective and form a model
of business prerequisites before engaging a system enabling users to control and
acquire access to their personal data. There are certainly issues that organisations,
no matter how willing to implement a system catering for users' privacy, will face.
Recent legislative eorts may have provided solid grounds for the existence of such
a system, but as denoted in Chapter 2 the implementation challenges, the restraints
and the changes in the business ordinary practices that organisation will have to
undertake are still issues to be addressed.
Regarding the implementation challenges, organisations will be required to func-
tion in a privacy-friendly mode, storing the minimal amount of data required to
achieve their tasks and keeping a record of how and to whom data is processed and
shared. Moreover, the concept of revocation raises signicantly the level of di-
culty, since business may be obliged to delete data or revoke permissions that are
vital for their economic growth. In a similar vein, the process of revocation may
hinter current business functions and contradict with contemporary business prac-
tices. For example, the adoption of cloud computing to increase business agility and
reduce liability will be in conict with individuals' request to control the sharing of
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data to third parties. In addition, cross-boundary sharing of data, which is com-
mon practice within cloud providers, opposes privacy requirements that a system
oering consent and revocation controls should consider. This thesis describes the
full range of revocation controls. There will be circumstances, however, where some
of these controls will be impractical to implement. Therefore, a comparison of the
two approaches, developed by focusing on dierent perspectives, may shed light in
the conict resolution methodology and bring to surface problems that will occur
from the implementation of a system oering consent and revocation controls.
Returning to the philosophical question of balance described in Chapter 1, it is
evident that a system oering consent and revocation controls cannot ensure that
the balance in society will not be disturbed. It is not the belief of the author
that such a technology could be achieved. Rather, oering consent and revocation
options to the users provide the means to facilitate the process of achieving balance.
The issues described in Section 1.1, challenging the value of privacy are still present
in the consent and revocation model. The consent and revocation controls, however,
may provide a fertile area for communication and common understanding between
users and organisations. Thus, enterprises could better understand the concerns of
their customers, whereas individuals will be better informed why in some cases their
privacy requirements cannot be fully implemented. Providing a platform for raising
awareness regarding privacy requirements and facilitating the process of negotiation
between enterprises and users is the necessary step to mitigate problems that disrupt
the balance.
Implementing consent and revocation controls raises technological, legal and
business challenges. Thus, researchers need to combine eectively diverse scientic
elds that are not necessarily complementary. Developing a logic based on a concep-
tual model of consent and revocation, applying it on real-world scenarios to identify
and address emerging diculties, and providing a testing strategy underpinned by
the same logic, is the rst decisive step towards this objective.
APPENDIX A
Code for the implementation of proofs in
Maude
This chapter provides the code used to capture the state-model illustrated in Chap-
ter 4 that was used to presents the proofs of the healthiness conditions described in
Section 4.3.
The code is:
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mod SIMPLE-4 is 
sort State . 
var W : Bool .
var M : State .
ops O L P S S1 T X : -> Bool [ctor] .
op a : -> State [ctor] .
op b : -> State [ctor] .
op c : -> State [ctor] .
op d : -> State [ctor] .
op e : -> State [ctor] .
op f : -> State [ctor] .
op g : -> State [ctor] .
op h : -> State [ctor] .
op i : -> State [ctor] .
op j : -> State [ctor] .
op rights : State -> Bool [ctor] .
eq rights( a ) = O .
eq rights( b ) = O and L and P .
eq rights( c ) = O and L and P and S  .
eq rights( d ) = O and L and P and S and S1 .
eq rights( e ) = O and L and P and T and X .
eq rights( f ) = O and L and P and S and T and X .
eq rights( g ) = O and L and P and S and S1 and T and X .
eq rights( h ) = O and L and T and X .
eq rights( i ) = O and T and X .
eq rights( j ) = O and L .
rl [grant] : a => b .
rl [grant] : b => b .
rl [grant] : c => c .
rl [grant] : d => d .
rl [grant] : e => e .
rl [grant] : f => f .
rl [grant] : g => g .
rl [grant] : h => e .
rl [grant] : i => e .
rl [grant] : j => b .
rl [grantshare] : a => c .
rl [grantshare] : b => c .
rl [grantshare] : c => c .
rl [grantshare] : d => d .
rl [grantshare] : e => f .
rl [grantshare] : f => f .
rl [grantshare] : g => g .
rl [grantshare] : h => f .
rl [grantshare] : i => f .
rl [grantshare] : j => c .
rl [grantsharetr] : a => d .
rl [grantsharetr] : b => d .
rl [grantsharetr] : c => d .
rl [grantsharetr] : d => d .
rl [grantsharetr] : e => g .
rl [grantsharetr] : f => g .
rl [grantsharetr] : g => g .
rl [grantsharetr] : h => g .
rl [grantsharetr] : i => g .
rl [grantsharetr] : j => d .
rl [grantthird] : c => f .
rl [grantthird] : d => g .
rl [grantthird] : f => f .
rl [grantthird] : g => g .
rl [delete] : b => a .
rl [delete] : c => a .
rl [delete] : d => a .
rl [delete] : e => i .
rl [delete] : f => i .
rl [delete] : g => i .
rl [delete] : h => i .
rl [revoke] : b => j .
rl [revoke] : c => j .
rl [revoke] : d => j .
rl [revoke] : e => h .
rl [revoke] : f => h .
rl [revoke] : g => h .
rl [deletethird] : e => b .
rl [deletethird] : f => c .
rl [deletethird] : g => d .
rl [deletethird] : h => j .
rl [deletethird] : i => a .
rl [revokesharetr] : d => c .
rl [revokesharetr] : g => f .
rl [revokeshare] : c => b .
rl [revokeshare] : d => b .
rl [revokeshare] : f => e .
rl [revokeshare] : g => e .
rl [process] : b => b .
rl [process] : c => c .
rl [process] : d => d .
rl [process] : e => e .
rl [process] : f => f .
rl [process] : g => g .
endm
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